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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two complementary essays that investigate current
product recall strategies in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulated food
sector. These studies address operations and supply chain factors that influence recall
effectiveness with two theoretically-based, empirical approaches. The first essay
examines recall effectiveness as measured by time to recall, a proxy for potential
consumer exposure to hazardous products (Hora, Bapuji & Roth, 2011) using duration
analysis techniques. The unit of analysis is a recall event as documented by the product
recall press release. Essay 1 addresses the following question: how do supply chain
competencies related to integration and monitoring systems between supply chain
partners, in addition to supply chain complexity factors, relate to time to recall?
The second essay investigates individual consumer perceptions of operational and
supply chain information in the context of a product recall announcement. Consumer
perceptions of product recalls are important indicators of recall effectiveness since they
are linked, theoretically and empirically, with future consumer behavior; and therefore
can affect future market share (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). The unit of analysis is the
consumer and a behavioral experiment is implemented to capture the effects of salient
factors on consumer perceptions. Essay 2 examines the following question: how does
information provided regarding operational and supply chain management aspects of
product failure affect consumer perceptions and repurchase intent when a product is
recalled?
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The first essay, “An Econometric Analysis of Product Recall Strategies and Time to
Recall in the Food Industry,” subjects firms’ proactive versus reactive product recall
strategies to rigorous empirical scrutiny. In addition, we operationalize supply chain
recall detection competence (SCRDC), which reflects the combined operational
monitoring, integration and coordination systems across supply chain business partners.
We use detection entity as a proxy for SCRDC, with the notion that superior SCRDC will
be reflected, in part, by recall defects that are detected internally (i.e., by a supplier or the
firm conducting the recall) rather than externally (i.e., by a consumer or a regulatory
agency). We integrate multiple secondary data sources and apply duration analysis
methods to test our model. Time to recall is an important aspect of recall effectiveness,
since perishable products have a finite shelf life; consequently, there is a small window of
opportunity in which a recall can be conducted in a way that actually reduces consumer
exposure. We find that internal detections (i.e., defects detected by a supplier, or the
recalling firm, rather than a consumer or a regulatory agency) have a shorter time to
recall than external detections. In addition, our proxy for a firm’s quality process maturity
(i.e., the number of days of production affected by a particular defect) has a direct effect
on time to recall (i.e., longer affected production periods are related to a longer time to
recall). These findings have significant implications for future research, practice and
policy, in part, because they suggest what types of supply chain strategies and
governmental regulations might be implemented to reduce time to recall.

Essay 1

contributes to operations and supply chain management theory and product recall
research by extending quality management theory (Crosby, 1979; Juran, 1992; Roth,
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Giffi, Seal, 1992) via the notion of SCRDC, integrating notions of supply chain
complexity (Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn & Flynn, 2009), and illustrating key differences
between the applicability of proactive or reactive recall strategies to food products as
compared to durable products (e.g., toys, medical devices, automobiles and other
consumer products).
The second essay, “Consumer Perceptions of Product Recall Strategies: The Effect
of Attribution on Repurchase Intent, Recall Satisfaction, and Recall Responsibility,” uses
a vignette-based experiment to examine the effects of firm communication to the public
regarding the causes of quality failures on consumer perceptions of recall responsibility,
recall satisfaction, and repurchase intent.

We conduct an exploratory study that

manipulates these three dimensions based on attribution theory (i.e., locus,
controllability, corrective action) as experimental factors.

We find that external locus

failures (i.e., defects that happened within a supplier’s operations) are related to higher
levels of recall satisfaction and a shifting of responsibility away from the recalling firm
and towards the supplier. Uncontrollable failures (i.e., failures outside of the volitional
control of the recalling firm or supplier) appear to be better tolerated by consumers than
controllable failures, as evidenced by effects on repurchase intent, recall satisfaction, and
recall responsibility. Finally, providing information about a corrective action intended to
address the underlying problem which caused the recall is linked to higher levels of recall
satisfaction.

Essay 2 contributes to supply chain management theory by adapting

attribution theory to the context of operational and supply chain quality failures. In
addition to providing preliminary implications for product recall research, this theoretical
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adaptation may be more broadly applicable to other situations where firms need to
communicate to consumers regarding supply chain and operational events, including
supply chain disruptions and corporate social responsibility issues.
In summary, understanding the effectiveness of recall systems in removing
potentially harmful products from the hands of consumers, as well as understanding the
consumer perceptions of those systems, is not only important for the creation and
maintenance of sustainable supply chain performance, it is important for public health
and well-being. In addition, this research suggests potential avenues for policy
intervention which could provide additional incentives for firms to improve their quality
processes. Future research can determine how these findings may (or may not) be
generalizable to other industries and product types.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This dissertation examines product recalls in two related essays which approach the
issue from different theoretical and methodological perspectives. Product recalls are an
observable manifestation of quality failures which result in product harm events (i.e.,
unsafe products reach consumers) (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). More specifically,
recalls are the result of external quality failures (i.e., quality failures that exist outside the
boundaries of the firms that are primarily responsible for the quality of finished goods)
(Juran, 1969; 1972; 1992). Estimated societal impacts of product harm – whether from
faulty consumer products, foodborne illnesses, or defective automobile components - are
substantial (e.g., total costs of unsafe consumer products, including healthcare costs and
property damage are estimated at $900 billion annually; Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 2012). Furthermore, the effects on businesses can be severe – in terms of
the initial impact to the firm conducting the recall, consequences for the supply chain, as
well as the industry-wide spillover effects.
While recalls of many product types have been on the rise over the past decade,
rigorous empirical research which characterizes the strategic and operational nature of
these failures and factors that influence the relative speed of current industry and
regulatory systems to handle the recalls, is extremely limited (Hora et al., 2011; Roth,
Tsay, Pullman, & Gray, 2008ab). Furthermore, the extant empirical literature that deals
with both operational and supply chain aspects of food recalls is nearly nonexistent,

1

despite the significant burden which it imposes on firms as well as public health. For
example, foodborne illness affects 1 in 6 residents of the United States (US), and is
estimated to create total societal costs, including healthcare costs and productivity losses
in excess of $1.4 trillion annually (Roberts, 2007).
This dissertation examines product recalls in the context of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulated food sector. We theoretically and empirically address
the following questions: 1) how do supply chain competencies related to integration and
monitoring systems between supply chain partners, in addition to supply chain
complexity factors, relate to time to recall? and, 2) how does information provided
regarding operational and supply chain management aspects of product failure affect
consumer perceptions and repurchase intent when a product is recalled?
Taken as a whole, the body of literature on product recalls varies extensively with
respect to methods and results. Studies have been conducted on demand and shareholder
value impacts via event history studies (Chen, Ganesan & Liu, 2009; Chu, Lin & Prather,
2005; Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011)
and recall communications and consumer perceptions of firm management of product
recalls via experiments (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Klein & Dawar, 2004, Laufer, Gillespie,
McBride & Gonzalez, 2005; Laufer & Jung, 2010).
While the recent empirical evidence seems to indicate that publically traded firms, in
particular, may have significant incentives to delay recalls in order to minimize impacts
to shareholder value (Chen et al., 2009), the marketing, communications and crisis
management literature suggests the opposite; namely, that firms that respond earlier and
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take responsibility for product failures, if appropriate, can limit reputational and market
share effects (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998;
Smith, Thomas, and Quelch, 1998). This creates a paradox for firms developing and
implementing recall strategies in terms of 1) recall timing and 2) recall communication
content.

In other words, with respect to recall timing, conventional wisdom would

suggest that it is more advantageous to announce recalls as soon as possible, yet in
practice, firms may delay the recall announcement. With regard to recall communication,
again, conventional wisdom suggests that it would be preferable to directly and candidly
communicate the circumstances of the product failure; however in practice firms may
only communicate such information as is required by law. This dissertation addresses
these dilemmas by examining recall timing and recall communication in the operations
and supply chain management context with two different theoretical and empirical
approaches.
Essay 1 offers implications with regard to the issue of recall timing by exploring
recall strategy and operational and supply chain characteristics that influence recall
timing in the FDA-regulated food sector using a duration analysis of secondary data 1.
Essay 2 takes a different perspective, investigating FDA-regulated food recalls from the
perspective of the consumer and addressing the latter half of the recall strategy paradox
by manipulating information provided in a framed field experiment and measuring the
resulting differences in consumer perceptions. Figure 1.1 illustrates these two different
1

The FDA regulates 80% of food consumed in the US including fruits, grains, vegetables, in-shell eggs,
infant formula, and a variety of processed and mixture items. The United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) regulates the remaining 20% of food products which consist of egg products, meat, and poultry.
FDA-regulated foods represent an estimated 75% of food expenditures in the US (Institute of Medicine and
National Research Council of the National Academies, 2010)
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approaches and how we expect to contribute to academia, managerial practice, and
governmental policy.
Figure 1.1 Dissertation Overview

1.2 PRODUCT RECALL AND QUALITY LITERATURE
This dissertation builds upon the literature examining product recall speed in the toy
industry (Hora et al., 2011), and event history studies of shareholder value impacts due to
product recalls in the marketing (Chen et al., 2009), organizational (Haunschild & Rhee,
2004; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), economics (Chu et al., 2005; Crafton, Hoffer & Reilly,
1981; Hoffer, Pruitt & Reilly, 1988; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983) and operations management
literature (Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011). In addition this work is grounded in the crisis
communications and product harm literature (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs,
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2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). More specific to operations
and supply chain management literature, this dissertation broadens our understanding of
recent work on quality risk issues in global food supply chains (Lyles, Flynn, &
Froehlich, 2008; Roth et al., 2008ab) and in the pharmaceutical industry (Gray, Roth &
Tomlin, 2009a; Gray, Tomlin & Roth, 2009b; Gray, Roth & Tomlin, 2011). In addition
to we integrate traditional quality management theory (Crosby, 1979; Juran, 1992; Roth
et al., 1992) into the recall strategy literature (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011). The
prior related research highlights the critical importance of understanding firm strategies
around recalls as an emerging, new global quality problem (Lyles et al., 2008; Roth et al.,
2008ab).
While the body of literature dealing with product recalls draws upon multiple
reference disciplines (e.g. marketing, economics, and strategy, and psychology), there are
two dominant approaches to this topic:

1) event history studies, which examine

shareholder value or demand impacts due to product recalls (Chu et al., 2005; Crafton et
al., 1981; Hoffer et al., 1988; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001) and
2) experiments, which study the different aspects of consumer behavior related to product
harm events. Some of this experimental work specifically addresses product recalls
(Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Siomkos &
Kurzbard, 1994). Furthermore, prior studies, with a few exceptions (Roth et al., 2008ab;
Salin & Hooker, 2001; Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001; Teratanavat, Salin & Hooker, 2005;
Marsh, Schroeder & Mintert, 2004; Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001; Thomsen, Shiptsova,
& Hamm, 2006), evaluate product recalls in the context of durable products, rather than
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perishable products. Studies that deal with recall timing and associated risks, either
empirically or conceptually, are extremely limited (Hora et al., 2011; Lyles et al., 2008;
Roth et al., 2008ab; Teratanavat et al., 2005).
In summary, the body of event history studies has yielded empirical results which
suggest that 1) shareholder value may be negatively impacted by product recalls,
contingent on a number of factors (e.g., recall severity and industry and firm
characteristics, including size and reputation) and predominantly in the short term (Chu
et al., 2005; Hoffer et al., 1988; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985, Pruitt & Peterson, 1986; Rhee
& Haunschild, 2006; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011); 2) product recalls can have short term
impacts on demand, which may spill over to other products manufactured by the same
firm (Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen et al., 2006); and 3) firms appear to learn from
prior recalls, reducing the likelihood of future recall events (Haunschild & Rhee, 2006;
Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011). Literature using consumer-based experiments have indicated
that attribution theory has predictive validity for the manner in which consumers perceive
aspects of product failures, especially when failures may be attributable to the firm or the
consumer (Folkes, 1984); and that consumers more favorably evaluate firms conducting
recalls as well as the affected products when firm communications are more transparent
and when firms take responsibility for failures (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994; Klein &
Dawar, 2004).
Two other intriguing results from the literature contribute directly to this dissertation
research: 1) the finding that publically traded firms may have incentives to delay recalls
to minimize shareholder value impacts (Chen et al., 2009); and 2) evidence which
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indicates that the indirect costs of product recalls to firms (e.g., shareholder value, market
share, brand equity, reputation) exceed the direct costs (e.g., replacement/repair/refund,
reverse logistics, product liability) (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003). These prior
related research findings motivate our work, in part, because of their implications for
managerial practice and policy.
The issue of incentives to delay recalls highlights the potential for market forces to
promote corporate policy which may not provide an adequate level of protection of
public health and safety, since delayed recalls result in greater consumer exposure to
unsafe products (Chen et al., 2009). Alternatively, if, as some studies find, market
penalties to shareholder value are not significant, on average, then market forces may
unlikely provide adequate incentives for firms to invest in an appropriate level of quality
systems (Hoffer et al.,

1988; Thirumulai & Sinha, 2011).

Governmental policy,

therefore, is a necessary and critical factor in promoting, maintaining and improving the
safety of consumer products.
The issue of indirect versus direct costs of recalls highlights one of the challenges
facing firms with respect to recall prevention and response. In effect, the losses that are
simplest to measure and manage, in some respects, are not the most serious issues facing
the firm.

Consequently firms may have difficulty in appropriately developing and

implementing recall strategies, because the relationship between recall strategies and
outcomes is often unclear and delayed, at best. The market share and reputational effects
of product recalls are rooted in stakeholder perceptions and, perhaps, to a greater extent,
by consumer perceptions and behavior. The contexts in which product harm events and
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product recalls have been studied, with respect to consumer perceptions, have varied.
They include experiments which manipulate severity of harm, statements regarding
corporate social responsibility, brand equity and firm reputation (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000;
Folkes, 1984; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Laufer, Gillespie,
McBride, & Gonzales, 2005; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).
Attribution theory, a theoretical lens adopted from cognitive psychology, has been
used to evaluate how consumers perceive product failures, primarily in the context of
locus, or the source of the failure (Folkes, 1984; Laufer, 2002; Laufer et al., 2005). These
experiments have largely focused on perceptual differences when the source (locus) of
product failure is the consumer (e.g., tires fail because of consumer driving habits) versus
the firm (e.g., tires fail because of an underlying manufacturing defect). This stream of
literature has confirmed, in general, that severity of the recall, in terms of the hazard to
the consumer, has negative effects on the consumer perceptions of firms. In some cases,
brand associations, corporate social responsibility information and other firm-specific
factors can minimize negative impacts on the consumer perceptions of the firm and the
recalled product (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Laufer et al., 2005; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).
While this literature has established a cumulative tradition of using attribution theory to
explain consumer perceptions of negative product experiences, it has, to date, not been
applied to how consumers interpret operational information.
1.3 GAPS IN THE OPERATIONS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
Research on how firms conduct recalls is sparse in the operations and supply chain
management literature. Much less is known about recall strategies in the food industry,
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where transparency is relatively low (Roth et al., 2008ab). However, once a potential
product defect is detected, the speed of recall responsiveness as well as the content of
information available about the failure becomes imperative for all stakeholders. Thus,
this dissertation aims to begin filling in the gap for rigorous research that adequately
reflects the extant operations and supply chain strategies and the complex interactions of
focal firms with their supply chains in the context of food product recalls.
In Essay 1, we examine the nature of product harm issues and product recalls of
perishable food products, as compared with durable products (e.g., consumer products,
electronics, medical devices and automobiles). We argue that substantive differences in
the nature of failures for perishables (e.g. food and pharmaceuticals), in addition to the
ubiquitous nature of their consumption, presents a particular challenge to the operating
systems – both industrial and governmental – that must deal with these failures. For
food, specifically, in addition to the unavoidably high level of consumer exposure, the
conformance quality attributes of these products are largely credence attributes, which
make it exceedingly difficult, or impossible, for consumers to verify prior to purchase
(Darby & Karni, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Roth et al., 2008ab). Consequently, both the
industrial and regulatory systems that ensure process quality in food products are
currently the primary safeguards against product harm due to conformance quality
failures. In summary, understanding the effectiveness of these systems in removing
potentially harmful products from the hands of consumers is an important operational and
societal issue in addition to being necessary for the creation and maintenance of
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sustainable supply chain performance (FDA, 2011a; Ollinger & Moore, 2009; Gray, Roth
& Leiblein, 2012 and Gray et al., 2011).
Essay 2 is motivated, in part, because understanding consumer perceptions and
related behavior subsequent to a recall is an important piece of the recall strategy
equation. We investigate the relationship between firm actions and consumer perceptions
via a behavioral experiment, providing a high level of internal validity for investigating
relationships that are virtually impossible to evaluate during an actual recall event. Essay
2 also contributes to the extant literature by providing insights into “indirect” recall costs.
Extant literature supports the notion that indirect recall costs are larger than direct recall
costs (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003). Indirect costs of recalls include market
share, shareholder value and reputational impacts to the firm. Direct recall costs include
more tangible and easily measured impacts such as reverse logistics, warranty,
replacement, and repair costs, as well as product liability (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985;
Rupp, 2003).
We believe it is important to examine the link between operational and supply chain
dimensions of recalls and selected indirect costs (as we do in Essay 2), which are
predicated on consumer repurchase behavior, in part because indirect costs are difficult to
measure and potentially hidden to practitioners. While understanding recalls costs is of
obvious relevance to firms seeking to minimize the impacts of product recalls on their
operations and profits, it is equally important for policy-makers, because it sheds light on
how regulations could be structured to motivate firms to act in a way that is consistent
with the objectives of human health and safety.

10

1.4 DISSERTATION CONTRIBUTIONS
To examine the recall strategies used by FDA-regulated food firms, we apply two
different theoretically-based lenses (i.e., the firm and the consumers) and empirical
approaches (i.e. secondary data and a behavioral experiment). The first study 2, “An
Econometric Analysis of Product Recall Strategies and Time to Recall in the Food
Industry,” subjects firms’ product recall strategies to rigorous empirical scrutiny by
examining the effect of proactive and reactive strategies, complexity factors and supply
chain recall detection competencies on time to recall, a proxy for recall effectiveness
(Chapter 2, Essay 1). Secondary data is employed for the analyses. In the second study,
“Consumer Perceptions of Product Recall Strategies: The Effect of Attribution on Recall
Responsibility, Recall Satisfaction and Repurchase Intent,” we apply a vignette-based
experiment to examine the effect of recall communication strategies on consumer
perceptions, including recall satisfaction, attribution of responsibility for the product
recall and repurchase intent (Chapter 3, Essay 2). Together, these two studies make
contributions to academia, industry, and policy-makers, by offering several insights.
First, Essay 1 suggests how firms may allocate resources to supply chain and process
monitoring and improvement activities to reduce the need for recalls in the first place, as
well as to improve defect detection capabilities within the supply chain. Essay 1 also
examines the operational and supply chain factors that influence time to recall, and
benchmark recall speed for various types of products and recalling entities. Essay 2
suggests how recall communications can be managed to minimize negative impacts to the
2

The proposal for Essay 1 was the recipient of the 2011 Joseph M. Juran Center for Leadership in Quality
Doctoral Dissertation Fellows Award (Carlson School of Management University of Minnesota).
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recalling firm, contingent upon sufficient supply chain capabilities.

Finally, this

dissertation’s findings are equally relevant to policy, since reducing time to recall can
reduce consumer exposure to defective products and because recall announcement
content is dictated, in part, by regulation.
Taking the mixed evidence for market incentives (e.g. impacts to shareholder value
caused by the product recall) for firms to reduce recalls by avoiding external quality
failures (Chu et al., 2005; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011), together with the potential for
publically traded firms to benefit from delaying recalls (Chen et al., 2009), we argue that
there is a critical need for research that examines multiple performance aspects of product
recalls as well as tradeoffs between different recall strategies. Furthemore, research is
needed which provides implications and recommendations not only for the firms that
must manage this issue, but also for policy-makers charged with protecting public health
and safety.
Together, these two empirical essays add to the existing body of literature regarding
product recalls while extending quality management theory (Essay 1), examining recall
strategy in a novel context (Essay 1) and adapting attribution theory to the operations and
supply chain management context (Essay 2). We summarize our findings in the context
of the larger stream of literature and suggest potential future research directions based on
this work in Chapter 4 (Conclusions). In summary, these two essays take two different
views of recall outcomes (i.e. time to recall and consumer perceptions) and, in doing so,
contribute new and relevant insights to understanding and improving recall effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 2
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT RECALL
STRATEGIES AND TIME TO RECALL
IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
We investigate supply chain and complexity factors associated with time to product
recall in the context of the US food industry, specifically those products regulated by the
FDA. The FDA is responsible for the regulation of 80% of all food sold in the US with
the remainder being regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
(Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the National Academies, 2010).
Over the past decade, public awareness of all product recalls—from cars to toys to
batteries to pharmaceuticals to food—has been on the rise. Consequently, policy-makers
have responded with concern, some of it specific to US food quality systems (GAO,
2000; 2004ab), and the effectiveness, (specifically the speed) of food recalls and
incentives for firms to act in the best interests of public health, as evidenced in the
following excerpt from a Government Accountability Office study (GAO, 2004a):
“USDA and FDA do not know how promptly and completely companies are
carrying out recalls.

Neither agency’s guidance provides time frames for

companies on how quickly to initiate and carry out recalls. Consequently,
companies may have less impetus to notify downstream customers and remove
potentially unsafe food from the marketplace” (GAO, 2004a, p. 4) 3.

3

While some FDA policies have changed since this GAO report (2004), the FDA position on recall time
frames remains the same: it is expressed in guidance, rather than regulation (guidance is not enforceable).
It is stated as follows “Issuance of a press release should be the highest priority and it should be issued
promptly” (FDA, 2009a, emphasis in the original).
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Recalls emanate from quality failures detected after products have been released for
distribution and consumption. The extant quality and operations management literature
terms such failures as external quality failures, because the defects are detected after the
product leaves the control of the supply chain entity, where the problem first occurred
(Gryna, 1999; Juran, 1992). In turn, one or more entities in the supply chain must
participate in the response. Accordingly, given that all recalls are external failures, we
propose that it is preferable, in terms of recall effectiveness, for a business-to-business
(B2B) supply chain entity to detect the defect before a consumer or regulatory agency
does and acts upon this information.
We introduce the term supply chain recall detection competence (SCRDC) to connote
superior operational monitoring, integration and coordination systems across B2B supply
chain partners, including suppliers, manufacturers, and channel partners, which, in part,
allow for the earlier detection of external failures. In this sense, while product recalls are
the manifestations of external quality failures, the effectiveness of recall processes
depend, in part, on the complex relationships between the firm announcing the recall and
its supply chain partners. In our study, we use time to recall to represent one important
dimension of recall effectiveness, positing that SCRDC is an important factor in reducing
the amount of time which elapses between the end of production of a specific item to
when the recall is first announced to the public.
We note that, for perishable consumables, such as food and pharmaceuticals (which
are also not completely testable (Roth et al., 2008ab)), the window of opportunity for
mitigating consumer risk is further limited to the shelf life of the defective product. Since
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shelf life begins at the end of a batch, or production run, our definition of time to recall
captures the risk that a contaminated or inappropriate food product 4 will be consumed
before the public is made aware of the problem. As such, the consumer-level reverse
logistics process typically only begins with the FDA announcement.
From the perspective of the firm conducting the recall (henceforth, referred to as the
recalling firm), arguably, reducing the time to recall poses tradeoffs in incentives (Chen
et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011). On the one hand, the sooner the public announcement is
made, the more potential consumer exposure is reduced, therefore limiting firm liability;
furthermore, lost sales may be minimized by early and responsive communication
(Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). On the other hand, longer time to
recall may reduce the number of units subject to reverse logistics processes, because the
product has expired. Furthermore, given the great difficulty in attributing illness to a
specific defective food, longer time to recall may actually benefit the recalling firm if the
timing of the recall further confuses the attribution of actual illnesses to the recalled
product (Mead, Slutsker, Dietz, McCaig, Bresse, Shapiro Griffin & Taux, 1999). It is less
clear how recall timing will affect brand equity and shareholder value in this sector (Chen
et al., 2009; Chu et al., 2005; Teratanavat et al, 2005; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011;
Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001).
Prior empirical research is almost exclusively confined to examining the product
recalls of durable products and largely examines demand or shareholder value impacts
4

Contaminated food products are those with pathogens known to be harmful or otherwise adulterated (e.g.,
greater than allowable levels of toxins or heavy metals), whereas inappropriate products refers to products
not fit to be consumed by a group of people, but the consumer does not have enough information to make
this determination (i.e., either the information is not available or it is mislabeled; for example, snack foods
with undeclared allergens, such undeclared peanuts or shellfish on the label).
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via event history studies (Chen et al., 2009; Chu et al., 2005; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985;
Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Rupp, 2003). Only a handful of studies investigate factors
influencing the relative speed of the current industry and regulatory systems to handle
recalls (Hora et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2008ab; Lyles et al., 2008). With the notable
exception of Marsh, Schroeder & Mintert (2004), Thomsen & McKenzie (2001), and
Thomsen et al. (2006), perishable products, and specifically food product recalls, have
not been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny. Moreover, despite the importance of
food safety to public well-being and the need to understand how to improve supply chain
systems to increase recall effectiveness, these studies neither address time to recall nor
incorporate operations and supply chain management issues. Consequently, we begin to
fill this void by theoretically and empirically addressing the following question: how
does the SCRDC, in addition to complexity factors relate to time to recall in the FDA
regulated food sector?
We offer the following contrasting examples of actual food product recalls to
contextualize our research:
Example 1: On June 17, 2008, a concentrated beverage was recalled from a
facility in Montana due to potential contamination with Clostridium botulinum,
a pathogen that can cause serious illness or death. At the time of the recall, the
product was already in distribution at retailers and being used in coffee shops in
Montana and Arizona. The expiration dates of the products affected by the
recall were given as September 23, 2009 through May 22, 2010. At the time of
the recall, no illnesses had been reported as a result of consuming this product.
The defect, which was due to a processing issue which rendered the product

16

vulnerable to contamination, was discovered through an internal records audit of
processing records (See Appendix 2A for the complete press release).
Example 2:

On October 20, 2010, all packaged fresh produce

(e.g.,

prepackaged chopped celery) processed between January 1, 2010 and October
19, 2010 was recalled from a manufacturing facility in Texas. At the time of the
recall, the product was in use in restaurants and institutional kitchens in Texas.
The recall was initiated based on a state health department investigation of an
outbreak of Listeria monocytogenes, which was linked to ten illnesses, including
five deaths, which occurred over an eight month period. After the state agency’s
investigation implicated products from this particular facility, an inspection
conducted by the state agency confirmed contamination with Listeria which
matched the outbreak (See Appendix 2A for the complete press release).
These two examples underscore several important elements of US food product
recalls: 1) whether or not illnesses were associated with the defective product at the time
of the recall; and 2) which organization detected the defect (in this case, an internal audit
versus an agency investigation of an outbreak of the illness) and 3) recall timing (clearly,
the concentrated beverage product had a substantial amount of remaining shelf life at the
time of the recall, increasing the chances that all the recalled product had not yet been
consumed, while the fresh produce recall affected months’ worth of production, which
had already expired). Our study explores aspects of all of these elements to rigorously
investigate factors that affect recall timing. As we develop our conceptual framework, we
will return to these examples, to illustrate factors included in our research.
The cornerstone of the US food safety initiatives and regulations is to keep the
nation’s food safe from both unintended and deliberate contamination. Unfortunately,
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contaminated food products continue to reach distribution channels and, ultimately,
consumers. For example, in the first quarter of the year 2012 alone, there were 142 food
recalls, initiated by more than 130 companies (with 9 of these companies having multiple
recalls) (FDA, 2012). With nearly 7 million units affected and 46 consumer illnesses
attributed 5 to these recalls nationwide, managing these events poses substantial
challenges to supply chain systems.

Such challenges – involving issues of defect

detection, tracing affected units and reverse logistics – suggest that the concept of recall
effectiveness has multiple dimensions. In addition to the public health considerations of
preventing or minimizing illnesses and issues related to managing firm liability and
impacts to brand equity, reputation and sales, we propose that recall effectiveness could
be evaluated in a number of different ways, including the speed of defect detection,
timeliness of recall announcements (particularly relative to product shelf life for
perishable products), and the volume of the product recovered. Our study focuses on the
timing aspects of food product recalls.
Total recall time can be decomposed into three stages: 1) Stage 1: end of production
to time of defect detection, 2) Stage 2: time of defect detection to public notification, and
3) Stage 3: public notification to the closure of recall activities, including reverse logistic
processes, by the recalling firm and recall monitoring by the regulatory agency. In this
research, we use the term time to recall to reflect the combined effectiveness of first two
stages of the total recall process; speeding up the time from the end of production to the

5

Clearly, there may be much larger numbers of consumers with undiagnosed or undetected health
consequences related to the contaminated products; the underreporting of foodborne illness associated with
pathogens, for example, is well-established (Mead et al., 1999).
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public announcement results in less consumer exposure to potentially harmful products
(Hora et al., 2011). Furthermore, the exact timing of Stage 1 is unobserved in our
sample. We operationalize time to recall as the number of days between the end of
production and the date of the first FDA recall announcement for a particular product.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the three stages of total recall time and the focus of our study, time
to recall.
Figure 2.1 Total Recall Time (Unit of Analysis = Recall Announcement)

The quality of food products and the timing of food product recall announcements
have profound implications for supply chain and operations management research and
practice, impacting consumer safety and public health, in part, due to the nature and
ubiquity of product consumption. Foodborne pathogenic illnesses impose an estimated
$77.7 billion dollars of healthcare costs (Scharff, 2012), up to $1.4 trillion in terms of
total societal cost annually (Roberts, 2007). However, due to the challenges of linking
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foodborne illnesses to specific products, as well as the underreporting of these illnesses,
recalled food products only represent a fraction of the conformance quality failures that
actually reach US consumers (Mead et al., 1999).
Based on Center for Disease Control (CDC) research, foodborne illnesses are
underreported by an estimated factor of 20 to 38, depending on the organism; accounting
for underreporting, an estimated 48 million persons are made ill annually in the US by
foodborne illness; 9.4 million of these illnesses are attributed to “known” pathogens
(Scallen, Hoekstra, Angulo, Tauxe, Widdowson, Roy, Jones & Griffin, 2011). This
occurs, in large part, because persons suffering from mild cases of foodborne illness do
not seek medical treatment, as well as limited laboratory diagnoses for mild cases (Mead
et al., 1999). Based on the limited testability of food products, which complicates defect
detection, as well as the difficulty in tracing back the source of the outbreaks (even when
outbreaks are detected by authorities), as well as the gross underreporting of foodborne
illness to regulatory agencies, we infer that the total number of food products in
distribution which violate federal standards for pathogens or other contaminants greatly
exceeds the number of products recalled. 6
While the consumption of food is, of course, unavoidable, there is evidence that food
safety issues are difficult to avoid: the CDC estimates that 1 in 6 US residents contracts a
foodborne illness annually due to a pathogen (Scallen et al., 2011) 7. Furthermore, food
6

The most recent CDC data indicates that 1,034 outbreaks were investigated in 2008, with 579 of these
outbreaks (56%) failing to be traced back to a specific food product source.
7
Not all foodborne illnesses are attributable to production defects: food preparation in commercial,
institutional and homes are responsible for a portion foodborne illnesses, however difficulty in monitoring
the source of foodborne illness make estimating the proportion of illnesses attributable to production versus
other settings extremely difficult (FDA, 2010).
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quality failures have profound spillover effects on businesses, including farms,
restaurants, retailers and distributors (for examples of firm failures that may be
attributable to food recalls, see Yousuf (2010) for reports of Topps Meats, the Peanut
Corporation of America, and AP Military which ceased operations and filed for
bankruptcy subsequent to recalls of ground beef, peanut products and spinach,
respectively).
Underscoring the importance of studying recalls in this context, it is anticipated that
trends towards increasing numbers of food product recalls are unlikely to reverse in the
near future. This expectation is based on several factors, including trends in the food
industry to increasingly source products from countries with low manufacturing costs,
poorly established quality systems and less regulatory enforcement, the relatively low
level of inspection and testing activities that US agencies are currently able to offer for
both foreign and domestic products and ingredients, and the highly concentrated nature of
food commodity manufacturing, which lends itself to high volume, broad recalls
affecting many different firms and products (FDA, 2011a; Gray et al., 2009ab; Roth et
al., 2008ab).
Prior characterizations of recall strategies as proactive, or reactive, have focused on
the timing of recall announcements with respect to whether injuries or illnesses have
occurred prior to the announcement (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011; Siomkos &
Kurzbard, 1994). Proactive recall strategies are indicated when no injuries or illnesses
have been reported to the regulatory agency prior to the recall. In contrast, reactive recall

21

strategies are indicated when injury or illnesses have been reported to the regulatory
agency prior to the recall.
We contend that simply characterizing recall strategies as proactive or reactive is not
specific enough for recalls of perishable products for several reasons. Firstly, we observe
that product recalls in these sectors, in contrast to durable products, are predominantly
proactive – in other words - illnesses have not been attributed to the recalled products at
the time of the recall announcement. We suggest that there are several factors which
contribute to this important difference.

Second, due to the difficulty in attributing

foodborne illness to a particular food, we suspect that many food recalls only appear to
be proactive because illnesses have not been traced back to a specific defective product
(Buzby, Frenzen, & Rasco, 2001; Buzby, 2003; Mead et al., 1999). Third, food recalls are
almost exclusively the result of conformance quality failures—which, in this context,
implies that the quality failure is considered to be regulatory non-compliance, triggering
mandatory reporting, which may contribute to recalls occurring before illnesses are
attributed to the recalled product (FDA, 2010). Finally, since the nature of the quality
issue is non-conformance, multiple failures are typically not necessary to confirm the
existence of a quality issue – one confirmed positive test result for a pathogen in a
product already in distribution, for example, is enough to trigger reporting to a regulatory
agency (89.5% of the defects in our final sample are pathogenic in nature). This can
again be contrasted with quality issues in durable products frequently associated with
design issues; typically multiple instances of a failure (e.g., accidents or injuries) occur
prior to a product harm issue being recognized (Hora et al., 2011).
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To illustrate the difference between the types of failure routinely associated with food
product recalls, as compared with more durable products, we return to our prior
examples. In both of our examples, the defect which caused the recall is a pathogen, the
presence of which, in either of these recalled products, is considered inconsistent with the
product specifications and violates federal law.

If we compare this situation to a

defective durable product, such as a toy, we find that while a toy might be recalled due to
a conformance quality failure (e.g., the use of paint exceeding federal standards for lead
content), it is far more likely for the toy to be recalled due to a design failure (e.g., the use
of small, powerful magnets in such a way that they are readily accessible to small
children, and consequently, may be ingested and cause injury (Hora et al., 2011)).
Similarly, if we examine the types of failures for which other types of durable products
are recalled, we find that design issues are far more common than conformance quality
issues (Bapuji & Beamish, 2008).
The predominance of design failure issues for durable product recalls shifts detection
away from a laboratory test, or a facility audit or inspection, to consumer use and injury,
which, when reported to the firm and the agency, eventually results in an investigation,
and, if a reasonable potential for harm within the scope of the law is found, requires a
product recall. We propose that this difference between the failure modes for perishable
versus durable products has important implications for the tendency for recalls to be
proactive or reactive.
In the case of durable products with design flaws, the consumer’s injury by a product
can be a part of the detection process, and therefore, contributes to the propensity for
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such recalls to be reactive, rather than proactive. For foods, the difficulty in attributing
an illness to a particular defective product compounds this difference, resulting in very
few confirmed reactive recalls in that sector. 8
We propose a theoretical framework that explores an alternative view of recall
effectiveness by considering the time to recall between the end of production and the
recall announcement (See Figure 2.1, where the unit of analysis is the press release
announcing the recall). More specifically, we argue this: the entity detecting a defect that
results in a product recall affects time to recall, and consequently, time to recall captures
one salient aspect of the recalling firm’s realized outcome. The recalling firm is the firm
that makes the recall announcement. The detection entity is operationalized in terms of
where the quality problem is first detected within the supply chain and reflects SCRDC.
We define an internal detection entity as being an upstream B2B supply chain entity 9
(i.e., supplier, manufacturer, distributor, or retailer), whereas an external detection entity
is the consumer or regulatory agency.
Using the dominant logic from quality management, internally detected recalls,
controlling for other factors, are posited to have a shorter time to recall than those
externally detected; and hence, the SCRDC will be higher if the detection is internal,
rather than external. The logic of our analogy is this: in traditional quality management
theory, external failures, as compared with the
8

internal failures, will result in higher

In our final sample of 258 food recalls, 12.4% are reactive, rather than proactive. In Hora et al., 2011, the
proportion of reactive recalls in a sample of toy recalls over a 15 year period was as follows: 38% of recalls
were reactive and 76% were related to design flaws.
9
We note that different food products, even from the same company, may have different supply chains;
therefore, the relative degree of integration and coordination among B2B partners to monitor and
communicate well when a problem occurs is posited to be as important as any individual firm in the chain.
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costs to the firm due to lost sales, reputational damage, warranty costs, reverse logistics,
and product liability. Alternatively, internal failures lead to costs related to investigating
failure, scrap and rework (Gryna, 1999).

As a result, while firms have incentives to

reduce both internal and external failure costs by investing in prevention and appraisal,
minimization of external failures are typically considered the highest priority in terms of
quality management.
We propose that the association of lower costs and higher performance associated
with internal B2B supply chain failures applies to detection entity, meaning that higher
performance – in terms of recall timing -- will be the outcome, on average, for internal
detections, as compared with the

external detections. Thus, SCRDC is a reflection, in

part, of supply chain design, monitoring systems, communications, feedback
mechanisms, and integration strategies that exist among supply chain entities that provide
them the absorptive capacity to recognize quality problems in the first place; in addition
to collectively resolving them faster (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tu, Vonderembse, RaguNathan, & Sharkey, 2006).
We evaluate the concept, in a sample of food recalls, for the detection of the
underlying defect which results in a recall (and not resolution of the underlying defect or
completion of the recall processes, including reverse logistics). We suggest that the
SCDRC is an important factor in time to recall and may be more broadly applicable to
other contexts. In addition, time to recall is a function of other supply chain factors,
including complexity (i.e., the downstream “reach” of the recalls and “magnitude,”
represented by the number of different product specifications included in the recall) and
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the recalling firm’s relative quality process maturity (QPM), as indicated by the period of
the production time (in days) affected by the recalls. Figure 2.2 depicts our conceptual
model and the relationships between the primary constructs used in this study, as well as
our control variables. The hypotheses labeled in this figure are developed in Section 2.2.
Figure 2.2 Hypothesized Model

We test our framework using duration analysis methods applied to a database of
recalls of FDA-regulated food products occurring between 2008 and 2010. We find that,
in contrast to prior work examining recalls of durable products (Hora et al., 2011),
proactive and reactive recall strategies have no direct effect on time to recall. Consistent
with our expectations and the quality management literature, SCRDC matters (Gryna,
1999; Juran, 1992). Internally detected defects are associated with a shorter time to recall,
ceteris paribus, than externally detected defects (Gryna, 1999; Ittner, 1992).
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These

results have implications for firms seeking to improve performance by improving internal
supply chain detection capabilities through supply chain design, monitoring,
communications and integration choices, and for policy-makers seeking to develop
regulation and guidance that minimizes consumer risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first provide the motivation
for our model, grounding our hypotheses in the extant literature and providing causal
logic for relationships between detection entity, a proxy for SCRDC, complexity factors
and QPM, in addition to other firm and product-level characteristics and the dependent
variable, time to recall. We then describe the data collection process and empirical
testing of our hypotheses. We follow with a discussion of the results of the empirical
modeling, and finally, we provide implications for firms, as well as policymakers, and
potential future research directions.
2.2 MOTIVATION & MODEL
2.2.1 Background
There are substantial differences between durable products and perishable products, like
food, when such products are recalled. These differences are relevant, not only to the
study of recall effectiveness as measured by recall timing, but also because differences
between these categories of recalls influence the strategies which firms may employ to
manage the recalls in terms of durable and perishable products when recalls occur. Table
2.1 summarizes some of these differences, which we discuss further in this section.
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Durable and Perishable Products
with Respect to Product Recalls
Durable Products

Example Products
Product Attributes
Failure Modality

Failure Attribution
& Liability

Recall Strategy
Detection Entity
Reverse Logistics

Repair/Replace/
Retrofit/Refund

Perishable Products

Consumer products, medical devices,
and automobiles
High testability, relatively long product
life 10
More likely to be design-related than
manufacturing-related (Bapuji, 2011;
White & Pomponi, 2003; Hora et al.,
2011).
Moderate to high attribution of failure
by consumer to specific product.
Liability can be very high, largely
depending on the severity of the injury.

Food, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics

More likely to be reactive than
proactive
Internal or External. Design flaws
often first detected by consumers.
Significant effort, particularly for
products which must be returned for
repair.

More likely to be proactive than reactive.

Repair is common for high-value
durable products such as automobiles.
Replacement or a retrofit kit (where
safety modification is performed by the
consumer) is also common for items
such as consumer electronics and toys.
Refunds occur as well, but less so for
high-value durable items.
Patients must coordinate with
pharmacists or physicians to obtain
alternative or replacement medical
appliances.

Typically, refunds are provided for food
products at the retail level.
For pharmaceuticals, patients must
coordinate with pharmacists or physicians
to obtain alternative medications. Refund
process may involve insurers when
prescription medication is implicated.

10

Low testability, relatively short product
life
Manufacturing-related 11

Low attribution of failure by consumer to
specific product.
Liability is high only when illness or
death can be attributed to a product
through investigation of an outbreak by
the FDA/USDA/CDC.

Internal or External
Some effort for pharmaceuticals which
must be destroyed.
Limited for food products, which are
typically discarded at the consumer,
retailer or distributor level.

Disposable items such as alcohol preps (medical device) or batteries (consumer product), for example,
might have a product life of a few years. Many durable items can be expected to have a much longer
product life and may be resold (e.g., cribs, strollers, automobiles, toys). Pharmaceutical shelf lives for
tablets average about 3 years. Sterile injectables typically are tested for a 1 year shelf life. Food products
may have shelf lives from a few days (fresh fish) to a few years (canned high acid foods).
11
When a pharmaceutical product is withdrawn from the market due to aftermarket safety issues (e.g.,
Vioxx), this is classified by the agency as a market withdrawal, not a product recall, and is governed by
different regulatory processes.
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In addition to the differences we discussed previously with respect to testability,
failure modality, attribution of injury or illness to a specific product and recall strategy,
whether it be proactive or reactive, and the nature of defect detection, a number of other
distinctions exist between durable and perishable products. We suggest that these
differences are important considerations for both product recall management and quality
improvement.
First, as noted in Table 2.1, many durable products have a useful life that exceeds that
of perishable products. Some products have extremely long potential useful lives and
may be traded in the aftermarket (i.e., cribs, strollers, appliances, and automobiles). In
contrast, perishable products can have extremely short to intermediate shelf lives (i.e., a
few days for bean sprouts and up to 5 years or more for canned goods). This product life
cycle has significant implications for the recall process since, as mentioned previously,
delaying a recall announcement may actually reduce a firm’s exposure to liability if it is
difficult to trace illness back to the defective product. An automobile, on the other hand,
may have a useful life extending into decades and multiple aftermarket owners,
prolonging the firm’s exposure to potential defects.
We next turn our attention to two interrelated issues of product recalls which contrast
sharply between these types of products. Reverse logistics processes, as well as the type
of reparation made to the consumer (repair, replacement, retrofit or refund), vary
significantly, depending on the type of the product. For many durable products with
significant value, some type of repair or replacement is typically undertaken; in some
cases, finding a suitable “fix” for a defect is one factor in delaying the recall. In some
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cases, a safety hazard is corrected by providing the consumer with a retrofitting kit which
is self-installed. For more technically complicated failures, the reverse logistics could be
extremely intensive: for example, when millions of laptop batteries overheated and had
to be replaced, logistics costs were high due to the need to return defective batteries for
reclamation, as well as the need to rapidly replace batteries to minimize consumer impact
(Marks, 2006).
Scheduling and capacity to repair or replace is also an issue: for automotive recalls,
the time to implement a remedy includes the design, manufacturing and distribution of
new parts or

the development of new procedures and scheduling with authorized

dealerships, contingent on the capacity of dealership service departments (Anderson,
2010). In the medical device industry, firms must work with physicians and insurers to
help achieve acceptable outcomes for patients with a potentially faulty pacemaker or
other type of medical implant – a task complicated by the availability of replacement
devices and underlying patient medical conditions.
For perishable products, reverse logistics are typically much less intensive, since for
many recalled products at the consumer level, there is no provision for any return, only a
refund. Furthermore, based on a recent survey related to food recalls, despite being
generally aware of food recalls in the recent past, only 59% of respondents reported ever
having looked for a recalled food in their home and only 9% reported returning the food
or seeking a refund from a retailer (Hallman et al., 2009). In some cases, while products
are still in the distribution channels, reverse logistics may be undertaken as part of the
“take-back” and refunding process between producers, distributors and retailers.
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However, in contrast with durable products, the recalling firm to consumer contact
regarding the reparation is likely to be minimal for food. For pharmaceuticals, the issue
of return and refund is complicated by the need to provide an appropriate substitute
medication. For over the counter products, this may be a simple refund situation where
the consumer selects a substitute without assistance. Nevertheless, in the case of a
prescription medicine, insurers, physicians and pharmacists will be involved in the
process. Again, the consumer to recalling firm contact is likely to be low, since the
transaction is intermediated by insurers and healthcare providers. Still, the reverse
logistics processes are significant, because recalled drugs are recovered and destroyed to
the extent possible.
For the remainder of this paper, we will concentrate on the processes, regulations and
factors affecting FDA-regulated food product recalls, specifically those factors which
influence our dependent variable, time to recall.
2.2.2

Food Supply Chains & Product Recalls

While the US produces high volumes of food domestically, increasingly finished food
products and ingredients for products manufactured in the US are sourced from around
the world and handled in complex and far-flung supply chains involving numerous
intermediaries (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the National
Academies, 2010; Nestle, 2003; Roth et al., 2008ab). Globalization and consolidation are
two factors known to drive the escalating number of food recalls.
Globalization, characterized by the involvement of global supply chain participants,
as well as the import and export of finished products and ingredients, results in high
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levels of supply chain complexity, in addition to challenging monitoring systems and
reducing traceability and transparency (Bozarth et al., 2009; Choi & Krause, 2006; FDA,
2011a; Jerardo, 2008; Roth et al., 2008ab).

On the other hand, consolidation of food

production has arisen due to a combination of market pressures which have resulted in
increasingly vertically integrated supply chains and the creation of very large public or
private commercial entities which control large portions of specific market segments
(Martinez, 2007; Nestle, 2003; Roth et al., 2008ab). Such consolidation concentrates the
sourcing and production of food products, magnifying the potential consequences of a
quality failure due to the high volumes of products that may be implicated (Institute of
Medicine & National Research Council, 2010; Nestle, 2003; Osterholm, 2011; Roth et
al., 2008ab).
Finally, as a result of both globalization and consolidation, food products have
become increasingly commoditized and undifferentiated (Nestle, 2003; Roth et al.,
2008ab). While food producers of processed finished products compete to add value in
the form of convenience, taste or nutritional attributes to earn market premiums,
commoditization increasingly occurs, not only at the ingredient level, but also at the
finished product level, facilitated in many cases by increasing levels of contract
manufacturing (Hughes, 2004).

As an example, consider the common practice of

retailers carrying “private label” branded goods, such as canned vegetables or soups
labeled under their own brand name.
To achieve the economies of scale necessary to compete in the low margin food
industry, it is now typical for a contract manufacturer, whose name remains largely
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hidden to end consumers, to manufacture dozens of brands of similar products in the
same facility with largely equivalent processes. The potential for this manufacturing
model to result in widespread quality failures is illustrated in Roth et al. (2008ab), in their
examination of pet food recalls starting in the year 2006, which resulted in the recall of
hundreds of different brands of pet food, produced by the same contract manufacturer,
using the same basic ingredient which was contaminated with melamine.
There is some evidence that contract manufacturers may pose a specific type of
quality risk, based on the results of Gray, Roth and Tomlin (2012). These authors use a
sample of FDA regulated pharmaceutical plants, demonstrating significantly higher levels
of quality risk in contract manufacturers than in company-owned internal plants, on
average.
Figure 2.3 depicts a generic and simplified single-ingredient food supply chain. As
illustrated, the general structure flows from farm production, including suppliers to farms,
which would include animal feed, fertilizers, seeds and other inputs, towards the end
consumer.

As a food product moves downstream, towards the customer, there are

multiple opportunities for imported inputs to enter the supply chain, or for intermediate
goods to be exported. Differentiation of more complex foods, such as convenience meals
(frozen entrees, for example), increases as the food product moves through the supply
chain towards the consumer. Despite the seemingly hierarchical nature of the supply
chain depicted in Figure 2.3, upstream producers can directly reach the consumer (e.g., a
farmer can directly reach a consumer or restaurant owner through a farmer’s market).
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The need to create economies of scale has driven supply chain players at both ends of
the supply chain to vertically integrate and occupy more than one niche within the supply
chain depicted in Figure 2.3.

The Kroger Company, for example, while known

predominantly in the US as a grocery retailer, owns 38 manufacturing and processing
facilities which produce 40% of the private label goods sold in Kroger stores, including
dairy, meat, beverages and shelf stable convenience foods (The Kroger Company, 2012).
Many large scale food production companies also occupy more than one niche within
the supply chain depicted in Figure 3. Dean Foods, for example, both processes and
distributes milk and dairy products, in addition to licensing its brand name to other firms.
Additionally, large scale food producers often interact directly with retailers. General
Mills, for example, supplies Wal-Mart directly, with Wal-Mart accounting for 23% of
General Mills’ annual revenue (Platt & Duronio, 2012).

Figure 2.3 Generic Food Supply Chain (Adapted from Roth et al., 2008b)
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As indicated previously, in the US, the FDA regulates approximately 80% of food
products sold, which comprises an estimated 75% of consumer food expenditures (GAO,
2004). FDA regulatory scope with respect to food products includes seafood, fruits,
vegetables, dairy products, in-shell eggs and infant formula. 12

Egg products, meat and

poultry are regulated by the USDA with enforcement and inspection activities, including
recalls administered through the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS).
Memorandums of understanding between the FDA and USDA attempt to harmonize
requirements for recalls and the reporting of food safety issues. The CDC, working with
both the FDA and the USDA, gathers data on foodborne illnesses, leads investigations of
potential outbreaks of foodborne illness, and monitors trends and the effectiveness of
prevention and control initiatives (FSIS, 2012).
Because the focus of this study is on a sample of FDA-regulated recalled food
products, we concentrate on FDA processes in the remainder of this paper; however, it is
important to note that our findings may be generalizable to USDA-regulated products due
to the similarity in regulatory systems, the structure of the industry and supply chain
design.
Consistent with other agencies that regulate and recall products due to potential safety
issues, the FDA classifies recalls with respect to the potential for creating a health hazard.
Class I recalls are the most serious; they are considered to present a “reasonable
probability that the use of, or exposure to, a violative product will cause serious adverse
12

While the division of responsibility for regulating individual products can be non-intuitive (FSIS is
responsible for liquid, frozen and powdered egg products, but the FDA is responsible for shell eggs.
Mixture products, such as meat & cheese pizza versus cheese pizza may fall under different jurisdictions.),
it is estimated that 85% of foodborne illnesses (due to foodborne pathogens) are attributed to FDAregulated products (GAO, 2004a; Nestle, 2003).
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health consequences or death” (US 23 Code of Federal Regulations 7.3(m)). Class II
recalls are associated with product safety issues which “may cause temporary or
medically reversible adverse health consequences or where the probability of serious
adverse health consequences is remote” (US 23 Code of Federal Regulations 7.3(m)),
while products subject to Class III recalls are considered unlikely to cause adverse health
consequences.
Press releases are issued for Class I recalls and, in some cases, for Class II recalls
when the defective product has been distributed to consumers. Our sample is comprised
of all food recalls associated with a press release. 13 Press releases are written by firms
and published via the FDA website and other media outlets, as deemed appropriate; in
rare instances where the FDA deems the firm response to be inadequate, the agency will
issue a press release. The following sections describe the dependent and independent
variables used in this study and the causal logic for our hypotheses. Appendix 2A
includes a detailed description of all constructs and definitions. Section 3 describes the
data sources and data collection methods.
2.2.3 Time to Recall
Recent operations management research investigating a sample of toy recalls
indicates that recall speed (time to recall), as measured by the time from the market
introduction of a specific product until the recall announcement, is related to whether the
recall strategy is proactive or reactive, the type of product defect, and the part of the
supply chain that issues the recall (Hora et al., 2011). This research suggests that,
13

In the full sample of food products (N=434), 13 recalls are Class II or Class III recalls. The majority of
the sample consists of Class I recalls.
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consistent with the prior evaluation of shareholder value impacts associated with product
recalls, proactive recalls take longer than reactive recalls, in part, because firms have
substantial incentives to delay recall notices (Hora et al., 2011).
For perishable products, we contend that it is more appropriate to study time to recall
as the difference between the production date (beginning of shelf life) and the date of the
recall announcement instead of the prior conceptualization using time to market
introduction. This operationalization more closely reflects the time to recall construct
with the nature of perishable products which have a finite shelf life which, in most cases,
will be far more limited than the useful life of a durable commercial product. Part of the
intent of a recall is to limit consumer exposure to an unsafe product (Hallman et al., 2009;
Marsh, Schroeder & Mintert, 2004; Roberts, 2004, US Code of Federal Regulations
21.1.7.40(a)). As such, recall timing is arguably of even greater importance when the
potentially hazardous product is perishable, or in other words, has a limited shelf life,
since the more time that passes before a recall is announced, the more likely it is that the
product will already have been consumed.
Time to recall can be calculated based on the date of the recall press release, product
shelf life and product-specific information provided in the recall press release, indicating
the date that the product will be considered “expired”. In this context, expiration dates,
sometimes known as “best by” or labeled as “guaranteed fresh until” dates, are
determined by the manufacturer. There are no federal standards for how these dates
should be determined or applied to products, although many states require that some sort

37

of dating be indicated on individual sale packaging. The formula for calculating the
dependent variable is: 14

Ti* = Shelf Lifei - (Expiryi – Recalli) (Equation 1)
where:
i represents the individual recall announcement (press release);
Ti* is the number of days from the end of production to the date of the recall
announcement;
Shelf Lifei is the shelf life for the recalled product;
Expiryi is the expiration date of the product; and
Recalli is the date of the recall announcement.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the beginning of shelf life at t=0 (end
of production) and time to recall. Earlier recall announcements are preferred with respect
to recall effectiveness, because potential consumer exposure is reduced when time to
recall is shorter. This view of recall effectiveness is consistent with the perspective of
consumers and policy-makers (reduced risk). Assuming that product failure is attributed
to a specific product, shorter time to recall is also consistent with reducing the recalling
firm’s exposure to liability, due to a hazardous product (Packman, 1998).
2.2.4 Supply Chain Recall Detection Competence (SCRDC) and Detection Entity
The central proposition of this study is that our dependent variable, time to recall, is
influenced by detection entity, which we argue is a proxy for the realized outcomes of
superior SCRDC. SCRDC reflects a competence which resides within the recalling
firm’s internal systems, as well as between the recalling firm and its supply chain
14

For the purposes of our study, we use the shelf life and date of expiration of the “earliest” expiring
product in a specific recall announcement. The rationale for this choice is that the first product to expire
within a given list of recalled products in a single announcement is most indicative of the relative timing of
the recall announcement in terms of minimizing consumer exposure to potentially hazardous products.
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partners. This multi-dimensional competence includes the manufacturing process, raw
materials and finished goods monitoring systems, process auditing, and the integrative
and coordinating mechanisms between supply chain partners.
The primary mechanisms for ensuring product quality are embedded within
production processes (e.g., process design, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and
testing, which occur prior to products being released for distribution). After a product is
released for distribution, these mechanisms continue to operate, and, in some cases,
identify a problem which implicates not only current production, but also prior released
finished goods.

Auditing production records, for example, can identify issues with

temperature control, packaging, pH, and other critical process attributes which can affect
production over a series of days, months or longer.
While the aforementioned detections may occur within a firm, there are also instances
where systems between supply chain partners contribute to defect detection. In the
previously described instance, where auditing production records uncover a defect, if the
finished product were an input to another manufacturer’s process, notification from the
supplying firm to the purchasing firm would minimize the amount of downstream
production volume affected.

As a different example, in our sample, we observed

anecdotal evidence of this competence being shared between different levels of the
supply chain. In one product recall involving mislabeling, which resulted in allergens
being present in a product without appropriate warning, the retailer notified the
manufacturer of a potential problem when the product scanned incorrectly in the retailer’s
point of sale system. In this instance, in part because of the retailer’s identification of a
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potential problem and subsequent communication to the manufacturer, the mislabeled
product lot was traced and recalled prior to any reports of consumer ill effects.
In summary, we propose that SCRDC is the cumulative outcome of a series of
choices by purchasing

and supplying firms and relationships and systems between

supply chain partners. Detection entity is therefore an outcome, in part, of the level of
SCRDC that exists between purchasing

and supplying firms, including processors,

distributors and retailers.
Detection entity is operationalized as the entity that detects the defect which results in
a product recall (internal detection indicated by defect detection by the recalling firm or
its supply chain partners; external detection indicated by defect detection by a regulatory
agency or a consumer). Consistent with the dominant logic of extant quality management
theory, we would expect that defect detection that occurs further upstream in the supply
chain would be preferable in terms of overall cost and other supply chain performance
dimensions (Gryna, 1999; Ittner, 1992; Juran, 1992).
We, consequently, propose that more timely recalls (those recalls associated with a
shorter duration or time to recall, controlling for other factors) will more likely be
associated with upstream (internal) detections than by downstream entities (such as
consumers or a regulatory agency, for instance, a state health department or the FDA).
The continuum of possible detection entities is depicted in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 Continuum of Detection Entities: Supply Chain Partners, Consumers
and Regulatory Agencies (Adapted from Roth et al., 2008b)
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Consistent with the quality management literature, product recalls, regardless of
product type, are typically characterized as conformance quality or fitness for use issues
(Juran, 1992). Notably, for durable products, there is evidence that design flaws, rather
than manufacturing defects, make up the majority of defects causing recalls (Bapuji,
2011; Beamish & Bapuji, 2008; Hora et al., 2011; White & Pomponi, 2003). In contrast,
food product recalls are almost exclusively due to defects that occur in manufacturing,
storage or distribution. 15 Typical quality management programs have the objective of
investing in prevention (quality planning, new product reviews, process planning &
control, audits, supplier evaluations, and training) and appraisal (inspections, testing of
inputs, work in process, and finished goods) activities to reduce the occurrence of
internal and external failures.

15
In our examination of FDA food recalls, we noted one exception to the source of the defect,
manufacturing, rather than design. In some cases, supplements are manufactured with harmful levels or
fraudulent ingredients. These failures may be related to design defects, rather than manufacturing defects.
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Internal and external quality failures are typically evaluated in the literature in terms
of the cost of quality (COQ) (Crosby, 1979; Crosby, 1984; Juran, 1972). While internal
failures cause costs related to scrap, rework, missing information, failure analysis,
reinspection, retesting and redesign, external failures cause costs related to warranty
claims, complaint resolutions, returned goods, reverse logistics, refunds, future discounts,
and – most importantly – lost sales due to customer defection and reputation damage
(Gryna, 1999).

Because external failures are so costly, even more so than internal

failures, quality management programs typically prioritize the minimization of external
failures.
Consequently, quality theory prioritizes external failures over internal failures based
on the logic that external failures are more damaging to the enterprise in the long term
than internal failures (Gryna, 1999; Ittner, 1992; Juran, 1992). Furthermore, evidence
from the economics literature suggests that the indirect costs associated with product
recalls (lost sales, shareholder value losses, brand equity losses) are greater than the
direct costs associated with warranty work, logistics of returns, complaint investigations
and legal liability (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003). This notion is consistent with
the commonly held view that COQ are often “hidden” or difficult to measure or reliably
quantify (Cokins, 2006; Crosby, 1979; Gryna, 1999; Juran, 1992).
As further support for our hypothesis, we offer logic grounded in information
processing theory literature (Galbraith, 1974). When failures are detected externally, the
information processing and coordination that must occur for the recalling firm to first, be
notified, and to second, organize their response, is greater than the information
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processing required by internal detections. Recalls are handled by exception; in contrast,
the communication of quality issues between B2B and within firms is routinized.
However, when detection comes from a consumer, or the agency, non-routine processes
are involved. More specifically, whether a consumer reports a defect to a producer or a
regulatory agency, a process of investigation and verification must occur prior to action.
Therefore, we associate consumer detection with a longer time to recall.
We also argue that agency detections require a level of information processing within
the agency prior to communication with the firm. While the agency, by policy and
design, is intended to act quickly to protect public health, a positive test result is the first
step towards potential enforcement action. Consequently, the agency may be more
methodical and slower in their actions, than internal firm communications or
communications between a buyer and supplier with coordinated information sharing.
We contrast this with an internal detection, where a positive test result or an internal
inspection that finds a problem. Routines exist to process internal detection quickly and
efficiently, even between firms assuming that effective contractual and relational
governance systems are in place. While this logic is relatively intuitive when applied to
detection by the recalling firm, we argue that it is also applicable to detection by suppliers
to the recalling firm, since the barriers to coordination between a supplier and buyer will
be less than those between a recalling firm and consumer or regulatory agency.
We propose that recalls detected by external entities (detentbinary=1) are reflective
of lower levels of SCRDC and will have a longer time to recall, on average, than recalls
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detected by internal entities (detentbinary=0), which are reflective of higher levels of
SCRDC. More formally:
HYPOTHESIS 1 Higher levels of supply chain recall detection competence are
associated with shorter time to recall, ceteris paribus.
Appendix 2A describes the operationalization of the detection entity in detail. Appendix
2A also contains a detailed description of the coding protocol and provides examples of
press release statements which correspond to each detection entity categorization.
2.2.5 Proactive & Reactive Recall Strategies
Recall strategies, as conceptualized in the product recall literature, have been
characterized relative to whether or not illness or injury has been associated with the
defective product at the time of the recall (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011).
Proactive recall strategies are indicated when no injuries or illnesses related to the
defective product have been confirmed prior to the recall. In contrast, reactive recall
strategies are indicated when injury or illnesses have been confirmed as being related to
the defective product prior to the recall. Proactive recall strategies have been associated
with delays in recalls in prior studies (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011).
Hora et al. (2011) argue that the time to recall (as measured by the difference between
the time of the product introduction and the recall announcement date) will be greater for
preventative recalls than reactive recalls.

Their reasoning includes firms having

incentives to delay recalls to preserve the stock price (Chen et al., 2009) and because a
preventative recall occurs in the absence of concrete information about injury or illness
attributed to the product defect.
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However, as discussed previously, foodborne illnesses are greatly underreported and
rarely attributed to a specific defective product. As a result, we suggest that the numbers
of food recalls announced with illnesses attributed to them are also underreported. We
also suggest that the theoretically predicted effect of proactive/reactive recall strategies
(reactive=1; proactive=0) might be smaller in the food sector than in many durable
product categories. We believe this, since failures that cause food recalls are considered
to be potential regulatory violations and required to be reported to the FDA within 24
hours of detection. Nevertheless, the incentives attributed to firms in prior studies which
might drive the delay of recalls also apply in this context. Being consistent with the
literature, we now hypothesize that:
HYPOTHESIS 2 Proactive recalls will be associated with a greater time to recall than
reactive recalls, ceteris paribus.
2.2.6 Quality Process Maturity (Affected Production Period)
Whether a recalled food product is produced in small, crafted batches (e.g., handmade
chocolate) or in large volumes (e.g., nearly continuous production runs, such as canned
goods), when the product is recalled, it has an affected production period associated with
it. This affected production period represents the time frame of production affected by
the underlying defect which caused the recall. Figure 2.5 depicts the concept of the
affected production period, bounded by quality monitoring information that defines
when the problem began (or when it can be reasonably assured to have been absent) and
when the problem ended.
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Where the monitoring of processes for defects is particularly infrequent and
production is semi-continuous and occurring in large volumes, the affected period could
stretch into years (e.g., Setton Pistachios recalled nearly two years worth of pistachios
after issues at its production facility and contaminated finished products triggered a
recall). Alternatively, when the defect is highly discrete, such as the application of
incorrect labels missing allergen information, the affected production period might be as
small as one day’s worth of manufacturing. As affected production periods grow longer,
the number of days between the first affected product and the last becomes longer. As a
result, the longer the affected production period, the greater we would expect the time to
recall to be for a specific product.
We propose that the affected production period is a proxy for the QPM of the
recalling firm, because longer production periods affected by defects are indicative of
less robust quality systems, both in terms of prevention and appraisal (Crosby, 1979).
This analogy is consistent with the Quality Management Process Maturity Grid proposed
by Crosby (1979), which contains five stages of maturity:
enlightenment, wisdom and certainty.

uncertainty, regression,

The latter three stages, enlightenment, wisdom

and certainty, mark an organization’s transition from identifying and resolving quality
problems routinely to defect prevention to processes that are consistently zero defect and
operate with a consistently high level of conformance quality (Crosby, 1979).
HYPOTHESIS 3. Quality Process Maturity is associated with a longer time to recall,
ceteris paribus.
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Figure 2.5 Affected Production Period (Proxy for Quality Process Maturity)

2.2.7 Supply Chain Complexity
Increasing product and supply chain complexity and trends towards increased
outsourcing, rather than vertically integrated manufacturing, have diffused the
responsibility for initial component quality (that is, the initial quality of an individual
component or ingredient of a larger product or mixture) across multiple organizations and
geographic regions (Gray et al., 2009a; Gray et al., 2011b; Lyles et al., 2008; Roth et al.,
2008ab). This diffusion has a perverse multiplier effect in that it simultaneously renders
the detection of potential defects more difficult, creates incentives among supply chain
members for deception and shirking, and increases the complexity of product recall
implementation and product recovery.
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In our study, we identify three different “complexity factors” which represent aspects
of supply chain complexity that affect time to recall. These factors are: recall magnitude
(number of different product specifications included in a single recall announcement),
recall reach (extent of downstream distribution of the recalled product) and recall
breadth (an indicator of the association of the recall with a broad failure that impacts
many downstream firms). These factors are consistent with extant conceptualizations of
supply chain complexity; principally, the idea that “the distinct number of components or
parts that make up a system” (Bozarth et al., 2009, p. 79), is a starting point for
recognizing increasing levels of complexity.
2.2.7.1 Moderating Effects of Recall Magnitude
When products are recalled, it is not unusual for more than one size, formulation, or
variety of a product to be included in the same recall announcement. This is particularly
true for food products, where the nature of processes and inputs is such that a single
defect (e.g., salmonella contamination, either in the processing equipment or introduced
by an input) can easily affect multiple products. In some cases where a single contract
manufacturer produces multiple brand names, the recall announcement may contain
multiple brand names, sizes, packaging and specification of affected products.
We conceptualize the number of products recalled as a proxy for one possible
dimension of the amount of information processing a recalling firm must perform to
announce, with some reasonable level of certainty, what products are affected by a
specific defect. In food recalls, the recall announcement contains a list of products
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affected. The number of products in a recall announcement is readily determined from
each press release.
When a recall is detected, either by an internal or external entity, the known
information about the defect (e.g., what type of problem, which product the defect was
detected in, how the defect was detected – by testing, inspection) is communicated within
or to the recalling firm. We propose that the level of information processing required to
coordinate determining which products, lots, batches and production dates are affected is
a function of both the detection entity and the number of products recalled. We believe
this since the number of products recalled introduces a level of complexity that must be
managed for the recall to be announced.
Due to regulatory requirements demanding that recalls be announced within days of
the discovery of a defect, information processing must be conducted with on-hand
resources. In other words, there is no time for adjustments to the organization’s structure
or information processing resources after the defect is detected (Galbraith, 1974). We
believe that, because recalls are rare events, it is unlikely that slack resources are
dedicated to handling them. This issue is analogous to the concept of “complicatedness,”
introduced by Vachon & Klassen (2002), to describe situations where required
information exists within the organization, but the volume of information may
overwhelm processing capabilities.
Vachon & Klassen (2002) provide evidence that product variety (as captured by the
number of products recalled), can have negative effects on supply chain performance,
including inventory levels, lead time and delivery performance (Bozarth et al., 2009; Lee,
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Padmanabhan & Whang, 1997; Vachon & Klassen, 2002). Consequently, we would
expect, on average, for the number of products to influence the effect of detection entity
on time to recall. More specifically, we expect that higher numbers of products within a
recall announcement will positively moderate the effect of SCRDC on time to recall,
rendering detections by internal or external entities less effective, on average, in terms of
time to recall.
HYPOTHESIS 4a The effect of SCRDC on on time to recall is positively moderated by
the recall magnitude.
2.2.7.2 Moderating Effects of Recall Reach (Downstream Distribution)
Product recall announcements, used to inform the public as to where affected
products are expected to be found, makes a note of the states in which an affected product
was distributed. Within the US, we characterize the distribution of finished goods as
local (1-3 states), regional (4-20 states) or national (>20 states). Appendix 2A contains
the details of how this variable was coded.
Similar to the number of products recalled, we expect that the extent of the
distribution of recalled products will have an amplifying effect on the relationship
between the detection entity and time to recall. As with increasing numbers of recalled
products, we would expect that a more widespread distribution of finished goods will
increase the information processing burden on the recalling firm to determine where the
affected products were sold (Galbraith, 1974). This logic is consistent with Bozarth et al.
(2009) and Vachon & Klassen (2002), who established the negative effects of the
increasing levels of supply chain echelons, and broader geographic spans of customers, as
negatively affecting the supply chain performance.
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Downstream distribution may be a proxy for the geographic extent of the distribution
and the complexity introduced when the number of downstream supply chain partners
increases. More specifically, we expect that more broadly distributed products within a
recall announcement will positively moderate the effect of SCRDC on time to recall,
rendering detections by internal or external entities less effective, on average, in terms of
time to recall.
HYPOTHESIS 4b The effect of SCRDC on time to recall is positively moderated by
recall reach.
2.2.7.3 Recall Breadth
The third complexity factor included in our study is conceptualized as a control
variable.

Recall breadth is an indicator of the size of the recall with respect to the

number of firms impacted. In 2008, the FDA began designating recalls which affected
many different products and many different firms with the term “major”. While this term
has no regulatory meaning, the FDA has used this term to categorize recalls which
require additional communication measures due to the breadth of products and firms
impacted (FDA, 2009).
There have been, to date, a total of five FDA-designated “major” recalls, all of which
occurred between 2008 and 2010.

These include:

powdered milk (2008), peanuts

(2009), pistachios (2009), shell eggs (2010), and hydrolyzed vegetable protein (2010)
(FDA 2009b).
We operationalize recall breadth as a binary indicator (recallbreadth=1, associated
with a major recall; recallbreadth=0, not associated with a major recall) which indicates
whether a particular recall announcement is linked to a major recall. We expect that a
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greater recall breadth, which involves recalls that affect dozens, or even hundreds, of
firms and up to thousands of different products, will be associated with a longer time to
recall. This is due to the cascading notifications and coordination between firms
supplying a defective ingredient, regulatory agencies, heavily involved in “major” recalls,
and the firms conducting the recalls.

We are also interested in determining if our model

is robust to estimation using recalls that are not associated with “major” recall events, by
including a model which only examines non-major recalls (recallbreadth=0).
2.2.8 Additional Control Variables
We control for multiple variables that we expect will influence time to recall. Due to
the wide variation in shelf lives, we expect that a large proportion of the variability in
time to recall will be attributable to the product type. We control for product type by
developing three categories:

refrigerated, frozen and shelf stable (cat0_refridge,

cat1_frozen, cat2_shelfstable, respectively). These categories capture the attributes of
the products themselves, including variability in shelf life and the aspects of the
underlying processing and storage characteristics. We also include several variables
which reflect the aspects of the recalling firm, including the public or private status of the
firm (public=1, private=0) and two indicators of firm size: annual revenue and number of
employees (firmrev and firmempl).
Publically traded firms, due to requirements for reporting various aspects of
operations, and due to the transparency of such operations to shareholders and the wider
public, may also be more systematic in their monitoring of processes and suppliers.
Larger firms typically have more resources; hence, larger firms might be expected to
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improve performance with respect to recall timing (longer remaining shelf life).
However, consistent with prior studies, publically traded firms may have incentives to
delay recall announcements, therefore reducing the remaining shelf life. We also control
for defect type (0=non-pathogen; 1=pathogen) and the year the recall was announced
(yr_2008, yr_2009, yr_2010) (Hora et al., 2011).
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
2.3.1 Sample Frame and Data Sources
This study uses secondary data collected from publically available sources to
construct a database of recall events for FDA-regulated food products over a three year
period (See Table 2.1A, Appendix 2A for details of individual variable definitions and
data sources).
The unit of analysis in this study is a recall event. A recall event (henceforth referred
to as a recall) is defined as an individual press release announcement of a recall of one or
more affected products. The sample frame for this study is the set of product recalls for
food products regulated by the FDA over the period of 2008 through 2010 for which firm
press releases were made and published on the FDA website. Due to our focus on
perishable foods subject to common recall administration systems, infant formula,
subject to separate recall requirements, was excluded.
The time period covered by this study includes a period of relatively consistent policy
and regulatory enforcement by the agency with respect to these types of product recalls.
This time period includes the sharp increase in the total number of food products
beginning in 2009 (Lister & Becker, 2010). This time frame also includes the beginning

53

of the FDA’s use of the designation “major” for recalls which, for a variety of different
reasons, may lead to the agency conducting expanded communications.
FDA policy dictates communication of product recalls through two different
mechanisms: 1) a weekly agency-issued enforcement report which lists all product recall
actions for the past week; and 2) firm-issued communications to the public, downstream
customers, distributors and retailers. According to FDA guidance, when the product has
already been distributed to the consumer level and there is a potential for a significant
health hazard, a press release is considered appropriate. The FDA publishes these press
releases on their website and has archived press releases for recall events from the year
2004 through the present time (see Appendix 2A for examples of press releases and
enforcement reports).
Enforcement reports summarize recalls by week and by recall class. These reports
include the recalling firm name, a description and list of the recalled products (size or
weight, packaging, any labeling as to lot codes, expiration, production or distribution
dates), a reason for the recall (defect type, also sometimes confirms detection entity),
volume of the product in commercial distribution, states in which the product has been
distributed, and the status of the recall as of the date of the enforcement report.
Press releases are made by the recalling firm and published on the FDA website in
addition to being released to other media outlets.

The FDA has issued guidance

regarding the content of the press release; however, the actual content of the press
releases varies substantially in terms of the level of detail provided. Agency guidance
recommends that the announcement include the recalling firm name, location (city and
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state), product identification information (including any codes, expiration dates, lot/unit
numbers), a description of what is currently known about the problem and any health
hazard associated with the defect, the number of illnesses associated with the defect that
have been confirmed at the time of the recall, information on what consumers should do
with the recalled product, and where to find additional information.
2.3.2 Data Collection
Data were collected by accessing the FDA’s online archives of weekly enforcement
reports and press releases for food products for the years of 2008 through 2010.
Enforcement report information was merged with press releases to develop an initial set
of 1,602 press releases for consideration. Because the dependent variable is a measure of
recall timing, we exclude any press releases which do not contain enough information
about the production, distribution or expiration dates necessary to calculate the dependent
variable. This reduces our sample to a total of 846 press releases.
The remaining press releases and enforcement reports were coded by three different
persons using a set of scales developed during a pilot analysis of 100 press releases, and
refined over time, to ensure internal consistency and external validity. Approximately
20% of the total sample was coded by more than one person in order to check for
consistency. Inter-rater reliability was high (>97%) and all cases where disagreement
occurred were readily resolved through discussion among the raters.
The central independent variable for this study, detection entity, is not reported in all
press releases. This omission further reduces our sample to 434 food product recall
cases. After the inclusion of all specified regressors and control variables, the final
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sample consists of 258 product recall announcements. Appendix 2A summarizes all
constructs and measures used in this study and provides additional detail regarding data
collection and coding.
2.3.3 Calculation of Time to Recall and Sample Descriptives
Time to recall

) is measured in days and is calculated based on the shelf life of the

earliest expiring individual product specified in a given recall announcement and the date
of the recall announcement relative to the expiration date of the product, consistent with
Equation 1 16. We illustrate the calculation of time to recall for our prior examples:
Example 1: Concentrated beverage
Ti* = 732 days – (June 17, 2008 – September 23, 2009)
Ti*= 732 – 463 = 269 days from the end of production to the recall
announcement date
Example 2: Cut, fresh, packaged produce
Ti* = 21 days – (October 20, 2010 – January 22, 2010)
Ti*= 21 – (- 271) = 292 days from the end of production to the recall
announcement date
Table 2.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the variables included in our
model. We note that, consistent with our expectations of duration data, there is a strong
skew in the dependent variable (timetorecall).
descriptive information for the sample.

16

(Equation 1)
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Appendix 2A provides additional

Construct

Variable Label1

Public

Public

Firm Size

Firmrev

Recall Breadth

Firmempl
Recallbreadth

Recall Strategy

Reactive

Supply Chain
Recall Detection
Competence
(Detection
Entity)
Quality Process
Maturity
(Affected
Production
Period)
Recall
Magnitude
(Number of
Products
Recalled)

Detentbinary

Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Description

Mean

0/1 private/public status of recalling
firm
Recalling firm revenue in millions
of dollars
Recalling firm employees
0/1 non-major/major status of
recall, as designated by the FDA
0/1 indicating proactive/reactive
recalls
Detection entity 0/1 indicates
internal/external defect detections

.136

Standard
Deviation
.343

4,097.235

15,464.0

13,951.59
.814

51,583.79
.390

.124

.330

.128

.335

prodperiod

Number of days defect occurred
undetected

231.252

288.232

noproducts

Number of products in the recall
announcement

6.713

10.568

cat0_refridge

0/1 dummy for fresh/refrigerated
products
0/1 dummy for frozen products

.097

.296

.116

.321

0/1 dummy for shelf stable products

.787

.410

0/1 for indicating nonpathogen/pathogenic defects
1-3 distribution states
Recall Reach
local
(Downstream
4-20 distribution states
regional
Distribution)
>20 distribution states
national
Days from the beginning of the shelf
Time to Recall
timetorecall
life to the date of the recall
(days)
announcement
Year dummy for recalls occurring in
yr_2008
2008
Year
Year dummy for recalls occurring in
yr_2009
2009
Year dummy for recalls occurring in
yr_2010
2010
1. Variable label as it appears in Stata.

.895

.307

.198
.240
.562
350.752

.399
.428
.497
322.172

.081

.274

.864

.343

.054

.227

Product Type
Defect Type

cat1_frozen
cat2_shelfstable
pathogen
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2.3.4 Model Specification
Our study examines factors which influence time to recall, a dependent variable (Ti*)
which captures the time, in days, between the beginning of the shelf life and the date of
the recall announcement. Because our dependent variable is a span of time, we propose
to use a duration (survival) model to address several aspects of our data which may
render an estimation by the ordinary least squares (OLS) model inappropriate (Cameron
& Trivedi, 2005; Harhoff & Wagner, 2009; Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008;
Kalbfleish & Prentice, 2002; Terwiesch, Ren, Ho, & Cohen, 2005). Duration data is
often skewed, which violates the standard OLS assumption that the dependent variable is
normally distributed, conditional on the independent variables. Furthermore, an OLS
model does not bound the predicted value of time to recall, which could result in
predicted values of time to recall

negative, and consequently, infeasible.

Finally,

duration analysis provides the flexibility to explicitly model unobserved heterogeneity
which, if significant and unaccounted for, could produce erroneous or biased results.
Table 2.3 summarizes the duration models which comprise our analysis.
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Table 2.3 Parametric Duration Model Summary
Model

Sample
Restrictions

Distributional
Assumptions

Model 1a
Model 1b
Model 1c

None
None
None

Log-normal
Log-logistic
Weibull

Model 2

None

Model 3

Limited to
recalls that
are not
FDAdesignated as
“major”
(recallbreadt
h=0)

Unobserved
Heterogeneity
(Frailty)
None
None
None

Comments

Examine models
for the consistency
of direction & the
significance of the
results. Check for
relevance of higher
order terms not
explicitly
hypothesized.
Consistent
Modeled using
If unobserved
with Model 1a- gamma and
heterogeneity is
1c results
inverse Gaussian
significant, those
distributional
estimates will be
assumptions
preferred. Choose
Model 1 or Model
2 to use for
robustness checks.
Consistent
Consistent with the Examine model for
with Model 2
results of Model 2 consistency
results
between major and
non-major recalls
(Compare Model
1b and Model 3).

The analyzed models are single-spell continuous time duration model, meaning there
is only one transition event:
Product Not Recalled

→ Product Recalled

This is a duration (survival) analysis where all cases within the sample experience the
event of interest (a product recall announcement). In addition, a shorter time to recall
(i.e., shorter survival time), or, in other words, a greater hazard rate, is preferable over a
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smaller hazard to reduce consumer risk and minimize firm liability due to consumer
illness.

Analysis time is equal to the duration in our model (Ti*), the time to recall

measured from t=0, defined as the end of production for the earliest expiring product
within a given product recall announcement (beginning of shelf life). Time to recall is
strictly positive. There is no censoring in our sample and the regressors do not vary over
time (i.e., they are time-invariant over the duration of a specific case which results in a
recall).
Duration models are specified in terms of survival and hazard functions. A survival
function is the cumulative proportion of the sample that does not experience the transition
event (in this case, the recall announcement), or the probability that the duration to the
transition event is equal to at least t. Conversely, the hazard function represents the
probability that the duration to the transition event is t or less.
The conditional density is a function of t, conditioned on X and θ, where:
X = time-invariant regressors
Θ = a parameter vector
Using a maximum likelihood estimation, the contribution to the likelihood is found to be
the conditional density. The density for the ith observation (where i is an individual
product recall announcement) can be written as:
(Equation 2)
The maximum likelihood estimator maximizes the log likelihood:
ln L(θ) =

(Equation 3)

assuming independence over i.
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In terms of the integrated hazard function, this can be written as:
ln L(θ) =

(Equation 4)

More specifically, the model can be formulated as a proportional hazards (PH) model
or an accelerated failure time (AFT) model. A PH model is written as:
(t)exp(

βx)

(Equation 5)

where h0(t) is the baseline hazard and is assumed to follow a distribution based on the
conceptualization of the underlying hazard.

Alternatively, an AFT model is

parameterized as:
(Equation 6)
where a distribution is assumed for exp(Xjβx), also known as the acceleration parameter.
When the acceleration parameter is greater than zero, failure becomes increasingly likely
with time, ceteris parabus. Accordingly, when the acceleration parameter is one, time
passes at a “normal” rate. When the acceleration parameter is less than one, failure
becomes less likely with time, ceteris parabus. We use the AFT model specification, in
part, because it enables us to directly compare all three of our conceptually-justified
distributional assumptions.
Our model, in AFT form, is specified as:

(Equation 7)
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2.3.4.1 Distributional Assumptions
Based on our understanding of recall processes and monitoring for defects and
illnesses associated with defects in food products, we would expect that, over the shelf
life of a given product, the distribution of recall announcements could be expected to
increase or be relatively constant early in the shelf life, and to decrease later in the shelf
life period. We base this on the rationale that process monitoring and auditing closer to
the end of production for a given product is arguably more relevant to detecting a defect
than later monitoring. In addition, our assumption is generally supported by the shapes of
the survival curves developed by the non-parametric estimation of the detection of
defects in meat and poultry processing plants by Teratanavat et al. (2005). Our assumed
distribution could be represented with a log-normal, log-logistic or Weibull distribution.
Parametric estimation of duration models can be sensitive to specification of the
density function (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Therefore, we estimate a series of
parametric duration models using these three distributional assumptions which we
consider conceptually justified.

Models 1a, 1b and 1c estimate time to recall using the

AFT specification and log-normal, log-logistic, and Weibull distributions, respectively.
We find consistent results in terms of the direction and significance of the coefficients.
As such, we conclude that the specification is not sensitive to distributional assumptions
within the three distributions considered.

Appendix 2B contains the results for all

distributional assumptions.
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2.3.4.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity (Frailty)
Duration models, like other types of statistical models, are vulnerable to
misspecification, including the inadvertent omission of relevant predictor variables
(Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, & Marchenko, 2010; Hosmer et al., 2008; Kalbfleisch &
Prentice, 2002).

To guard against misspecification, we test for the relevance of a variety

of higher order terms, in addition to estimating a model which incorporates unobserved
heterogeneity, also known as frailty.

The hazard for an unshared frailty or unobserved

heterogeneity model can be written as:
(Equation 8)
where

is an unobserved case-specific effect. The survival function can, consequently,

be written as:
(Equation 9)
where

is the parametric survival function.

Modeling explicitly for this

unobserved heterogeneity accounts for differences between cases not captured in the
variables included in the model. Consequently, if we find evidence of a significant frailty
effect, we would conclude that there are factors that significantly affect time to recall that
are unobserved, and therefore omitted, from our model. The estimation of the frailty
effect, however, allows the model estimates to account for this unobserved heterogeneity,
if necessary (Hosmer et al., 2008).
To estimate the model expressed by Equation 9, a distribution is assumed for
For the purposes of tractability, typically a gamma distribution or an inverse-Gaussian
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distribution are assumed (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Cleves et al., 2002). When

is

assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 1 and a variance equal to ϴ, the
survivor function can be written as:
(Equation 10)
Alternatively, if the inverse-Gaussian distribution is assumed, the survivor function can
be written as:
(Equation 11)
Consequently, if unobserved heterogeneity is negligible, ϴ goes toward zero and the
model estimation without the unobserved heterogeneity term is preferred (Cleves et al.,
2010).
Because the results of the three conceptually-based distributional assumptions are
largely consistent, the choice of the estimated models is irrelevant. We proceed with an
additional estimation and interpretation using the log-logistic assumption. Incorporating
unobserved heterogeneity results in a preference for the model without frailty, since the
unobserved term is not statistically significant under either gamma or inverse Gaussian
distributional assumptions (χ2 = 0.00 p<1.00, see Appendix 2B for full results).

In

Section 4, we interpret the results of the final models.
2.4 RESULTS
2.4.1 Model 1b Estimates
Table 2.4 illustrates the results of the final estimated models, while Table 2.5
summarizes the results of our hypothesis testing. Model 1b is the log-logistic AFT model
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which includes all the hypothesized relationships, in addition to the higher order term
Recall Breadth X Affected Production Period, which, during misspecification checks,
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Table 2.4 Model Estimates: Unstandardized Coefficients
& Average Marginal Effects (AME)

Construct

Model
Variable/Proxy

Public/Private

Public
Firm Revenue

Firm Size

Firm Employees

Recall Breadth

Recall Breadth

Recall Strategy

Reactive

SCRDC

Detection Entity

QPM

Affected Production
Period
Number of
Products
(Magnitude)
Cat1_frozen

Recall
Magnitude

Product Type

Cat2_ShelfStable

Defect Type

Pathogen
Regional (Reach)

Recall Reach

National (Reach)

Year

Yr_2009
Yr_2010

SCRDC X
Reach

Detection X
Regional
Detection X
National

SCRDC X
Magnitude

Detection X
Number of
Products

Recall Breadth
X QPM

Recall Breadth X
Affected Production
Period
Constant

Model 1b
Full Sample
Coefficient
AME2
-.439*
-107.949*
[.338]
[81.885]
4.31 X10-6
.018
[6.57 X 10-6]
[.027]
-1.90 X 10-6
-.019
[2.72 X 10-6]
[.027]
1.538**
378.458**
[.293]
[87.595]
.078
19.168
[.207]
[50.894]
1.304**
320.921**
[.529]
[132.907]
.003**
.624**
[.001]
[.233]
.006
1.427
[.006]
[1.386]

Model 3
Recall Breadth=0
Coefficients
AME2
.006
.494
[.847]
[75.954]
.00003
.069
[.00004]
[.078]
-4.13 X 10-6
-.035
[.00001]
[.129]
----.091
8.146
[.339]
[30.405]
.372
33.405
[.406]
[36.652]
.003**
.277**
[.001]
[.112]
.009**
.830**
[.004]
[.414]

1.802**
[.554]
2.079**
[.421]
-.002
[.444]
.187
[.301]
.034
[.267]
.188
[.422]
.023
[.443]
-.808
[.545]
-.530

443.507**
[147.549]
511.717**
[113.427]
-.402
[109.154]
45.986
[73.890]
8.484
[65.677]
46.204
[103.982]
5.591
[108.93]
----

2.146**
[.678]
1.024**
[.422]
-.316
[.313]
-.269
[.526]
-.723**
[.328]
.355
[.407]
-.020
[.487]
.077
[.613]
.435

192.436**
[77.162]
91.862**
[36.542]
-28.362
[27.911]
-24.102
[47.455]
-64.844**
[34.410]
31.861
[37.997]
-1.764
[43.643]
----

[.574]
-.002

---

[.715]
.011

---

[.014]

---

[.012]
--

---

-.002**

[.001]
-----1.796**
2.892**
[.655]
-[.399]
-(*significant at p<.10, **significant at p<.05)
Note 1: Robust standard errors specified are reported below each estimate in parentheses. Robust standard errors
were estimated using firmcluster, an indicator assigned to each unique firm present in the sample. This allows for
the correlation of error terms across clusters of recall announcements conducted by the same firm. There are 201
unique firms in our sample of 258 product recalls.
Note 2: Average marginal effects (AME) reported as dy/dx for all values except for Firm Revenue and Firm
Employees, reported as elasticities.
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was determined to be significant. Model 3 mirrors Model 1b, except that the sample has
been restricted to those recalls not associated with a FDA-designated “major” recall
(recallbreadth=0) to check for the robustness of the model.
Positive coefficients are indicative of longer durations with increasing values of that
regressor. For categorical regressors, a positive coefficient is indicative of longer
durations, as compared with the reference category. In our conceptualization, a longer
survival time corresponds to a longer time to recall, which is less desirable than a shorter
time to recall for a similar product in terms of reducing consumer exposure to potentially
defective products.
In Model 1b, SCRDC as measured by the proxy, detection entity, is significant and
positive, providing support for Hypothesis 1, and indicating that externally detected
(consumer or agency) failures have a longer time to recall, on average, than internally
detected (supplier or recalling firm) failures. Greater recall breadth (recallbreadth=1), as
expected, is associated with greater time to recall, controlling for other factors. Product
categories are significant predictors of time to recall. As expected, refrigerated products
have a much shorter time to recall than frozen or shelf stable products, on average, due to
their shorter shelf lives.
For the purposes of visualizing the differences between internal and external
detection, we compare survival curves graphically. Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 depict the
survival curves for internal and external detection entities and refrigerated, frozen and
shelf stable product categories, respectively. The y axis of the survival curve is the
probability that the product recall has not occurred by time t. The x axis is the analysis
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time, the duration in our model; t=0 represents the end of production for each recall
event. Refrigerated products, consistent with their shorter shelf lives, have very steep
survival curves which begin to flatten out towards 0 at t~365 days. In each case, when
comparing internal and external detection entities for each product category, we note a
flatter survival curve for the external detection entity (which is more pronounced for
frozen and shelf stable products than for refrigerated products), which demonstrates that
the internal detection entity, consistent with higher levels of SCRDC, is preferred. This
result is consistent with quality theory, relative to time to recall performance.
Figure 2.6 Survival Curves for Refrigerated Products
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Figure 2.7 Survival Curves for Frozen Products
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Figure 2.8 Survival Curves for Shelf Stable Products
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Figure 2.9 presents a comparison of the survival curve for different values of
detection entity and recall breadth. As expected, time to recall occurs at a faster rate for
internal/non-major (recallbreadth=0) events than for external/major (recallbreadth=1)
events. This is consistent with our understanding of the primary effect of detection entity
and the nature of greater recall breadth. Greater recall breadth (FDA designated “major”
recalls) is indicative of broad impacts across many different products and firms. We
suggest that recall breadth negatively impacts time to recall due to issues with
coordination between regulatory entities and recalling firms. When an upstream supply
chain entity is responsible for a defect that leads to recalls in many different downstream
products across multiple firms, the downstream product recalls are delayed by the
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notification process between the original recalling firm and the downstream recipients of
the defective material. When the breadth of the recall is sufficiently large, such that the
FDA designates a need for special communication efforts, time to recall is significantly
impacted, as is evidenced by the flattening of the two uppermost survival curves in
Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9 Survival Curves Comparing Detection Entity & Recall Breadth
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Public/private status was used as a control variable (public=1, private=0). Model 1b
results indicate that there is a negative effect of public status on time to recall (significant
at a p<.10 level). While our firm size controls of firm revenue and the number of firm
employees are not significant, the nearly significant result of public status may be
indicative of more sophisticated traceability systems in larger, publically traded firms.
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The estimated effects of defect type (pathogen=1, non-pathogen=0), direct effects of
recall reach (downstream distribution - Local, Regional or National), year dummies and
recall magnitude (number of products - noproducts) included in the recall announcement
were not significant in Model 1b.
We do not find significant effects of the interaction between detection entity and
recall magnitude or recall reach. Consequently, Hypotheses 4a and 4b are not supported.
This may be indicative of what has been reported to be the relatively high level of
downstream traceability present in the US food system. In other words, when recalls
happen, the number of products recalled and the breadth of downstream distribution do
not affect time to recall because downstream traceability is well developed.

It is

noteworthy to mention, however, that upstream traceability, or the ability to trace inputs
back to their point of origin, particularly with respect to imported ingredients, is not
similarly well developed, and consequently, quality systems for the US food supply are
vulnerable to undetected upstream defects. As such, US producers may need to adjust
their monitoring systems accordingly.
Contrary to prior work in the context of toy (durable product) recalls, we do not find a
significant affect of proactive/reactive recall strategies on time to recall, indicating that
Hypothesis 2 is not supported (Hora et al., 2011). As discussed previously, the nature of
food quality issues lends itself to the under-attribution of illness to specific products. As
such, the traditional proactive/reactive recall strategy characterization may be of limited
usefulness for food products.
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Prior work has suggested that publically traded firms may have substantial incentives
to delay recalls until more information is available (reactive strategy) (Chen et al., 2009).
While we do not find a significant effect in our sample of proactive/reactive strategies on
time to recall, we note that similar incentives are likely to exist for both public and
private food producers, and that, furthermore, the limited ability of the current systems to
attribute illness to specific products could encourage firms to hide defects until external
detections force a recall.
We find a significant and positive effect of QPM as measured by the proxy, affected
production period (prodperiod), indicating, in support of Hypothesis 3, that as defects go
on for longer periods of time, the corresponding time to recall is extended.

Figure 10

illustrates the survival curves for selected values of the affected production period (1 day,
100 days, 500 days and 1000 days).
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Figure 2.10 Survival Curves for Selected Values of
QPM (Affected Production Period)
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If we plot the survival curves for the same values of QPM (affected production
period=1 day and 500 days) for low and high recall breadth (recallbreadth=0, non-major
recall; recallbreadth=1, major recall), we can note the steep survival curve for high QPM
(1 day) combined with low recall breadth as compared with the much flatter survival
curve for low QPM (500 days) combined with high recall breadth (Figure 2.11). The
steeper curve indicates a shorter time to recall, controlling for other factors and is,
consequently, indicative of greater consumer risk reduction.
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Figure 2.11 Survival Curves for Selected Values of QPM (Affected Production
Period) and Recall Breadth
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2.4.2 Model 3 Robustness Check for Recall Breadth
Due to the recent prevalence of very broad recalls with extensive effects on many
products and firms (e.g., FDA-designated major recalls), a large proportion of the sample
is associated with “major” recalls. We are interested in determining if our estimates are
sensitive to eliminating that portion of the sample related to major recalls. We conduct
an additional analysis for the subset of recalls not designated as major (Model 3;
recallbreadth=0) to check the robustness of our results. Table 2.4 summarizes a
comparison of the coefficients and average marginal effects across the full sample
(Model 1b) and sample restricted (Model 3) models.
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Due to sample size restrictions (N=48), our ability to make an inference from Model
3 is limited, however, the results, in general, are consistent with Model 1b, with a few
exceptions. We discuss these exceptions, as follows. The effects of firm size (firm
revenue & number of firm employees), proactive/reactive recall strategy, affected
production period, product category, defect type (pathogen), year dummies and
interaction terms are consistent between Models 1b and 3. Model 3’s estimates do not
include a significant result for publically traded firms; however, we are limited not only
by the sample size for Model 3, but also by the limited presence of public firms in that
sample (5 firms out of 48 are publically traded).

Model 3 indicates a statistically

significant direct effect between nationally distributed products (recall reach) and time to
recall. This result lends some support to the finding that nationally distributed products
are recalled more quickly than regionally or locally distributed products, possibly because
national distribution networks are accompanied by well developed traceability
capabilities which enable for the quicker identification of affected products.
The number of products recalled (recall magnitude) has a significant and positive
effect on time to recall in Model 3, indicating that, as the number of products in recall
announcement increases, time to recall increases. This may indicate that, for low recall
breadth, the recall magnitude has significant effects due to the higher information
processing and coordination requirements of managing a recall with more affected
products (Galbraith, 1974).
Finally, Model 3’s estimate of the effect of SCRDC (detection entity) on time to
recall is not statistically significant (z=.80 p<.421). We suspect that this result is due to
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the limited sample size and number of regressors included in the estimation. When we
drop the interaction terms and re-estimate Model 3, we find the SCRDC coefficient to be
positive and significant (at p<.08), which is consistent with Model 1b. Because we can
find no compelling conceptual or theoretical explanation for the effect of SCRDC to be
different in a sample of recalls not associated with a major recall, we suggest that Model
3’s results are consistent with Model 1b, but limited by sample size.
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Hypothesis
Number
H1

Table 2.5 Hypothesis Testing & Results Summary
Hypothesis Statement
Results
Basis
Higher levels of SCRDC
are associated with shorter
time to recall.

Supported

Detection entity is positive
and significant in Models 1a,
1b, 1c and 2. Detection entity
is positive and significant at
p<.08 in Model 3, when
interaction terms are dropped
due to the limited sample size.
Reactive is not significant in
Models 1a,1b, 1c, 2 and 3.

Proactive recalls will be
associated with a greater
time to recall than reactive
recalls.
Quality process maturity is
positively associated with
longer time to recall.

Not
Supported
Supported

Detection entity is positive
and significant in Models 1a,
1b, 1c, 2 & 3.

H4a

The effect of SCRDC on
time to recall is positively
moderated by recall
magnitude.

Not
Supported

Interactions are not significant
in Models 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 & 3.

H4b

The effect of SCRDC on
time to recall is positively
moderated by recall reach.

Not
Supported

H2

H3

2.5 DISCUSSION
2.5.1 Contributions
In aggregate, the extant literature reflects the recall timing paradox which firms
conducting product recalls and public policy-makers charged with ensuring an acceptable
level of public safety face.

This paradox indicates that while the corporate crisis

communications and marketing literature support the idea of conducting recalls
proactively to manage consumer opinion and influence customer loyalty (Dawar &

78

Pilluta, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006), publically traded firms may face substantial and
prolonged market penalties as a result of the product recalls, and may, in fact, benefit
from delaying the recall until more information is available (Chu et al., 2005; Chen et al.,
2009). Overall, however, the results are mixed regarding the extent to which market
forces (in the form of short-term abnormal shareholder returns) provide incentives for
firms to act in a manner which promotes a desirable level of public safety (Chu et al.,
2005; Chen et al., 2009; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011, Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001). In
short, the evidence is unclear as to what strategies and policies are best suited to balance
tradeoffs between direct and indirect impacts to firms due to product recalls and to ensure
that the public is appropriately protected from the physical and financial losses due to
unsafe products.
This study examines factors that influence recall timing in a context which has not
been studied previously – the FDA-regulated food sector. Time to recall is an important
dimension of recall effectiveness, to the extent that more timely recalls reduce consumer
risks, firm costs including liability, and costs to society.
Our first hypothesis regarding SCRDC is supported.

This result suggests that,

consistent with quality theory, directing prevention and appraisal activities towards
internal detection of defects contributes to one dimension of recall effectiveness – recall
timing. We argue that SCRDC as reflected by detection entity is a realized outcome of a
priori supply chain design and monitoring choices made by the recalling firm and its
supply chain partners. To the extent that these choices build a superior ability to detect
and resolve quality issues within each firm and across supply chain partners, we suggest
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that the resulting competency benefits supply chain partners by enabling a shorter time to
recall. This competence, which we do not fully explore here, may have other benefits;
supply chains with high levels of SCRDC may also perform well against other measures
of recall effectiveness, including liability minimization, reverse logistics costs and
volume recovered.
Prior operations management proactive/recall strategy characterizations, although
hypothesized to be consistent with the prior literature (Hora et al., 2011), do not have an
effect on time to recall in this study’s context. This result, which conflicts with prior
findings (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011), is an indication of the very different nature
of quality failure and product recalls in the food product context, as compared with
durable products. In addition, the difference in the proportion of recalls reactive in the
food sector, as compared with the durable product recalls, highlights how the true
impacts of food quality issues are largely obscured, particularly from the point of view of
the consumer. While this study focuses on product recalls as observable external quality
failures in this particular industry, we suggest that our findings, particularly with respect
to SCRDC and QPM, may be generalizable to other contexts, including durable products.
2.5.2 Managerial & Policy Implications
We suggest that firms seeking to improve both recall effectiveness and reduce the risk
of external quality failures examine their supply chain design and monitoring systems,
since these choices will ultimately affect their ability to prevent or detect failures before
they leave the control of the firm. We propose that monitoring system design should be
considered holistically across supply chain partners, rather than being confined internally
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to a single firm. The significant and positive effect of QPM (affected production period)
on time to recall underscores what quality theory would suggest:

that impacts of

uncontrolled, undetected defects become increasingly severe over time with respect to
recall effectiveness. This finding, coupled with the significance of SCRDC, reinforces
the importance of evaluating monitoring systems in light of their internal single-firm
processing characteristics and the processing and monitoring systems of their suppliers.
We suggest that, with respect to pathogenic contamination, which is the current
leading cause of product recalls, this recommendation is particularly relevant for firms
that receive high volumes of bulk ingredients or intermediates from other firms and
further process them into finished goods in semi-continuous processes (Golan, Krissoff,
Kuchler, Calvin, Nelson & Price, 2004; Hughes, 2004; Kumar & Budin, 2006;
Teratanavat & Hooker, 2001). Furthermore, this study provides evidence that the quality
monitoring associated with a specific product unit may include ongoing quality
monitoring activities after the release of the product for distribution. In addition, these
“after the fact” activities, including document review, process testing and supplier
communication, play a role in recall effectiveness as defined by time to recall.
Because we expect that recalls will continue to be an unfortunate necessity, firms that
wish to differentiate themselves in the otherwise highly commoditized food industry may
find that improved recall effectiveness and, eventually, recall prevention through
conscious supply chain design and monitoring choices, including increased testing,
auditing and cooperative relationships with suppliers, may increase their value
proposition. This aspect of quality system implementation could be considered a form of
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corporate social responsibility, since product recalls impose health hazards on consumers
and costs to consumers individually and society as whole (Roberts, 2007; Scharff, 2011).
Our findings regarding SCRDC support the effectiveness, in the context of product
recalls, of industry self-monitoring. This is the central principle of many regulatory
enforcement systems, including that of the FDA. In the case of food product recalls, the
industry’s own monitoring is more effective than detection by a regulatory agency or a
consumer with respect to recall timing.

In other words, while regulatory agency

oversight is critical to holding firms accountable, it is not timely; consequently,
incentives need to be aligned to promote internal monitoring. Policy-makers may need to
consider regulations and policy which can provide incentives to firms to conduct more
internal monitoring and to focus on enforcement and compliance support efforts based on
the risk of contamination, compliance risk and the likelihood of affecting downstream
facilities.
In addition, the severity of impacts across firms and poor time to recall performance
of high recall breadth events (FDA-designated “major” recalls) highlights the importance
of targeting enforcement towards upstream commodity providers. However, in addition
to these findings (that agency enforcement activities are not as effective as supplier or
recalling firm monitoring with respect to time to recall), FDA and similar agencies will
continue to be challenged by resource constraints. As a result, the development and
implementation of regulations which improve incentive alignment in this industry and
other product safety contexts is critical to public health and safety.
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2.5.3 Limitations & Future Research
Our study is not without limitations. We are limited by the nature of the available
data in several ways. Secondary data require that the researcher identify the constructs of
interest and then determine if the data or suitable proxy measures are available to match
those constructs. Inevitably, there are constructs of interest that are not available, and
proxies, which while justified, are imperfect measures of the underlying construct (Roth,
Gray, Shockley & Weng, 2009). In some respects, we avoided some of these issues by
defining specific constructs, such as detection entity, a priori, and then coding the press
releases according to the specified definition. Some of our measures can be considered
objective (e.g., number of products recalled). In other respects, however, our data could
be criticized due to the use of potentially imprecise measures of shelf life, approximated
measures (firm revenue, firm employees) and, in some cases, the restricted sample size
due to missing data. Furthermore, the nature of product recalls is such that we cannot
construct a true panel dataset with repeated measures for firms over a number of years,
which restricts our analysis to time invariant predictors.
This analysis is conditioned on the population of food products that were recalled
over the time period of our sample; we do not observe food products that were not
subjected to recalls, which could be considered a form of right censoring. Nevertheless,
we believe that this model makes an important contribution with respect to disentangling
some of the firm, product and supply-chain related factors that influence time to recall
when a food product recall occurs.
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS
This study provides new and contrasting findings regarding the nature of factors that
influence time to recall in the context of food products.

This work is relevant to

academia, industry, and policy-makers. Given the ongoing trends towards increasing
levels of disintermediation, complex, long supply chains, contract manufacturing,
importation and concerns about terrorism and counterfeiting, it can be argued that new
sources of safety issues will continue to arise (Lyles et al., 2008; Roth et al., 2008ab). As
a result, conducting effective product recalls will continue to be of interest to consumers,
industry and policy-makers.
In addition to the ubiquitous nature of food, the conformance quality attributes of
food products are largely credence attributes and are difficult, or impossible, for
consumers to verify prior to purchase (Darby & Karni, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Roth et al.,
2008ab). Consequently, the industrial and regulatory systems that ensure quality in these
product categories are the primary safeguard against product harm due to conformance
quality failure. As a result, understanding the effectiveness of these systems in removing
potentially harmful products from the hands of consumers is an important societal issue.
Both industry and governmental agencies have responded to this trend, both by
increasing traceability and testing systems and regulatory requirements and enforcement
activities (FSIS, 2010; FDA, 2011a). Nevertheless, more work is necessary to ensure that
scarce resources are directed towards areas where the most benefit can be realized (FDA,
2011b).
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This study is part of a larger program of research and suggests multiple directions for
additional study. We believe that additional insights could be gained by applying the
framework of detection entity to other product contexts, including pharmaceuticals,
which can also be considered perishable products. As detailed in Appendix 2A, we
identified four distinct potential detection entities:

regulatory agencies, consumers,

recalling firms and suppliers, to recalling firms. We believe that an investigation which
parses out the relationship between different types of detection entities and recall timing
in a variety of perishable and durable product contexts would be useful for generating
additional insights into differences between durable and perishable products and quality
failure issues.
Our study does not delve into issues between the recalling firm and suppliers,
although we recognize that there are likely to be principal-agent issues with respect to the
supplier reporting of quality issues. Additionally, food producers face particular
challenges with respect to appraising quality and preventing external failures, since
quality attributes cannot always be tested or inspected (Roth et al., 2008ab).
The limits of “testability” in food and pharmaceutical products have become painfully
obvious in recent years due to the delayed discovery of substitute ingredients in pet food
(melamine) and heparin (oversulfated chondroitin sulfate) (FDA, 2010a). In light of the
well-known limitations of testability and increasing threats to food safety, there is an
urgent need to investigate which monitoring and governance structures are most effective
at minimizing external failure and incentivizing internal detection.
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CHAPTER 3
CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF PRODUCT RECALL
STRATEGIES: THE EFFECT OF ATTRIBUTION ON
REPURCHASE INTENT, RECALL SATISFACTION,
AND RECALL RESPONSIBILITY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This research explores how firm statements about the operational and supply chain
characteristics of product failure influence consumer perceptions and repurchase intent
when a product is recalled. A product recall is the publically announced removal from
the market of a product due to quality issues which constitute a potential safety hazard to
consumers, particularly if the quality issue constitutes a violation of applicable product
safety laws (CPSC, 2012a; FDA, 2011b; FSIS, 2012; 2012; NHSTA, 2006). Our study, a
vignette-based experiment, focuses on the context of recalled food products regulated by
the FDA, which regulates approximately 80% of the food products in the US,
representing an estimated 75% of consumer expenditures on food (Institute of Medicine
and National Research Council of the National Academies, 2010). Essay 2 investigates
FDA-regulated food recalls from the perspective of the consumer, aiming to answer the
following research question: how does information provided regarding operational and
supply chain management aspects of quality failure affect consumer perceptions and
repurchase intent when a product is recalled?
While the operations and supply chain management literature has not specifically
addressed the consumer side of product recalls, the marketing, communications and crisis
management literature suggests that firms that respond earlier and unambiguously take
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responsibility for product failures, when appropriate, will minimize reputational and
market share effects (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Pearson & Clair,
1998; Smith, Thomas, and Quelch, 1998).
The marketing literature has also established that consumers make spontaneous
evaluations of responsibility when products fail to meet their expectations; however, this
literature has not specifically addressed perceptions of the operational or supply chain
related information provided during a product recall (Folkes, 1984). In other words,
while the literature has, to some degree, evaluated how consumers respond to product
performance and quality issues and, in turn, how those responses relate to behavioral
intentions, we know very little about how consumers interpret information during a
product recall about the cause of a defect and the possible prevention of a future
recurrence. Consequently, the literature does not, with regard to recall communication,
indicate if it is preferable to communicate directly and candidly about the circumstances
of the product failure or to communicate only such information as is required by law.
Product recalls are conducted, in part, to reduce the level of consumer exposure to
potentially harmful products (Packman, 1998).

Product harm issues occur when a

product does not perform according to accepted safety standards. For consumer products
(e.g., electronics, toys, sporting equipment, furniture, and appliances), unsafe products
are associated with 32,000 deaths and 35 million injuries annually in the US and have
been demonstrated to impose costs in excess of $900 billion on the public (CPSC,
2012b). Product recalls can impact short-term demand across entire market segments
(Chu et al., 2005; Crafton et al., 1981; Marsh et al., 2004; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983;
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Thomsen et al., 2006), negatively influence share prices (Hoffer et al., 1988; Jarrell &
Peltzman, 1985; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011; Thomsen &
McKenzie, 2001), damage brand equity and influence consumer behavior with respect to
repurchase intent (Cleeren, Dekimpe, & Helsen, 2008; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). In
some cases, they also impact firm survival (Chen et al., 2009).
Recalls of all types of products have received attention from the media, policymakers, and industry, in part due to a recent upward trend in the total number of recalls
occurring in the US and due to the tremendous costs which defective, and potentially
hazardous, products impose on consumers, firms, and society as a whole (Bapuji, 2011;
FDA 2011b; Nestle, 2003; Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council of the
National Academy, 2010). This attention has been reflected by the academic community;
however, to date, the linkage between consumer perceptions of operational and supply
chain aspects of quality failures and indicators of future purchase behavior has not
explicitly been studied.
The initial public communication of a product recall is typically handled via a recall
announcement constructed by the firm conducting the recall.

While some of the

information included in these announcements is prescribed by regulation or agency
guidance, firms have the freedom to provide discretionary information which can shape
consumer impressions of the recall event. For example, when the Peanut Corporation of
America (PCA) recall of various peanut-based products cascaded throughout the US food
supply chain in 2009 and 2010, it affected firms that had used PCA products as
ingredients. These affected firms then conducted their own product recalls, often citing
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the cause of the recall as contamination introduced by a supplier (Wittenberger &
Dohlman, 2010).
We propose that this type of statement is a form of impression management used by
firms when accounting for negative events publically (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Folkes,
1988a). We use attribution theory to explain how consumers react to specific aspects of
operational and supply chain information provided in product recall announcements.
Attribution theory has been used extensively to explain how individuals ascribe causation
to everyday events, particularly when the events are perceived to be important, unusual,
and disconfirm a prior expectation (Folkes, 1988; Weiner, 2000). In other words, this
research focuses on what firms communicate about the failures that cause product recalls
and, in turn, how consumers react.
Our investigation is tied to the operations and supply chain management field in two
ways: first, details of defects, including where and how they occur and how they will be
prevented in the future, are supply chain attributes. Second, only those firms with the
requisite operational capabilities will have the opportunity to choose to disclose
discretionary information in the event of a product recall. To the extent that consumers
respond to information provided by the firm, their future behavior regarding the purchase
of the same or similar products and brands may be influenced (Folkes, 1984; 1988ab;
Folkes & Kotsos, 1986; Siomkos & Kurzbad, 1991; Weiner, 2000).
This study advances the understanding of consumer behavior relative to operational
and supply chain information under product recall conditions, which is important for two
reasons. First, firms conducting recalls need concrete evidence of how consumers react
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to these events; such reactions are difficult, if not impossible, to measure during actual
product recall events. Indirect recall costs, which include reduced market share and
reputational effects, are difficult to measure and believed to be significantly greater than
the more easily measureable direct costs, such as warranty, litigation, product
replacement and reverse logistics (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003). As such, we
argue that studying consumer perceptions and behavior in response to product recalls is
of particular importance. If, in fact, managing consumer impressions through specific
types of communication can minimize negative market share effects, firms not only have
incentives to potentially be more transparent in their recall announcements, but to also
develop the necessary capabilities so that the relevant causal information is available at
the time of the recall announcement.
Second, policy-makers need to better understand consumer reactions to recall
announcements under a variety of conditions. Such understanding is critical to the design
and implementation of effective regulations, particularly with respect to aligning firm
incentives for reducing external quality failures and conducting product recalls
responsibly.
Figure 3.1 depicts a framework of factors which influence the consumer perceptions
of product recalls, ultimately resulting in behavioral outcomes.

In our behavioral

experiment, we manipulate the factors of locus, controllability, and corrective action
(defined in Section 3.2) in product recall announcements, holding other factors, such as
product type, recall timing and recall severity, constant.
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework: Product Recall Announcements
and Consumer Behavior
Manipulated
Experimental
Factors

Factors
Held
Constant

•
•
•

Other Recall Factors
(Held Constant)

Product Recall
Announcement

•
•
•

Locus
Controllability
Corrective Action

Product Type
Recall Timing
Severity

Consumer
Perceptions

Consumer
Behavior

3.1.1 A Behavioral Framework of Consumer Perceptions of Product Recalls
We posit that consumer behavior is influenced by the perceptions of the recall event.
Consumer reactions to a product recall are expected to include assessments of
responsibility for the recall (e.g., recall responsibility) and an orientation towards future
purchases of the same product (e.g., repurchase intent). In addition to the notions of
recall responsibility and repurchase intent, we add the concept of recall satisfaction to
indicate the consumer’s level of satisfaction with the recalling firm’s handling of the
recall event.
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Other consumer behaviors, which may be influenced in this framework, include
complaining behavior or negative word-of-mouth (Folkes, 1984), temporary withdrawal
from purchases of products similar to that recalled (Bougie et al., 2003; Zeelenberg &
Peters, 2007), in addition to whether the consumer responds to the recall by checking for
the recalled product in their home and, if found, whether the consumer ignores the
warning and consumes the product, discards the product, or seeks a refund for the product
(Hallman et al., 2009). Our study focuses on perceived recall responsibility, repurchase
intent, and recall satisfaction, specifically on the effects of manipulating communication
of locus (internal to or external to the firm conducting the recall), controllability (under
the volitional control of the firm conducting the recall or its supply) and corrective action
(a corrective action for the defect is given or withheld) on these dependent variables.
We develop theoretical constructs and operational definitions, tentatively validate
measures, and then conduct a pilot study using a fractionated factorial experimental
design with a single food product type. Our experiment uses vignettes based on actual
firm announcements of product recalls to collect responses from a sample of students and
non-student participants. We use our pilot data (179 subjects) to construct measurement
models for multi-item dependent and covariate scales and then test our hypotheses using
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA).
In this exploratory study, we find support for effects of locus, controllability and
corrective action on recall satisfaction and responsibility, consistent with the directions
indicated by attribution theory. In other words, when a firm explains that a supplier was
the source of a contamination, on average; consumers are more satisfied with the
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handling of the recall and attribute responsibility to the supplier more so than the
manufacturer. Uncontrollable causes, which might be believed to be more excusable that
controllable causes, are associated with higher levels of repurchase intent and recall
satisfaction. Corrective actions are, as expected, associated with higher levels of recall
satisfaction. While these initial findings are intriguing, we propose further modifications
to the measures and scenarios and suggest future applications of this experiment with an
expanded design in a more demographically heterogeneous sample.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide background
on product recalls, and more specifically, food product recalls, and then develop a
hypothesized model of how the content of firm communication lead to consumer
perceptions and behavior based on attribution theory. We then develop our hypotheses
based on the proposed conceptual model (Section 3.3). We explain our research design
(Section 3.4), including the preliminary development of scenarios and measures, and a
process of measurement validation, which concludes with the collection of the pilot data.
Next, we analyze the pilot data using latent variable methods to validate measurement
models and MANCOVA to test our theoretically-based hypotheses (Section 3.5).
Finally, we discuss our results and implications and propose further measurement
modifications for the future deployment of this study (Section 3.6).
3.2 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
3.2.1 Product Recall Announcements
When a product is recalled, firms construct a response which includes communicating
with regulatory agencies, informing the public and managing returns, replacements,
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repairs or refunds. Typically, the first official public indication of that response is a
product recall announcement which, in the US, is usually issued by the firm conducting
the recall under the guidance of the regulating agency, such as the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (toys, electronics, sporting goods and other consumer products), the
FSIS (meat, poultry and egg products), the National Highway and Traffic Safety
Administration (automobiles) or the FDA (food products including in-shell eggs, dairy,
fruits, vegetables, and seafood and pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and medical devices).
Regardless of the product type or agency involved, product recall announcements
share common features, including descriptions of the products affected, the nature of the
defect and the hazard, where the product was sold, contact information for the firm
conducting the recall, and instructions for handling the recalled product. Other types of
information, specifically where (locus), how and why (indicating controllability) the
defect occurred and any information regarding corrective actions (stability) intended to
prevent future occurrence of the same defect are suggested by agency guidance, but not
required.

This study focused on the effectiveness and outcomes of providing

discretionary operational and supply chain information about the nature of the product
quality issue, specifically in the context of food product recalls regulated by the FDA.
3.2.2 Attribution Theory
Attribution theory, originally developed by Heider (1958), has been used to explain
how consumers make causal inferences when experiencing life events, products and
services (Heider, 1958; Folkes, 1988ab). The underlying premise of this theory is this:
although individuals’ attribution of causality is not without error or bias, the process is
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relatively logical, and, ultimately, affects future behavior (Folkes, 1988). Furthermore,
the dimensions of attribution theory have been found to have particularly high predictive
validity when the situation involves unexpected and negative outcomes, which matches
the product recall context (Coombs, 2007).
Attribution theory has been studied relative to self-perception, motivation (Kelley,
1972; Weiner & Kukla, 1970), and in the marketing literature, perceptions of product
quality failures or product harm events (Folkes, 1984; Klein & Dawar, 2004). We adapt
this theory to operationalize the three dimensions of causal attributions with respect to
operational and supply chain characteristics of product quality failures.

Table 3.1

describes how each of the three dimensions of attribution theory corresponds to our
operational definitions in the operations management and supply chain context. We
suggest that communications by the firm are subsequently interpreted by the audience
receiving the message. In this case, it is the consumer receiving the message (Coombs &
Holladay, 1996). Attribution theory predicts that consumer causal attributions regarding
product quality issues would fall along three dimensions: locus, controllability, and
stability (Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000).

We adapt the theory to the context of the

operational and supply chain aspects of the defect, defining locus as internal or external,
corresponding to defects that occur inside or outside the boundaries of the operations of
the firm conducting the recall (Klein & Dawar, 2004).
Following prior use of attribution theory, controllable causes exist when the firm
conducting the recall, or its supplier, has a higher degree of volitional control over the
cause of the defect. Uncontrollable causes reflect an inability to influence the occurrence
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of a defect, based on the procedures and policies in place at the time the defect occurred.
As an example, if a pathogen is detected by a food producer in their raw materials or
finished goods and the test result is not reported or acted upon, the defect is characterized
as controllable. In other words, the firm had the necessary information to prevent the
defect from passing on to the consumer, but failed to do so. Alternatively, a temporary
refrigeration failure not detected by the food producer prior to the product being
distributed, but which causes a quality problem that results in a recall, would be
considered an uncontrollable cause.
It could be argued that the producer has the responsibility to monitor their operations
more closely, and therefore, should have detected the refrigeration failure. Nevertheless,
from the perspective of attribution theory, this type of failure is considered
uncontrollable, while the deliberate non-reporting of a defective quality test result is
controllable. Controllable/uncontrollable defects, as such, occur along a continuum from
deliberate contamination by the producing firm to events that a producer has little to no
control over, such as the unanticipated quality impacts of a natural disaster.
Finally, the causal attribution dimension of stability is mapped to our construct of
corrective action. Stable causes are those that consumers can reasonably expect to
happen again in the future (Dawar & Klein, 2004; Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000);
consequently, firms that provide information in the recall announcement describing
corrective actions which will minimize the likelihood of recurrence of the same defect are
signaling that the cause is unstable. We propose that corrective action is a proxy for one
dimension of stability, acknowledging that other aspects of stability may be salient,
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including firm reputation, compliance and product recall history and other past actions.
Table 3A.1 provides operational definitions for all of the constructs used in our study
(See Appendix 3A).
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Table 3.1 Causal Attribution Dimensions and Operations Management/Supply
Chain Management Operational Definitions
Attribution
Operational Definition
Dimension
INTERNAL LOCUS occurs when a defect that causes a product
recall occurs INSIDE the manufacturing firm. In other words, the
defect is because of something that happened within the
manufacturer's operations.
Locus

Controllability

EXTERNAL LOCUS occurs when a defect that causes a product
recall occurs OUTSIDE the manufacturing firm. In other words, the
defect is because of something that happened at a supplier or
retailer, or some other entity other than the manufacturer.
CONTROLLABILITY is the degree to which the occurrence of the
defect is under the volitional control of the firm conducting the
recall or their supplier. Consequently, a defect that is more highly
UNCONTROLLABLE would be one which would be unanticipated
and difficult to detect.
A STABLE DEFECT is a product defect that the consumer could
reasonably expect to occur again in the future. STABLE DEFECTS
are indicated by a lack of communication regarding any potential

Corrective
Action/Stability

CORRECTIVE ACTION which would minimize the risk of
recurrence of that particular defect in the future.
An UNSTABLE DEFECT is a product defect that the consumer
could reasonably expect NOT TO OCCUR in the future.
UNSTABLE DEFECTS are indicated communication regarding
potential CORRECTIVE ACTION which would minimize the risk
of recurrence of that particular defect in the future.

98

3.2.2.1 Product Recall Announcements and Supply Chain Capabilities
When product recalls are announced, firms have the opportunity and often choose to
include types of information not required by regulation. For example, during the pet food
recalls, which occurred due to melamine contamination (Roth et al., 2008ab), and the
recalls which occurred due to the use of salmonella-contaminated peanut products from
the Peanut Corporation of America, suppliers were identified as the source of the defect
when the individual firms announced the recalls. In making these statements, firms may
attempt to deflect blame from their own processes, which is one way to defend against
customer backlash due to product harm.
Blame deflection is only possible if the firm has relevant and reliable information
(i.e., where the failure occurred, the nature of the failure and possible future prevention)
on hand at the time the recall is announced. Such information, even if available, takes
time to confirm and configure into an appropriate statement which satisfies agency
requirements, internal stakeholders (e.g., legal counsel) and external stakeholders (e.g.,
suppliers, distributors and retailers). In this way, we argue that operational competencies,
derived from monitoring systems, supply chain design, and relationships with channel
partners, have a direct bearing on the type of impression management options available to
a firm conducting a recall.
Similar to providing information about the locus of a defect, firms may provide
information about the level of volitional control associated with the cause of the defect.
A controllable cause may be relatively straightforward to explain in terms of preventing
future occurrences, for example, by explaining the corrective actions which the firm will
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take to remedy the defect’s cause. Conversely, an uncontrollable cause may not be as
amenable to a corrective action, but may be better tolerated by the consumer.
Communicating a corrective action, regardless of the underlying nature of the defect’s
cause, may be undertaken to signal the firm’s intentions to correct the situation that
allowed the defect to occur. By communicating the unstable nature of the cause (i.e., it is
unlikely to reoccur), firms can reassure consumers of their good intentions, in addition to
influencing the consumer’s perception of the risk of the product.
As with locus, we argue that the firm’s ability to communicate information about
controllability and corrective actions is limited by the competence of the firm conducting
the recall and its supply chain partners relative to rapidly communicating, investigating
the underlying cause of the defect, and developing a suitable remedy. Given the short
time frame available to firms when constructing a recall announcement (once a defect is
confirmed), we suggest that only firms with superior capabilities in these dimensions will
have the option to manage consumer impressions along all three attribution dimensions.
By investigating the effect of these dimensions on consumer perceptions and
behavioral intentions, we aim to offer firms a prescription which 1) distinguishes when
higher levels of transparency may be preferred, 2) links the development of the supply
chain competencies with the opportunity to manage risk in the event of a product recall,
and 3) suggests what type of policy interventions might be necessary to align firm
incentives with the desired action. To this end, we argue that the current regulatory
systems may allow firms to inappropriately deflect blame (e.g., to suppliers) and that the
required content of a product recall announcement could influence firm actions to prevent
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recalls (i.e., because the information required in the recall announcement will impact
consumer impressions negatively) and impose consequences via the recall announcement
(i.e., because required information provides consumers with a clearer picture of the
nature of the failure).
Before offering our hypotheses which address the relationships between attributions
and consumer perceptions and behavioral intentions, we fully develop our conceptual
basis for our dependent variables:

perceived recall responsibility, perceived recall

satisfaction, and repurchase intent.
3.3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT
3.3.1 Perceptions of Recall Responsibility
Attributions have been linked to the assessment of blame or responsibility in multiple
contexts; forming a judgment about accountability for a situation is a precursor to
forming an intention to change behavior (Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). We propose that
perceived recall responsibility, defined as the degree to which the consumer holds the
supplier, or the firm, conducting the recall responsible for the recall event, is a key
dependent variable, because making justifications regarding the underlying cause of the
defect is intended, in part, to diffuse responsibility (Laufer, 2002; Laufer et al., 2005).
The crisis management literature, in particular, has focused on attributions which lead
to the assignment of responsibility, since higher levels of responsibility are related to
negative reputational effects, in this context (Bülow-Moller, 2010; Coombs, 2004;
Coombs & Holladay, 2002). To return to the example of the hundreds of recalls related
to the Peanut Corporation of America salmonella contamination, many of those recalls
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included a statement explaining that the supplier was the source of the contamination. In
some cases, the supplier was named.
We distinguish three separate types of responsibility assignment which correspond,
respectively, to the degree of responsibility attributed by the consumer to 1) the supplier,
2) the manufacturer, and 3) being shared by both the supplier and the manufacturer. We
find this to be appropriate to our research context, because our extensive review of food
recalls indicates that recall announcements commonly include information which cue
attributions of responsibility to either the manufacturer or an upstream supplier. Because
the manufacturer (e.g., the purchasing organization) is the producer of the finished good
in our context, we include the concept of shared responsibility to capture the idea that
recall responsibility resides within supply chain partners, to some degree, when the defect
originates with the supplier.
3.3.2 Perceived Recall Satisfaction
Recall announcements are a medium which conveys multiple types of information,
including the affected product specifications, the nature of the hazard, details about the
defect and its cause, and remedies (e.g., refund, repair, replacement). Based on consumer
preferences for specific types of information, and analogous to the construct of purchase
satisfaction (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004), we propose that recall satisfaction is defined as
the degree to which the consumer’s expectations regarding the handling of a product
recall are met by the firm announcing the recall.
Studies investigating consumer response to recall announcements with respect to risk
reduction have found that consumers have definite preferences for the amount and type of
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information provided regarding a recall (Hallman et al., 2009). Among the types of
information considered “very important”, consumers included hazard information, any
confirmed illnesses, a description of the affected product, what to do with the affected
product, what is being done to fix the problem which caused the recall, and how the
defect occurred. Of these types of information, the latter two (what is being done to fix
the problem and how the defect occurred) are recommended; however, they are not
required for inclusion in the announcement. The preceding items are required and appear
in every press release announcing a food recall.
Purchase satisfaction has been studied extensively as a predictor of repurchase intent
and brand loyalty (Oliver, 1993; Oliver & DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver & Swan, 1989;
Westbrook & Oliver, 1991; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). The commonly used definition
is phrased in terms of expectation confirmation or disconfirmation: purchase satisfaction
occurs to the degree that a consumer’s expectations regarding a product are met or
exceeded (Oliver, 1993). Analogously, we argue that recall satisfaction is an important
dependent variable in our research context, because it is an indicator of consumer’s
perceptions of the adequacy of firm response and remedies.
3.3.3 Repurchase Intent
Repurchase intent, defined as a consumer’s intent regarding the future purchase of a
product that they have already purchased at some time in the past, has long been studied
as an outcome variable, particularly in the marketing literature. In studies specific to
consumer reactions to product harm and recall events, repurchase intent has been linked
to corporate social responsibility statements, brand equity (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Klein
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& Dawar, 2004), and perceived risk (de Matos & Rossi, 2006; Siomkos & Kurzbard,
1994). In the product harm context, repurchase intent has not been hypothesized as a
direct outcome of consumer’s causal attributions, in part due to the mediating influence
of purchase satisfaction (dissatisfaction) theorized, and has been demonstrated to account
for significant variance in repurchase intent in more general consumer contexts
(Anderson & Mittal, 2000; Mittal & Kamakura, 2001).

Nevertheless, due to the

prevalence of studies examining the demand impacts of product recalls, both for the
recalling brand and for other brands (Chu et al., 2005; Crafton et al., 1981; Marsh et al.,
2004; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen et al., 2006), we argue that it is important to
consider the potential direct effects of attributions on repurchase intent.
3.3.4 Effects of Causal Attributions
We hypothesize that locus and controllability have direct effects on each of our
dependent variables: perceived recall responsibility (e.g., supplier, manufacturer, and
shared responsibility), recall satisfaction and repurchase intent.

Our construct of

corrective action, which maps to attribution theory’s stability dimension, is hypothesized
to have a direct effect on recall satisfaction and repurchase intent. This exploratory study
is limited by the use of a fractionated factorial experimental; main effects and interaction
effects are aliased with each other and therefore cannot be separately tested. The logic
and theoretical basis for the hypothesized main effects are developed in the following
sections. Figure 3.2 depicts the hypothesized relationships tested in this exploratory
study.
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Figure 3.2 Hypothesized Model

Product Recall Announcement
Attribution Dimensions

Consumer Perceptions/Behavior

EXPERIMENTAL FACTORS
Manipulated High/Low

H1a,b,c, d, e
Locus
(Internal =0 – defect occurs
inside recalling firm; External
=1 – defect occurs outside
recalling firm)

H2a,b,c, d, e
Controllability
(Controllable=0;
Uncontrollable=1 -Volitional
Component)

Repurchase Intent

Note 1: Allow Repurchase Intent,
Recall Satisfaction and Attribution of
Responsibility to covary

Recall Satisfaction

Attribution of
ResponsibilityManufacturer
Shared
(single item
measure)

H3a,b
Attribution of
Responsibility
- Supplier
(single item
measure)

Corrective Action
(Unstable =0 Corrective
Action Provided; Stable=1 No
Corrective Action )

Attribution of
Responsibility
- Shared
(single item
measure)

Covariates
• Perceived Risk Difference (Pretest)
• Purchase Dissatisfaction
• Gender
• Education
• Age
• Illness experience
• Recall awareness
• Relevant work experience

3.3.4.1 Locus
Locus is operationalized in our study, consistent with the literature, as internal
(corresponding to defects that originate within the recalling firm’s organization) or
external (corresponding to defects that originate within a supplier’s organization). In our
review of food product recalls, we observed that where such information is applicable,
firms tend to include information regarding a supplier’s role in contributing to a defect
that results in a recall. This type of impression management would seem to attempt to

105

shift blame for a recall and any resulting negative consequences, such as injury or illness,
away from the firm conducting the recall.
Consistent with attribution theory, we hypothesize that, as blame is focused away
from the firm conducting the recall (external locus), both the repurchase intent for the
recalled item and recall satisfaction will be higher, as compared with the recalls with an
internal locus (Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 2000).. Thus, a reduction in actual repurchase
intent would be represented by a positive coefficient (e.g., towards a higher agreement
with statements that indicate that the recall has negatively affected intentions to
repurchase). This wording is consistent with prior work in the product harm context
(Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).
Similarly, we hypothesize that external representations of locus would have the effect
of increasing recall satisfaction, holding other factors constant, because consumers will
approve of the recalling firm’s handling of the situation more when blame is shifted
externally. Recall satisfaction is operationalized as the degree to which the consumer’s
expectations regarding the handling of a product recall are met by the firm conducting the
recall. Higher levels of recall satisfaction are associated with higher levels of agreement
with our measurement items. In other words, repurchase intent and recall satisfaction will
be more favorable for external locus causes than for internal locus causes.
More formally, these two hypotheses are stated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1a External locus is associated with higher levels of repurchase intent
as compared to internal locus causes.
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HYPOTHESIS 1b External locus is associated with higher levels of recall satisfaction
as compared to internal locus causes.
When the recall announcement describes the source of a defect as external to the
recalling firm (i.e., in our context, the defect source is the supplier), the announcement
provides a cue to the consumer that responsibility is associated, at least in part, with an
entity other than the firm conducting the recall. As such, we hypothesize that external
locus will be associated with higher levels of supplier responsibility and lower levels of
manufacturing responsibility. Furthermore, while we hypothesize that consumers will
shift the attribution of responsibility towards the supplier, in these situations, the firm
conducting the recall (e.g., the purchasing firm, in this instance) will be perceived as
sharing accountability for the defect with the supplier. If supported, the implication of
this hypothesis is that while describing the supplier as the source of a defect has the effect
of shifting some responsibility away from the purchasing firm, it does not absolve the
purchasing firm completely. Consistent with this logic, we hypothesize that:
HYPOTHESIS 1c External locus causes is associated with lower levels of perceived
manufacturer responsibility, as compared with internal locus causes.
HYPOTHESIS 1d External locus causes is associated higher levels of perceived
supplier responsibility as compared with internal locus causes.
HYPOTHESIS 1e External locus is associated higher levels of perceived shared
responsibility as compared with internal locus causes.
3.3.4.2 Controllability
Controllability captures the volitional role of entities involved in causation.

A

controllable defect is one in which the supplier or manufacturer has volitional control
over the circumstances that allowed the defect to happen or pass on to the consumer. For
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example, in a study which explores consumer reactions to product failure using
attribution theory, the example is given of a weight loss supplement which does not
perform as expected (e.g., the consumer does not lose weight when using it). A failure
scenario controlled by the consumer included not following the diet prescribed to
accompany the weight loss supplement. Conversely, a failure scenario not controllable
by the consumer was related to an illness which required a prescription medication which
interfered with the active ingredient in the weight loss supplement. The consumer, in this
instance, was unaware that the medication would interfere with the supplement (Folkes,
1984). The key difference between these two situations, with respect to attribution
theory, is the consumer’s volition with respect to the failure. By not following the
recommended diet, even while aware of the potential adverse effect on the weight loss
program, the consumer has exercised volition which affects the outcome. In the case of
the illness, which required a prescription medication, there is an absence of volition due
to the illness and the consumer’s lack of awareness of the potential for the prescription to
affect the outcome (Folkes, 1984). In an experiment based on similar scenarios, and a
survey-based study, Folkes (1984) linked controllability to anger responses related to
product failure.
We argue that controllability of the underlying cause of a defect which causes a
product recall will influence consumer perceptions for how the recall is being handled
(recall satisfaction), assessments of responsibility for the recall, and repurchase intent. In
our operationalization of controllability, we distinguish between causes under the
complete volitional control of either the recalling firm or their supplier (i.e., a quality test
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result is ignored by the recalling firm or their supplier), as compared with less volitional
causes (i.e., a lightning strike causes a power failure which leads to loss of refrigeration
and contributes to contamination, but the loss of refrigeration goes undetected). While
we might argue that all manufacturing circumstances are, to some extent, under the
supervision, and consequently, control, of the recalling firm or their supplier, the
scenarios which include the undetected loss of refrigeration are comparatively less
controllable (i.e., being due to an extreme event, such as a lightning strike, and
undetected, indicating, since it was unknown, that the failure was not a result of
deliberate or volitional action). As a result, we expect consumer perceptions of these
failures to differ, based on the idea that controllable failures, to some degree, demonstrate
a willful neglect of potential adverse effects for consumers. Therefore, we would expect
consumers to, on average, respond negatively, with correspondingly lower levels of
repurchase intent and recall satisfaction.

In other words, repurchase intent and recall

satisfaction will be more favorable for uncontrollable causes than for controllable causes.
More formally, these hypotheses are stated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2a Controllability is associated with reduced repurchase intent.
HYPOTHESIS 2b Controllability is associated with reduced recall satisfaction.
Because controllability is understood to incorporate volition, it follows that an
individual or organization that has control over an outcome or situation can also be held
accountable. We argue that this provides the rationale for a direct linkage between
controllability and perceived responsibility in our research context.

Assignment of

responsibility is a key feature of attribution theory, since determining a responsible party
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reduces the uncertainty associated with a negative situation (Weiner, 1995). As a result,
we hypothesize that consumers seeking to reduce the uncertainty regarding the safety of a
specific product – and food products, in general – will have a strong need to assign
responsibility, and that cues as to the controllability of the defect will increase
attributions of responsibility to entities involved in the recall. We expect to observe the
effects of controllability on each of our perceived responsibility constructs, resulting in
higher levels of responsibility attributed to manufacturers and suppliers individually, and
higher levels of shared responsibility when the defect is controllable. These hypotheses
are stated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2c Controllability is positively associated with perceived manufacturer
responsibility.
HYPOTHESIS 2d Controllability is positively associated with perceived supplier
responsibility.
HYPOTHESIS 2e Controllability is positively associated with perceived shared
responsibility
3.3.4.3 Corrective Action (Stability)
Stability relates to the permanence of the cause of the defect (Folkes, 1984). A stable
defect is one that a consumer could reasonably expect to occur again in the future. An
unstable defect is one that the consumer can reasonably expect will not occur again in the
future (Folkes, 1994). Stability is called corrective action and is operationalized by
providing (unstable) or withholding (stable) information regarding a corrective action.
Typically, quality management systems include procedures for investigating the
underlying cause of failures, including environmental, health and safety and quality
failures. Once a root cause is determined, the organization can determine what type of
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remedy, or corrective action, to put in place to minimize the risk of the same problem
occurring in the future.
The FDA requires that firms report corrective actions to the agency as part of the
process of closing out a product recall event (FDA, 2009a).

While FDA guidance

suggests that product recall announcements include information regarding corrective
actions, such information is not required by regulation. In our review of food product
recall announcements, we find that less than 2% of recall announcements provide any
information regarding the investigation of root cause or corrective action. We speculate
that firms may be reluctant to provide corrective action information due to liability
concerns (i.e., describing the corrective action implies what could have been done to
prevent the defect in the first place, which could contribute to liability) or, simply, that
due to the pressure of needing to announce a recall quickly after a defect is detected,
firms do not have the time to adequately determine the appropriate corrective action
(Packman, 1998).
Prior research has indicated that, in a product recall context, consumers consider
information related to how a quality problem will be remedied to prevent recurrence
“very important” (Hallman et al., 2009). Attribution theory would predict that unstable
causes (i.e., those causes for which a corrective action is stated in the recall
announcement) create less concern for consumers with respect to repurchase intent, in
part because the danger, or risk, associated with the product would be considered smaller,
because the probability of recurrence is lower than that of a stable defect cause.
Furthermore, by providing a cue that the cause is unstable, the recalling firm can convey

111

a sense of urgency in remedying the problem and influence consumer perceptions that the
recall is being managed appropriately.

We, therefore, hypothesize that omitting

information regarding a corrective action has a negative effect on repurchase intent and
recall satisfaction; in effect, when recall announcements contain information regarding a
proposed corrective action, consumers have more positive perceptions of recall handling
(recall satisfaction) and higher levels of repurchase intent. In other words, repurchase
intent and recall satisfaction will be less favorable when no corrective action is
communicated than for when a corrective action is communicated.
More formally, we propose the following:
HYPOTHESIS 3a Corrective action communications are associated with higher levels
of repurchase intent.
HYPOTHESIS 3b Corrective action communications are associated with higher levels
of recall satisfaction.
3.3.4.4 Covariates
Consistent with other studies that evaluate consumer perceptions of a product harm
issue, we include a number of covariates (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; de Matos & Rossi,
2006; Jolly & Mowen, 1985; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Mowen, 1980; Mowen, Jolly &
Nickell, 1981; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1991). The purpose of the covariates is to parcel
out the variance in our dependent variables that is related to the plausible control
variables, rather than the hypothesized relationships of interest. We control for perceived
purchase risk, purchase dissatisfaction, several demographic covariates, including gender,
age and education level, and several experience-related variables (e.g., relevant work
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experience, recall awareness, and illness experience). The following sections describe
the nature and purpose of the covariates in more detail.
3.3.4.4.1 Perceived Purchase Risk
Perceived purchase risk is the consumer’s assessment of potential adverse
consequences associated with a purchasing goal (Cox & Rich, 1964; Bettman, 1973;
1979; Dowling & Staelin, 1994). Increasing the probability and severity of adverse
consequences increases the perceived risk.

In evaluating risk, consumers consider

various types of loss which could result from the purchase decision, including poor
product performance, loss of social status, physical loss, financial loss, time,
psychological losses and frustration (Taylor, 1974). Higher levels of perceived risk with
respect to a purchasing decision lead to a variety of risk-reduction behaviors among
consumers, including extensive searching behaviors, evaluation of larger amounts and
more varied types of information, and product trials (Dowling & Staelin, 1994;
Gemunden, 1985).
We adopt perceived risk as a subjective assessment of risk from the consumer’s
perspective, rather than an objective measure of risk (Bauer, 1960; Mitchell, 1999).
Perceived risk is defined as consisting of two components: some level of probabilistic
belief about the likelihood of a negative outcome and a belief regarding the level of
consequences (loss or harm) associated with a negative outcome (Cunningham, 1967;
Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Mitchell, 1999).
Because one component of perceived risk includes an assessment of the probability of
a negative consequence, we expect that providing evidence of a negative consequence
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will increase perceived risk, regardless of any attributional manipulations (Bettman,
1973; 1979; Taylor, 1974; Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Mitchell, 1999). Our study is
specifically designed to offer evidence of potential physical loss by revealing the
potential hazard associated with the product under recall. We control for the level of
perceived purchase risk present prior to the experimental treatment to parcel out variance
that is due to individual level differences in the baseline perceptions of risk.
3.3.4.4.2 Perceived Purchase Dissatisfaction
Purchase satisfaction occurs to the degree that a consumer’s expectations regarding a
product are met or exceeded (Oliver, 1993). This concept can be extended to encompass
dissatisfaction and incorporating negative expectation disconfirmation. Dissatisfaction
has been linked to evaluations of product quality; we expect that by manipulating the
experimental scenario to indicate poor product quality, and specifically a potentially
hazardous product, that significant levels of purchase dissatisfaction will result. This is
consistent with the notion that a food product recalled due to a safety issue does not meet
the most basic expectations for quality. We operationally define purchase dissatisfaction
as occurring when a consumer’s expectations about a product’s performance are not met
(Oliver, 1993; Oliver & DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver & Swan, 1989; Westbrook & Oliver,
1991).
The relationship between purchase dissatisfaction and repurchase intent has been
demonstrated to be stronger than that of satisfaction and repurchase intent (Anderson &
Mittal, 2000).

We consequently argue that controlling for the effects of purchase

dissatisfaction on our dependent variables is appropriate and necessary.
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3.3.4.4.3 Demographics, Recall Awareness and Relevant Experiences
Individual level characteristics may influence satisfaction levels, assignment of
responsibility and repurchase intent (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001). Therefore, we control
for gender, age and level of education. The prevalence of food recalls over the past few
years may have altered individual perceptions of food recalls, in general. Consequently,
we control for recent personal experiences with foodborne illness (perceived) and the
awareness of recalls occurring within the past year.

Because subjects with work

experience in areas related to food (food service or food manufacturing) or healthcare
may have specialized knowledge that influences their perceptions of food recalls, we
control for the presences of these types of experiences.
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
We use a 23 experimental design (two levels each for locus, controllability and
corrective action) with a random assignment to test our hypothesized model (Table 2.2).
Randomization of the treatment assignment minimizes the possibility that effects are due
to a form of selection bias. For this exploratory study, we use a fractionated factorial
design, consisting of four treatment combinations. This design allows us to test the
effects of locus, controllability, and corrective action on our dependent variables. Table
3.2 depicts the treatment combinations and coding scheme used for the experiment.
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Scenario
Number
1
2
3
4

Table 3.2 Treatment Combinations & Coding
Locus
Control
Corrective Action
External –
High = 1
Internal –
Low = 0
Internal –
Low = 0
External –
High =1

Controllable –
Low =0
Uncontrollable –
High =1
Controllable –
Low =0
Uncontrollable –
High =1

Corrective Action –
Low = 0
Corrective Action –
Low = 0
No Corrective Action
– High = 1
No Corrective Action
– High = 1

3.4.1 Vignettes and Measures
Our experiment is administered as a framed field experiment which consists of
exposing participants to a written scenario, or vignette, to provide the stimulus for the
treatment (Rungtusanatham, Wallin & Eckerd, 2011). A vignette-based experiment is
appropriate for several reasons. First, it is not possible to cause a product recall to
measure consumer reactions, nor is it possible to pre-test consumer perceptions prior to a
product recall. Second, vignettes have been successfully used in the marketing literature
to test various hypotheses regarding brands and product harm events, as well as in the
operations management literature (Gürhan-Canli & Batra, 2004; Jolly & Mowen, 1985;
Mowen et al., 1981; Rungtusanatham et al., 2011; Tsiros & Mittal, 2004). The vignettes
describe a purchase scenario followed by the discovery that the purchased item has been
recalled. Pre-test items were administered after a brief set of experimental instructions,
followed by the purchase and recall scenario, post-test items and manipulation checks.
To ensure appropriate measurement validity and reliability, we developed
measurement items and the experimental vignettes following an iterative process that
combines elements of recommended scale development practices (Churchill, 1979; Roth,
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Schroeder, Huang, & Kristal, 2007) and an experimental vignette design (Hall, 2012;
Rungtusanatham et al., 2011).

The combined measurement development process is

depicted in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 Vignette and Measurement Development (Adapted from Roth, et al.,
2007 and Rungtusanatham et al., 2011)

Vignette Design
Specify Theoretical Domain &
Operational Definitions of Constructs
•
•

Research Context
Factors of Interest

•
•

Common Module
Experimental Cues

Generate Items
•
•

Literature Review
Item Creation

Vignette Validation
•
•
•
•

Experimental Protocol
Manipulation Checks
Time Required
Clarity

Purify & Pretest Items
•
•

Refine Vignette
& Measurement
Items

Pilot Test &
Analysis

Item Sorting
Subject Feedback

After reviewing the literature to develop our research context and factors of interest,
we developed a set of tentative constructs and operational definitions. Our literature
review included relevant government regulations, guidance, and reports from the
Government Accountability Office, which studies recall systems, and the content and
format of all press releases issued for food product recalls from 2008 through 2010, in
addition to marketing, operations and supply chain management literature.

Our

measurement and vignette development process consisted of the following steps: 1) a
pen and paper exercise using a preliminary vignette and open ended questions in an MBA
class; 2) item sorting exercises; 3) vignette pre-testing to assess clarity, readability, time
required to complete the exercise and comprehension of the manipulation checks; and 4)
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final measurement item and vignette refinement prior to administering the experiment to
a pilot group of student and non-student participants.
3.4.2 Vignette Development
3.4.2.1 Pen & Paper Exercise – MBA Students
A pen and paper pilot exercise was conducted with 15 MBA students as a
preliminary assessment of vignettes and measurement items. This exercise provided
confirmation of the realism of the vignette and a sense of the amount of time subjects
would need to complete this type of exercise, in addition to providing preliminary
feedback on the effectiveness of the manipulations. Appendix 3B contains the four sets
of vignettes and questions used in the pen and paper exercise. We also noted that the
participants:

1) in general, attributed responsibility to the manufacturer or supplier

consistent with the manipulation of locus, 2) responded to the use of the word
“voluntary” in the recall announcement as a positive statement regarding the firm’s
handling of the recall, 3) responded to the product recall announcement with reduced
repurchase intentions and 4) had stated preferences about what type of information they
were interested in seeing in a recall announcement consistent with prior studies (Hallman
et al., 2009). As a result of this exercise, we chose to exclude the word “voluntary” from
our vignettes, since nearly all food recalls are considered voluntary (i.e., “voluntary” in
terms of FDA recall announcements simply means that the recall is being conducted by
the firm and not as part of a formal enforcement action by the FDA) and the concept does
not convey substantive information about the responsiveness of the firm conducting the
recall. See Appendix 3B for additional details regarding this exercise and its results.
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3.4.2.2 Common Module
As recommended by Rungtusanatham et al. (2011), we built our vignettes after
determining the factors of interest for manipulation and the general format of the vignette
around a common module. The common module consisted of the format of the vignette
(instructions, introductory statement, press release, and follow-up statement) and all
aspects of the vignette held constant over all treatments. The type of defect (salmonella),
description of symptoms and possible outcomes of illness, number of illnesses (121
illnesses), product type (frozen cheese pizza), product description (batch numbers,
packaging, distribution area) and the name of the recalling firm, were the same
throughout all four scenarios. In addition, each scenario contained the same introductory
paragraph setting up the vignette and the same follow-up paragraph concluding the
vignette. The format of the press release was taken from actual FDA press releases and
consistent with FDA guidance regarding required information and standard hazard
language. The warning regarding the symptoms and possible outcomes of salmonella, for
example, was taken exactly from FDA guidance.
3.4.2.3 Experimental Cues
After developing the common module, we developed tentative experimental cues for
our manipulated factors: locus, controllability and corrective action (stability). We pretested a version of the vignette with cues for an external locus, controllable failure with a
corrective action included. We selected this version for pre-testing, because it represents
the extreme case for our three factors, and since we were interested in determining

119

whether participants would comprehend the scenario, as intended (Hall, Roth &
Rungtusanatham, 2012).
Pre-testing was conducted by deploying the vignette and a set of follow-up questions
to a group of undergraduate students at Clemson University. Students received extra
credit for completion of the exercise, which was deployed by on-line survey. Questions
asked as part of the exercise included comprehension checks (e.g., “a number of people
were made ill by this product”), intended to assess whether or not participants understood
the scenario as intended, potential measurement items for perceived responsibility and
recall satisfaction, opportunities for free text responses to comment on the clarity of
wording, and a question which asked participants to estimate the amount of time spent on
the exercise. Responses were recorded on a five point agreement scale with a sixth
choice included for “don’t know”. The full text and results of the pre-testing exercise are
included in Appendix 3B.
The results of the vignette pre-test are reported in Appendix 3B. The pre-test results
indicate that the overall comprehension of the preliminary vignette was high for salient
aspects of the scenario, including the type of defect, defect severity, illnesses associated
with the product, supplier involvement (locus), controllability and corrective actions. In
addition to this pre-test, the measurement item sorting exercises, discussed in the next
section, included a variety of items intended to act as experimental cues for the high and
low levels of each attribution dimension. The results of the item sorting guided the
writing of the manipulation check items and the final vignette design. Sorting results for
these cues/manipulation check items are included in the measurement items sorting

120

procedure. In finalizing the vignettes, we made a few changes: the supplier involved in
the external locus vignettes is domestic, rather than foreign, and the vignettes were
simplified slightly to concentrate the cues, as shown in Table 3.3 , which illustrates the
final experimental cues for each of the four scenarios used in the pilot study.
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Table 3.3 Vignettes & Treatments Cues
Scenario

Locus

Corrective
Action
“The cheese had
“Chef Milo has
failed internal
instituted
quality tests
additional internal
conducted by
and independent
Robert’s Dairies,
third party testing
Inc. prior to sale to of incoming raw
Chef Milo.”
materials.”
“The refrigeration
“Chef Milo has
failure was not
instituted new
detected by the
procedures and
Chef Milo
retrained
Corporation prior to employees to
distributing the
require more
frozen pizzas.”
frequent
inspections of
refrigerated
operations.”
“Pizzas were
No corrective
distributed to
action information
retailers after
provided
multiple units had
failed internal
quality tests
conducted by Chef
Milo prior to
distributing the
product.”
Neither the Chef
No corrective
Milo Corporation,
action information
nor Robert’s
provided
Dairies, Inc., were
aware of the
refrigeration failure
when the frozen
pizza was
distributed.”
Control

Scenario 1 –
External,
Controllable,
Corrective Action

“The source of the
contamination was
cheese supplied by
Robert’s Dairies, Inc.”

Scenario 2 –
Internal,
Uncontrollable,
Corrective Action

“Interrupted power
supply to refrigeration
units at Chef Milo’s
manufacturing facility,
causing products to be
exposed to higher
temperatures, leading to
contamination with
salmonella.”

Scenario 3 –
Internal,
Controllable, No
Corrective Action

“The source of the
salmonella
contamination was the
processing equipment at
the Chef Milo facility”

Scenario 4 –
External,
Uncontrollable,
No Corrective
Action

“Interrupted power
supply to refrigeration
units at Robert’s Dairies
manufacturing facility,
causing products to be
exposed to higher
temperatures, leading to
contamination with
salmonella.”
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3.4.3 Measurement Item Development
From the literature we developed a tentative set of 15 items representing 3 constructs
and 18 experimental cues representing the three dimensions of attribution at the high and
low levels of each dimension. Perceived purchase dissatisfaction (Oliver, 1993; Oliver &
DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver & Swan, 1989; Westbrook & Oliver, 1991), perceived purchase
risk (Mitchell, 1999; Siomokos & Kurzbad, 1994), and repurchase intent (Siomokos &
Kurzbad, 1994) have been studied extensively. Consequently, the proposed scales only
reflected slight modifications to our context. We conducted an item matching exercise
using an online survey tool which also provided respondents with an opportunity to
provide open-ended responses regarding the clarity of the items.

To maintain a

reasonable number of items for each sort, we split the constructs into three groups,
sorting the most similar constructs together.

In addition to sorting the proposed

measurement items, we included items representative of treatment cues for the three
dimensions of attribution theory.

The purpose of these exercises was to establish

preliminary content, convergent and discriminant validity, and tentative reliability (Roth
et al., 2007). See Appendix 3B for the complete lists of items included in each of the
three sorting exercises.
The degree of agreement in item sorting was assessed to establish tentative validity
and reliability.

Moore & Benbasat’s (1991) item placement ratio calculates the

proportion of judges that selected the targeted construct (i.e., a “hit”) and the total
number of potential item placements. This ratio can be used to provide a measure of the
proportion of judges selecting the target constructs and, by examining “off-diagonal”
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placements, provides information about the potential discriminant validity issues (Menor
& Roth, 2009). For the three different sorts, the overall hit ratios ranged from 51.79%
(stable/unstable) to 82.3% (repurchase intent, internal locus, external locus, purchase
dissatisfaction).

We anticipated that participants would have some difficulty in

distinguishing controllable causes versus uncontrollable causes, and consequently, were
seeking cues which provided the most separation between these two concepts. Similarly,
stable/unstable was difficult to match, in part, due to the nature of the experimental cue:
stable was related to defects for which no corrective action was proposed.
The results of sorting manipulation check items with their intended experimental cue
definition were further confirmed by the vignette pre-test. Individual measurement scale
hit ratios (e.g., repurchase intent, perceived purchase risk and purchase dissatisfaction)
exceeded the 75% recommended cutoff (Roth et al., 2007).

See Appendix 3B for

detailed reporting of item placement ratios.
Collectively, the literature review and sorting exercises provide tentative support for
the reliability and validity of the constructs and the measurement items. The results of
these exercises were used to further refine the measurement items. In addition, between
the sorting exercises and the pilot study, we added two constructs: recall satisfaction
(i.e., patterned after purchase satisfaction, as discussed previously) and perceived recall
responsibility (i.e., single item measures of manufacturer, supplier and shared
responsibility). These constructs, and the associated items, were not part of the sorting
process conducted prior to the pilot study. The final measurement items are included in
Appendix 3B.
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3.4.4 Implementation
3.4.4.1 Sample Frame and Experimental Procedure
The sample frame for this experiment includes consumers of convenience food
products living in the US. The experiment was administered through an online survey
which randomized the assignment of treatments across four scenarios. Undergraduate
and MBA classes were solicited in-class, where possible, to increase participation. A
combination of in-class cash prizes and on-line gift certificates were used as incentives
for participation. In-class incentives were offered at the rate of $20 per 10 participants
with awards made based on a random lottery. On-line incentives were offered in the
amount of $100 gift certificate randomly awarded at the end of the exercise.

The

Facebook solicitation of participants used an on-line drawing of a gift certificate as an
incentive. Of the valid responses, frequency of the administration of each of the four
scenarios was roughly equivalent (see Appendix 3A for details).
3.4.4.2 Subjects
Our sample consists of university students recruited from classes offered in the
College of Business and Behavioral Sciences at Clemson University and a convenience
sample of non-student adult participants solicited via Facebook. A total of 210 responses
were collected over a period of fourteen days. The original sample of 210 cases was
reduced to 180 cases by listwise deletion when one or more predictors, covariates or
dependent variable measures were missing.
Approximately 65% of the useable sample was male; 35% was female. Over 97% of
the sample had at least “some college” education. Over two-thirds (68.5%) of the sample
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was employed, at least part-time, and averaged six to ten years of work experience. More
than three-quarters (78.8%) of the sample consisted of undergraduate or graduate
students. While upper age groups are not well-represented in this convenience sample,
40.6% of the sample was aged 30 or older. Complete demographic details of the sample
are included in Appendix 3A.
3.4.4.3 Sample Description
Table 3.4 describes the variable minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviations.
Table 3.4 Sample Descriptive Statistics
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Purchase Risk (Pre-Test)

2.00

7.00

4.79

0.93

Purchase Dissatisfaction
Repurchase Intent (Higher values
indicate lower repurchase intent)

3.33

7.00

5.58

1.00

2.00

7.00

5.41

1.10

Recall Satisfaction
Manufacturer Responsibility

1.00

7.00

4.42

1.09

1.00

7.00

5.32

1.10

Supplier Responsibility

1.00

7.00

4.77

1.37

Shared Responsibility

1.00

7.00

4.60

1.44

Gender (1=Male)

.00

1.00

0.65

0.48

Age

1.00

6.00

2.59

1.07

Education

2.00

7.00

4.08

1.27

Illness Experience

1.00

7.00

4.22

1.97

Recall Awareness
Food Service Work Experience (1=yes)

1.00

7.00

5.34

1.64

.00

1.00

0.54

0.50

.00

1.00

0.06

0.23

.00

1.00

0.17

0.37

Food Manufacturing Work Experience
(1=yes)
Healthcare Work Experience (1=yes)

Note: See Appendix 3B, Tables 3B.8 and 3B.10 for item wording.

126

3.4.4.4 Covariates
A pre-test question assessed the applicability of the vignette with the participant’s
purchasing behaviors (How frequently do you buy frozen pizzas? ; 7 point scale ranging
from “never” to “nearly always”). About 13.9% of the sample responded “never” with
the balance of the sample reporting “infrequently” to “very often”. Approximately 60.5%
of the sample reported buying frozen pizzas “occasionally,” “sometimes,” “often,” or
“very often”. On the basis of these self-reported purchasing behaviors, we conclude that
the product featured in our vignettes is relevant to the participants and that the
participants can be considered as having sufficient knowledge of the product to
participate and provide meaningful responses.

Over three-quarters (75.86%) of

participants recalled hearing about at least one food recall within the past year and over
half (52.8%) reported believing that they may have become ill from consumption of a
food item within the past year. Both of these awareness scales were collected from the
post-test, and therefore, could be inflated due to the treatment. Over half (52.8%) of
participants reported having work experience in the food service area, 5.6% reported
having experience in food manufacturing and 16.7% reported having experience in
healthcare.
3.4.4.5 Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were administered as part of the post-test and were intended to
measure whether the participants comprehended the intended differences in the treatment
levels for locus, controllability and corrective action.

Multiple manipulation check

questions were included for each manipulated factor, in part to improve the robustness of
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our manipulation checks, and in part, because we were concerned with the participants’
ability to recognize differences between defects and actions associated with the supplier
versus the manufacturer. A complete list of manipulation check items is included in
Appendix 3B.
We evaluated the manipulation checks for each treatment, comparing the responses
for each item with the level of the treatment received. One-way ANOVA indicates that
we achieved the desired level of treatment comprehension for the locus for three of the
four manipulation checks (p<.01). One of the four manipulation check questions (“The
salmonella contamination in the pizza came from the cheese supplied by Robert’s Dairies
Inc.”) was not statistically different in the internal or external locus comparison. We
attribute this to measurement issues highlighted in our debriefing interviews with
participants.
The manipulation check for controllability indicates that we achieved acceptable or
marginally acceptable treatment comprehension for three of the four manipulation checks
(p<.0001, p<.085 and p<.123, see Appendix 3B for details).

As noted in our

measurement development, we expected to have some difficulty in achieving
discriminant validity for the controllability construct; nevertheless, the manipulation
check results support cautious interpretation of our experimental results for
controllability. One-way ANOVA of the manipulation of stability provides evidence of
directionally appropriate and statistically significant differences (p<.0001 for all three
items). In total, we conclude that our manipulation checks are supportive of the internal
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validity of our experiment; however, we will seek to improve the manipulation of
controllability in the final study.
3.4.4.6 Realism
Realism was measured with two seven point agreement scales ranging from “very
strongly disagree” (1) to “very strongly agree” (7):

“The situation described in this

exercise was realistic,” (mean=5.850, standard deviation=.906) and “I took my role in
this exercise seriously,” (mean=6.256, standard deviation =.694). Based on these results,
we conclude that the experimental scenario was sufficiently realistic.
3.5 RESULTS
Our analysis consists of a validation of the measurement models for two sets of
scales: the dependent variables repurchase intent and recall satisfaction (Measurement
Model 1) and the covariate scales purchase dissatisfaction and perceived risk
(Measurement Model 2). After demonstrating the reliability and validity of these scales,
we use aggregated mean values for these scales, in addition to our other measures, in a
MANCOVA model which tests for the primary effects of the three manipulated
attribution dimensions, controlling for our covariates.
3.5.1

Confirmatory Analysis of Measurement Models

The final items for the four multi-item scales were used in the pilot study; the pilot
sample has been analyzed to refine and confirm the measurement models for the two
scaled dependent variables and two scaled covariates. Roth et al. (2007) recommends
that measurement models be evaluated to confirm validity and reliability in the second
stage of measurement development. The data used to validate these scales was collected
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using seven point Likert scales anchored with “very strongly disagree” and “very strongly
agree”.
3.5.1.1 Reliability Analysis
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to evaluate the composite
reliability of the four multi-item scales. In our assessment of these scales, we found that
one item (RP5) in the repurchase intent scale did not adequately fit with the remaining
items, or the construct definition, since it was more closely related to withdrawing from
an entire category of purchases, rather than repurchase intent for the specific product
being recalled. This change reduced the repurchase intent scale from five to four items,
but remains consistent with our definition, and consequently, ensures content validity.
The Werts-Linn-Joreskog composite reliabilities for the four scales are reported in Table
3.6; because each reliability is equal to, or exceeds, the .70 cutoff values, we have support
for acceptable scale reliability (Bollen, 1989).
Table 3.5 Measurement Scale Descriptives and Composite Reliability
Construct
Purchase Risk
(Pre-Test)
Purchase
Dissatisfaction
Repurchase
Intent
Recall
Satisfaction

Standard
Min Max Mean Items Deviation

Reliability1

2

7

4.79

4

0.93

0.70

3.33 7

5.58

3

1.00

0.88

2

7

5.41

4

1.10

0.90

1

7

4.42

3

1.09

0.81
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3.5.1.2 Unidimensionality Analysis
Our CFA results provide evidence of unidimensionality based on goodness-of-fit
indices. We use Joreskog-Sorbom’s goodness-of-fit (GFI) and adjusted goodness-of-fit
(AGFI), the Bentler-Bonnett normed fit index (NFI) and non-normed fit index (NNFI), in
addition to the comparative fit index (CFI), to substantiate the unidimensionality of our
scales. For the goodness of fit indices, a value of 1 indicates a perfect fit and values
exceeding .90 are considered substantive evidence of unidimensionality. In addition, we
report root mean-square residuals (RMR) and root mean-square errors of approximation
(RMSEA) for both models; values approaching zero are desirable, however, a value of
.06 is considered to indicate a good fit and .08 is a moderate fit (Bollen, 1989). Table 3.7
provides the fit index values for the two measurement models compared with the
standard evaluation criteria.
Table 3.6 Measurement Models 1 & 2 Fit Statistics

Model
χ2
GFI
AGFI
CFI
NFI
NNFI
RMR
RMSEA

Model 1

Model 2

Criterion

Repurchase Intent &
Recall Satisfaction
49.52 (13 d.f.)
p<.000001
0.92
0.84
0.96
0.94
0.93
0.08
0.13

Perceived Risk
and Purchase
Dissatisfaction
20.02 (13 d.f.)
p<.09
0.97
0.94
0.98
0.95
0.97
0.07
0.06

Not significant
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.06
0.06
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3.5.1.3 Convergent Validity Analysis
We evaluate convergent validity by reviewing the magnitude and direction (sign) of
the standardized path loadings of each item onto the designated construct. Standardized
path loadings occur in the direction expected and are statistically different from zero
(p<.01). Table 3.8 reports the standardized path loadings, critical ratios and p-values for
each item. The average variance extracted (AVE) is calculated for each scale; a value of
.50 or greater is considered evidence of convergent validity (Bollen, 1989).

The

perceived purchase risk scale has a marginal AVE value of .40; we conclude that this is
acceptable for the exploratory nature of this study, but it will need to be addressed in a
future implementation of this experiment. Based on path loadings and average variance
extracted, we conclude that the measurement scales adequately reflect the designated
constructs and exhibit convergent validity.
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Table 3.7 Measurement Models: Standardized Path Loadings, Critical Ratios
and Average Variance Extracted
Construct

Indicator
Label

Measurement Item

Standardized
Path Loading

Critical
Ratio

Measurement Model 1

Repurchase
Intent

RP1
RP2
RP3
RP4

Average Variance Extracted = .71
This product recall has decreased the
chance that I would buy a Chef Milo
pizza in the future.
I would be less likely to purchase the
Chef Milo brand in the future.
I would buy a different brand of pizza
next time.
I would avoid purchasing the Chef Milo
brand in the future.

0.92

-

0.86

17.29

0.78

13.98

0.89

18.51

0.83

11.14

0.74

10.16

Average Variance Extracted = .59
Recall
Satisfaction

RSat1
RSat2
RSat3

I feel satisfied with Chef Milo
Corporation's statements about quality.
I'm satisfied with how the Chef Milo
Corporation handled this product recall.
The Chef Milo Corporation seems to
have handled this problem responsibly.

0.85

-

0.77

4.88

0.77

-

0.41

8.68

0.47

8.68

0.82

6.31

0.79

6.95

0.87

-

Measurement Model 2
Purchase Risk
(Pre-Test)

Average Variance Extracted = .40
PR1
PR2
PR3
PR4

Purchase
Dissatisfaction

DIS1
DIS2
DIS3

1.
2.
3.

I'm concerned about food safety.
I'm worried about the quality of the food
I consume.
I could get sick from eating food that has
quality issues.
I feel like consuming frozen cheese
pizza could be hazardous.
Average Variance Extracted = .71
I am unsatisfied with the quality of this
product.
I feel dissatisfied with my purchase of
this product.
This product did not meet my
expectations for quality.

The critical ratio (CR) for a one-tailed test of significance and the associated p-values are: CR=1.64,
p<.05; CR=2.33, p<.01; CR=3.10, p<.0001.
The items presented here were measured on a scale from 1 “very strongly disagree” to 7 “very strongly
agree”.
Average variance extracted (AVE) >.50 indicates convergent validity.
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3.5.1.4 Discriminant Validity Analysis
Discriminant validity is assessed by conducting a Χ2 difference test for each pair of
scales. This procedure includes a CFA, in which the paired constructs are allowed to
freely correlate, and a CFA, in which the correlation between the constructs is
constrained to equal one. A significant Χ2 difference result provides evidence that the
constructs are different, and consequently, supports discriminant validity. Table 3.9
reports the results of the Χ2 difference tests, indicating that, because the p-values for each
test are less than or equal to .05, we have support for discriminant validity
Table 3.8 Pairwise Tests of Discriminant Validity
Construct Scale Pairs

Unconstrained
χ2
d.f.

Constrained
χ2
d.f.

χ2 difference
test p value

Purchase Risk
Purchase Dissatisfaction

49.52

13

154.35

14

0.001

Repurchase Intent
Recall Satisfaction

20.02

13

46.70

14

0.001

3.5.1

Hypothesized Model Analysis

The data was analyzed using a 23 between-subjects multivariate analysis of
covariance (MANCOVA) to allow for relationships between the dependent variables
(recall satisfaction, responsibility and repurchase intent) and to test for the effects of the
three dimensions of attribution (locus, controllability and stability/corrective action)
while controlling for the covariates. Data screening was conducted by first examining the
distribution of the dependent variables for deviations from normality. Skew and kurtosis

134

were mild for all of the dependent variables (largest skew = -.620; largest kurtosis =
1.272). The assumption of linearity between the dependent variables was checked by
creating scatterplots of each dependent variable combination and examining the plots for
signs of non-linearity. No obvious non-linearity was detected. MANCOVA assumes
independence of observations. Based on the way the experiment was administered using
a random assignment of scenarios, via an online survey, or individually, in a classroom
setting or via an emailed link, we have no expectation that this assumption will be
violated. Multivariate normality was tested by examining outliers based on Mahalanobis’
distance within each treatment group. One outlier was detected above the critical value
(Critical value= 24.322 α=.001 for 7 variables). This case (Χ2 =25.125) was located
within Scenario 2 and was deleted, resulting in a final sample of 179 cases. Equality of
covariance was evaluated using the very conservative Box’s M test (F=1.81; d.f. 45,
72,517; p<.001), which indicates a violation of this assumption. However, our results
should be robust to this violation, because of the ratio of cases to the number of variables
and the nearly equivalent number of subjects in each treatment group (Tabachnik &
Fidell, 2007).
Levene’s test was used to evaluate equality of error variance; results indicate a
violation of this assumption for repurchase intent, recall satisfaction, supplier
responsibility, and shared responsibility. Manufacturing responsibility did not violate
this assumption. F statistics and Pillai-Bartlett Trace statistics are robust to this violation
when treatment group sizes are nearly equal (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).
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3.5.2.1 Multivariate Tests of Significance
Multivariate tests indicate that locus, control, stability, age, education, recall
awareness (having heard about a food recall within the past year), purchase
dissatisfaction, and gender are significant predictors of at least one of the dependent
variables. Power to detect effects is greater than .8 for locus, stability, and purchase
dissatisfaction, indicating adequate power. Power is between .6 and .76 for control,
education, recall awareness, perceived risk, and gender, indicating moderate power to
detect effects. Tests of between subject effects (corrected model) indicate the overall
model is significant for each of the dependent variables (repurchase intent: F=10.87; d.f.
13,165; p<.0001; recall satisfaction:

F=3.45; d.f. 13,165; p<.0001; supplier

responsibility: F=3.11; d.f. 13,165; p<.0001; manufacturer responsibility: F=5.38; d.f.
13,165; p<.0001; shared responsibility: F=3.78; d.f. 13,165; p<.0001).
3.5.2.2 Covariates
Applying the adjusted α=.01 criterion for the univariate F tests, we find the following
significant covariate effects: 1) recall awareness affects shared responsibility (F=9.10;
d.f. 1, 178; p<.003) positively, 2) food manufacturing work experience has a nearly
significant positive effect on repurchase intent (F=5.38; d.f. 1, 178; p<.022), and 3)
purchase dissatisfaction negatively affects repurchase intent (F=77.61; d.f. 1, 178;
p<.0001), supplier responsibility (F=10.03; d.f. 1, 178;

p<.002) and manufacturer

responsibility (F=13.57; d.f. 1, 178; p<.0001). Note that repurchase intent and purchase
dissatisfaction are negatively worded scales (i.e., “I would buy a different brand of pizza
next time” and “I feel dissatisfied with my purchase of this product” are rated on a 7
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point agreement scale where lower scores indicate higher repurchase intent/lower
dissatisfaction and higher scores indicate lower repurchase intent/higher dissatisfaction).
Perceived risk (pre-test level) is marginally significant in its negative effect on repurchase
intent (F=5.93 p<.016).
3.5.2.3 Hypothesis Tests
Specific hypotheses were tested with planned contrasts, univariate F tests and RoyBargmann step-down analysis.

Table 3.9 summarizes the results of the univariate F

tests, and step-down analysis. Table 3.10 illustrates each set of hypotheses and
summarizes the evidence associated with each hypotheses test result.
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Table 3.9 MANCOVA Summary Results: Univariate and Stepdown Tests of
Effects of Locus, Controllability and Corrective Action
Manipulated
Factor
Locus

Controllabili
ty

Corrective
Action

Dependent
Variable
Repurchase
Intent
Recall
Satisfaction
Manufacturer
Responsibility
Supplier
Responsibility
Shared
Responsibility
Repurchase
Intent
Recall
Satisfaction
Manufacturer
Responsibility
Supplier
Responsibility
Shared
Responsibility
Repurchase
Intent
Recall
Satisfaction
Manufacturer
Responsibility
Supplier
Responsibility
Shared
Responsibility

Univariate
F

d.f.

Univariate
α1

Stepdown
F

d.f.

α

3.83

1, 175

0.052

4.17

1, 175

0.052

7.86**

1, 175

0.006

5.12**

1, 174

0.022

20.04**

1, 175

0.0001

12.14**

1, 173

0.0001

10.87**

1, 175

0.001

20.4**

1, 172

0.001

29.92**

1, 175

0.0001

26.34**

1, 171

0.0001

13.34**

1, 175

0.0001

14.56**

1, 175

0.0001

6.70**

1, 175

0.01

2.33

1, 174

0.12

8.10**

1, 175

0.005

2.31

1, 173

0.12

1.60

1, 175

0.21

0.62

1, 172

0.55

0.95

1, 175

0.33

0.80

1, 171

0.48

3.46

1, 175

0.06

3.78

1, 175

0.06

6.18**

1, 175

0.0001

12.37**

1, 174

0.0001

8.09**

1, 175

0.005

2.69

1, 173

0.091

0.41

1, 175

0.525

1.04

1, 172

0.439

0.49

1, 175

0.487

0.002

1, 171

0.968

** p<.05

Table 3.10 Hypothesis Testing Results Summary
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Hypothesis

Hypothesis Statement

H1a

External locus has a direct negative effect
on repurchase intent as compared with the
internal locus (Lower values of repurchase
intent scale correspond to higher levels of
repurchase intent).

H1a not supported.

H1b

External Locus has a direct positive effect
recall satisfaction as compared with the
internal locus.

H1b supported (Contrast
Difference = .367; p<.02).

H2a

Uncontrollable causes have a direct and
negative effect on repurchase intent as
compared with the controllable causes
(Lower values of repurchase intent scale
correspond to higher levels of repurchase
intent).

H2a supported (Contrast
Difference =-.294 p<.027).
However,repurchase intent and
recall satisfaction are correlated at .357, so the variance explained may
not be unique.

H2b

Uncontrollable causes have a direct and
positive effect on recall satisfaction as
compared with the controllable causes.

H2b supported (Contrast
Difference =.383 p<.016).
However, repurchase intent and
recall satisfaction are correlated at .357, so the variance explained may
not be unique).

H3a

Corrective action has a direct negative
effect on repurchase intent as compared
with the no corrective action (Lower
values of repurchase intent scale correspond
to higher levels of repurchase intent).

H3a not supported.

H3b

Corrective action has a direct negative
effect on recall satisfaction as compared
with no corrective action.

H3b supported (Contrast
Difference = -.570 p<.0001).
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Results

Hypothesis

Hypothesis Statement

H1c, H1d,
H1e

Locus has a direct effect on attribution of
responsibility.

Results
H1c, d and e supported.
Manufacturer responsibility contrast
difference=.715 p<.001 and shared
responsibility contrast difference=.608 p<.0001.

More specifically, external locus will be
associated with lower levels of
manufacturer responsibility, higher levels
of supplier responsibility and higher levels
of shared responsibility, as compared with However shared responsibility has a
within cell pooled correlation with
the internal locus.
recall satisfaction of .166, so
variance explained may not be
unique.

External locus of control is
associated with lower levels of
manufacturer responsibility
(Contrast difference=1.043,
p<.0001). However manufacturer
responsibility has a within cell
pooled correlation of -.246 with
recall satisfaction, therefore variance
explained may not be unique.
H2c, H2d,
H2e

Controllability has a direct effect on
attribution of responsibility.

H2c supported (Contrast
difference=-.326 p<.032; however
pooled within cell correlation
More specifically, controllable causes will
between recall satisfaction and
be associated with higher levels of
manufacturer responsibility = -.246,
manufacturer responsibility, higher levels consequently, variance explained
of supplier responsibility and higher levels may not be unique).
of shared responsibility as compared with
the uncontrollable causes.
H2d and e not supported.
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3.5.2.4 Assessment of Dependent Variables
For the univariate F results, the effective alpha is adjusted by the number of
dependent variables (5) to indicate that p<.01 could be considered acceptable for an
overall p<.05 for the group. Univariate F results are reported in Table 3.9.
Roy-Bargmann step-down F tests were conducted to assess the impacts of correlated
dependent variables where there is theoretical support for the importance ranking of the
dependent variables. For the purposes of our analysis, repurchase intent was considered
to be the most theoretically important, based on its implications for sales and market
share, followed by recall satisfaction, manufacturer responsibility, supplier responsibility,
and shared responsibility.

Each step-down test includes dependent variables as

covariates, so, for example, the step-down test for recall satisfaction includes repurchase
intent as a covariate. The step-down test for manufacturer responsibility includes both
recall satisfaction and repurchase intent as covariates, and so on. The step-down tests, in
addition to the univariate F tests of effects and pooled within-cell correlations among the
dependent variables, is used to assess the unique contribution of a predictor to a specific
dependent variable.

The interpretation of stepdown F tests are subject to the

homogeneity of regression slopes assumption (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).

This

assumption tests for the presence of interactions between manipulated experimental
factors and covariates. Homogeneity of regression slopes was supported by F tests which
indicated that interactions of the covariates with each of the manipulated factors were not
significant at p<.05. Stepdown F test results are reported in Table 3.10.
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3.6 DISCUSSION
Demographic variables, such as age, gender and education, were not significant
predictors of any dependent variable; however, this should be retested in a study with
more power, in addition to examining the potential interactions of these variables with
other predictors. Illness experience was also not a significant predictor of any dependent
variable.
Recall awareness, as measured by whether the subject recalls hearing about a recall
within the past year, was significant and positive in its effect on shared responsibility,
indicating that the more aware our subjects were of prior recalls, the more likely they
were to attribute responsibility to both the manufacturer and the supplier. This result
leads us to conclude that the full study should more thoroughly examine the dimensions
of recall awareness by developing a multi-item scale.
Purchase dissatisfaction explains a significant amount of variance in repurchase
intent, consistent with the literature.

Perceived risk is marginally significant.

As

expected, higher baseline levels of perceived risk are associated with lower levels of
repurchase intent. Food manufacturing work experience has a nearly significant positive
effect on repurchase intent, indicating perhaps that those who are more knowledgeable
about the inner workings and processes of food production are more tolerant of the recall
with respect to repurchase intent.
Locus affects recall satisfaction, indicating that when firms communicate that a
supplier is responsible for a defect, consumers respond accordingly in the recall
satisfaction dimension. However, there is no direct effect supported for the repurchase
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intent. Similarly, locus affects the perceived responsibility dependent variables as
expected, with the external locus associated with higher levels of supplier responsibility
and shared responsibility and lower levels of manufacturer responsibility.

The

implication of this finding is that the tendency we observed for firms to communicate the
involvement of a supplier in a defect that results in a recall may have a positive effect on
consumer perceptions of the firm’s handling of the recall and the attribution of
responsibility for the recall. This finding is an example of how recall announcements
may be structured favorably for firms, although this is not necessarily aligned with the
objective of protecting consumers from exposure to unnecessary risks. We argue that
policy-makers should consider this finding and, at a minimum, ensure that when recall
announcements cite a supplier as a cause of a failure that the recalling firm provides
additional supporting information to counterbalance what might be a spurious attribution
on the part of the consumer. In other words, policy change with respect to the content of
recall announcements may be necessary

to ensure purchasing

firms are held

accountable, not only by the regulatory agency, but also by consumers.
Uncontrollable causes are tolerated better with respect to repurchase intent than
controllable causes and associated with higher levels of manufacturer responsibility and
recall satisfaction. Taken together, these results suggest that, consistent with attribution
theory, consumers may expect firms to do more to prevent failures perceived as more
controllable than those failures perceived to be uncontrollable. This finding also supports
a potential source of leverage if policy-makers pursue regulations that require more
specific information to be supplied in the recall announcement, since firms with
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controllable causes will arguably be penalized more by consumer perceptions.
Alternatively, this finding is a cue to firms of the importance of understanding consumer
awareness for, and tolerance of, supply chain failures that may be perceived to be
reasonably preventable.
Stability, or the communication of a corrective action to minimize the change the
defect could reoccur, was, as expected, associated with higher levels of recall satisfaction,
but did not have a significant effect on repurchase intent. No effects were hypothesized
between this dimension and perceived responsibility constructs and no significant
relationships were found. These results are of interest, in part, because the provision of a
corrective action in the recall announcement is extremely rare, occurring in less than 2%
of food recalls examined in our Essay 1 study over a three year period. Recalling firms
are required to provide some information to the FDA regarding a final planned corrective
action prior to the regulatory conclusion of the recall. Therefore, if the “fix” to the
problem is simple and something the firm can commit to at the time of the recall
announcement, it may be beneficial, in terms of consumer perception, to do so publically.
This consideration may be counterbalanced by liability concerns if the public
announcement of a corrective action is considered a basis for the admission of culpability
(Packman,1998).
The use of MANCOVA provides robust support for effects of attribution dimensions
(main effects aliased with interactions) and overall model significance, but does not allow
us to test for mediating relationships, which may be present. The estimation of unique
contributions to explaining variance in the dependent variables was done using step-down
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tests; such results are heavily dependent on assumptions of the relative importance of the
dependent variables. Similar to a stepwise regression, these results should be treated with
caution due to this underlying assumption which governs which variables become
covariates at each level of the step-down test. As noted in Table 3.11, the pooled withincell correlations of specific dependent variables (e.g., repurchase intent and recall
satisfaction) indicates that we cannot claim unique effects. In other words, the significant
effects of each factor on each dependent variable (supported by univariate F tests and
step-down tests) cannot be considered unique based on this analysis.

Nevertheless,

contrast results and the pattern of significance in univariate F tests and step-down tests
support a cautious interpretation of main effects, as represented in Table 3.10, with the
understanding that interactions are aliased with the main effects. The issue of mediating
relationships and parceling out unique variance in dependent variables will be resolved in
the final study by using structural equation modeling methods.
3.7

CONCLUSIONS
Essay 2 evaluates the effect of manipulating three dimensions of causal attribution

(i.e., locus, controllability and corrective action) on consumer perceptions including
repurchase intent, recall satisfaction, and perceived recall responsibility while controlling
for perceived risk, purchase dissatisfaction and other relevant individual characteristics.
We believe the contribution of this study is relevant, particularly since, with increasingly
extended supply chains and high proportions of outsourcing, externally-driven product
failures are becoming more likely, because the majority of product value-add occurs
outside the focal firm.
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3.7.1

Contributions

The marketing and crisis communications literature has contributed to our
understanding of consumer reactions to product harm and other negative and disruptive
events. At the same time, the operations and supply chain management literature has not
specifically addressed consumer perceptions of operational failures in the product recall
context. It is common for firms, when making product recall announcements, to identify
the source of the effects of the recalling firm attributing product failure to a supplier
(external locus). This study provides the first evidence that locus operates not only in the
“individual-other” context of traditional attribution studies, but also applies when the
attribution choice is “other-other”. In other words, consumers, on some level, distinguish
between supply chain entities and assign responsibility based on the information provided
to them.
This study provides preliminary evidence of primary effects of attributional
dimensions on important consumer perceptions of product recalls which, based on the
literature, will lead to behavior. Consequently, we begin with this work to establish: 1)
what firms may be able to do to effectively manage consumer impressions via a recall
announcement; and 2) what policy-makers may need to consider when developing
regulations regarding announcement content to ensure that firms do not receive undue
benefit from impression management and are incentivized to prevent product recalls (i.e.,
by ensuring that recall announcement information appropriately triggers consumer
perceptions that impose consequences on the recalling firm).
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Based on food industry trends with respect to the importation of inputs and products
and the increased levels of outsourcing to low cost developing countries, we expect firms
in this sector will continue to deal with failures that originate outside their internal
operations.

As a result, when making a product recall, these firms have important

choices to make regarding how to communicate the nature of the product quality issues
that underlie the recall, including how they convey the source of the product failure and
any potential corrective action which will reduce the chance of recurrence.
Based on prior work, we content that these implications are relevant, in part, because
indirect costs of product recalls related to consumer behavior are likely to be greater than
more tangible, easily measured direct costs, such as repairs, replacements, refunds,
reverse logistics and product liability (Jarrell & Pelzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003).
Furthermore, for firms to have the option to communicate discretionary information,
such as how and why a defect occurred (controllability), and efforts to remedy the
problem (corrective action), the recalling firm must have the communication and
problem-solving capabilities that enable such information to be reliably available at the
time of a product recall. This issue is further complicated by the relatively short amount
of time between detecting a failure and making the recall announcement, which limits the
recalling firm’s opportunity to investigate and verify sources of quality issues.
3.7.2 Limitations and Future Research
The limitations of this study primarily stem from the sample’s limited demographic
breadth and the use of a fractionated factorial design, which does not allow for separate
testing of main and interaction effects of our experimental factors. The full study will
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address both of these issues by using a more heterogeneous sample, which will improve
the study’s power to detect certain relationships (e.g., demographic variables such as age,
education and gender) and by using an expanded design to test for interactions between
the manipulated factors. While this study was confined to a single product type and
failure level, additional levels of failure (severity), product type (pharmaceuticals, and
consumer goods.) are of interest. In addition, we would like to improve performance on
the manipulation checks, in part by more thoroughly investigating potential combinations
of treatment scenarios, in addition to more thoroughly pre-testing manipulation check
measurement items.

Measurement item performance in pre-testing was marginal to

acceptable (See Appendix 3B). Not all measurement items were rigorously pre-tested.
Therefore, this step of scale development will be addressed in the final study.
We examine the interface between supply chain management and marketing by
making the first direct test of consumer perceptions of supply chain characteristics. This
exploratory work takes some initial steps towards explaining how short-term demand
may be impacted as a result of a product recall, while previous studies have only
documented the existence of this effect using event history methodologies (Chu et al.,
2005; Crafton et al., 1981; Marsh et al., 2004; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen,
Shiptsova, and Hamm, 2006). While firms may attempt to manage consumer attributions
by disclosing supplier failures, this is the first study, to our knowledge, to empirically test
how consumers interpret this information. Firms increasingly manage complex, lengthy
and global supply chains, making the prospect of failures originating outside the firm
increasingly likely (Bozarth et al., 2009). Consequently, knowing how informational
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content regarding product failure in recall announcements affects how consumers react to
product recalls becomes an increasingly important factor to investigate.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
4.1 STUDY IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation contributes to a growing body of literature addressing product
recalls, doing so in a relatively unique context (FDA-regulated food products), in addition
to using two different perspectives: time to recall and consumer behavior. Although
product recalls have received significant attention from the popular press in addition to
consumers, policy-makers and researchers, empirical research that characterizes the
strategic and operational nature of these failures and factors which influence the relative
speed of current industry and regulatory systems to handle the recalls is still extremely
limited (Hora et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2008ab).
We address the following two research questions through our theoretically-driven
empirical essays: 1) How do supply chain recall detection competency, in addition to
supply chain complexity factors related to time to recall? 2) How does information
provided regarding operational and supply chain management aspects of product failure
affect consumer perceptions and repurchase intent when a product is recalled?
Essay 1 examines the factors that influence recall timing in a context which has not
been studied previously, the FDA-regulated food sector. Time to recall is an important
dimension of recall effectiveness, because more timely recalls reduce consumer risks and
lessen firm costs, including liability costs and other costs to society.

We provide

evidence that SCRDC, as measured by the proxy detection entity, is a significant
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predictor of time to recall, a finding that can provide implications to practice (e.g., in
terms of concentrating efforts and resources on moving detections upstream) and policy
(e.g., in terms of motivating regulations and guidance that will improve firm incentives to
move detection entity upstream).
This work extends quality management theory by conceptualizing differences in the
nature of external failures based on how they are detected (Crosby, 1979; Roth et al.,
1992; Juran, 1992). While much of the quality systems improvement work has justifiably
focused on reducing the number of external defects by improving internal systems, the
increasing length and complexity of supply chains across all product types has led to
serious deficiencies in governance and control. As a result, global firms and supply
chains have been, and will continue to be, forced to handle product recalls; to the extent
that existing quality systems can be extended to encompass the issues that product recalls
raise, firms and supply chains may reduce the need for future recalls and, in effect, learn
from these disruptions (Haunschild & Rhee, 2006; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011).
Essay 2 provides insights into whether or not consumers make attributive distinctions
between recalling firms and their suppliers when products fail. These insights have
implications for both the industry and the regulators. First, when products are recalled,
firms face complex choices regarding the communication of the details of the product
failure. The literature currently offers mixed messages regarding the importance of early
and extensive communication during product harm events. We believe this study offers
evidence of how firms should frame communications regarding the product failure and
the involvement of the larger supply chain.
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While the product harm and crisis

communications literature has made substantial contributions in this area (Dawar &
Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Klein & Dawar, 2000; Laufer et al., 2005;
Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994), this is the first study to link the operational and supply
chain dimensions of a failure to consumer behavior.
Consequently, this investigation offers tangible evidence of the value of operations
and supply chain management capabilities that make information regarding the source,
cause and remedy for a failure available quickly enough to communicate it in a recall
announcement. Such capabilities require participation and coordination within a firm
conducting the recall and also across supply chain partners.
Regulatory agencies (i.e. FDA, USDA) are necessarily concerned with developing
regulations and policies that encourage industry to comply and which reduce risk. Essay
2 can guide future policy decisions by offering insights into how consumers respond
behaviorally to various stimuli in product recall announcements. To the extent that
policy dictates what firms communicate about these important failures, regulators may be
able to provide incentives for firms to minimize the risk of product recalls by requiring
recall announcement information that materially affects consumer behavior.
Given the limitations of regulatory systems to enforce requirements (e.g., inspections
and fines), our findings suggest that the product recall announcement content could be
designed in such a way that it: 1) encourages firms to develop the capabilities necessary
to provide more complete information at the time of a recall announcement and 2)
provides consequences to recalling firms and their suppliers by requiring a higher level of
transparency.
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4.2 FUTURE RESEARCH
The two essays in this investigation develop a foundation for a larger program of
research which we expect to expand to include additional relevant variables in terms of
time to recall and recall strategy, and different product type and failure contexts with
respect to examining consumer behavior. We plan to extend the use of the database
constructed for Essay 1, for example, to examine proxies for SCRDC, and, using an
econometric model which adjusts for selection bias, develop a model which predicts the
accuracy of recall announcements as another proxy for recall effectiveness.
Furthermore, our research can be the basis for examining underlying issues of
incentive misalignment and agency issues between buyers and suppliers managing
product quality and product recalls. While Essay 1 is currently limited to examining
recall timing in terms of suppliers and the recalling firms as one internal detection entity,
we suggest that incentives and governance structures between purchasing organizations
and suppliers in the context of quality failures is an area that deserves research attention.
Due to the sensitive nature of the issues addressed by this work, we expect that
collecting primary data from firms regarding recall policies and performance may be
challenging and could suffer from bias due to social desirability. Furthermore, the use of
secondary data, while useful in this context, has limitations (Roth et al., 2009).
Therefore, we suggest that there may be avenues of research suggested by this work that
will require a more analytical approach to overcome some of the issues with collecting
valid empirical data. Information sharing, for example, and incentives between buyers
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and suppliers to share unfavorable information regarding defects and quality issues, may
be a potential area to explore using analytical models.
In Essay 1, we develop a framework of differences between the nature of failures in
perishable and durable products and subsequent differences in recall strategy and
management. While Essay 1 only included FDA-regulated food products, a similar
strategy for collecting pharmaceutical recall data could be used to compare these two
different product categories, and that of medical devices, as a point of comparison for
durable products.

Similarly, this methodology could be used to compare durable

products in other categories (e.g., consumer products, automobiles) to perishable products
to begin to more thoroughly assess the differences in product recall strategy and
effectiveness in different product categories. Very few studies (see Chu et al., 2005 for
an exception) in the product recall literature address more than one product type. This
limits the scope and generalizability of the findings and our ability to develop more
mature theories of recall strategy. While such work is extremely challenging, due to the
need to work across multiple data sources, we contend that it would make a valuable
contribution to theory and practice.
The findings from Essay 2 will be used to inform the design and implementation of a
full factorial experiment examining food product recalls and consumer attributions. We
expect that additional measurements and vignette development will be necessary to
ensure robust results. In addition, we plan to access a more demographically broad
sample. Beyond the implications of this experiment to the context of product recalls,
Essay 2 offers a basis for other future work at the interface between operations and
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supply chain management and marketing.

Our development of attribution theory’s

dimension of locus as a construct that applies to different partners in a supply chain opens
up additional possibilities for investigating the nature of the consumer perceptions of firm
operations and supply chain management practices, including health and safety standards,
environmental performance, worker standards, and other corporate social responsibility
issues. As lengthy supply chains are opened up to more scrutiny by non-governmental
organizations in addition to consumer activists, we anticipate that consumer perceptions
of firm operations will increasingly become a matter of practical interest.
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ESSAY 1 CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS, DATA SOURCES AND DATA
COLLECTION
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Variable
Type
Dependent
Variable

Table 2A.1 Construct Definitions & Data Sources
Construct/
Operational Definition/Sample
Variable Name
Measure
Time to Recall –
Time to Recall is the duration
timetorecall
between T=0 (beginning of shelf life)
and Ti*, the date of the recall
announcement.
Recall Magnitude
-Number of
Products Recalled
noproducts

Number of products listed
individually in the press release.

Recall Reach Downstream
Distribution
local
regional
national

Downstream Distribution is a
proxy for the complexity of
determining the scope of the recall,
the number of states where recalled
product was distributed.
Downstream Distribution has been
recorded as the number of stages and
condensed into 3 categories (0=1-3;
1=4-20; 2>20 states).
Proactive recalls occur before any
illness or injury is attributed at the
agency level to a specific product.
Reactive recalls occur after an
illness or injury is attributed at the
agency level to a specific product.
Detection Entity – the entity which
detected the defect which is the basis
for the recall as indicated by the
enforcement report or press release.
Detection Entity is coded as a binary
variable, External
(Agency/Consumer) or Internal
(Recalling Firm/Supplier)

Proactive or
Reactive Recall
Strategy
reactive
Supply Chain
Recall Detection
Competence Detection Entity
detentbinary
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Data Source
Enforcement
Report, Press
Release &
industry
standards for
shelf life
Enforcement
Report or
Press Release
Enforcement
Report or
Press Release

Enforcement
Report or
Press Release

Enforcement
Report or
Press Release

Variable
Type

Construct/
Variable Name
Supply Chain
Entity
scentity

Operational Definition/Sample
Measure
Supply Chain Entity – a
categorization of the recalling entity
– the firm making the recall (e.g.
agency, manufacturer, distributor,
retailer). In practice since all recalls
in our database were voluntary, this
did not include the agency category.
In the final analysis, the
categorization was collapsed to
manufacturer (0) and
distributor/retailer (1).
Defect Type
Four defect types were coded:
pathogen
labeling/allergens (0), pathogen (1),
packaging (2), and contaminant or
stability issue (3). In the final
analysis, the categorization was
collapsed to pathogen (1) and all
other defects (0).
Quality Process
Affected production period
Maturity represents the number of days
Affected
between the production or expiration
Production Period of first affected product and last
prodperiod
affected product listed in the recall
announcement, indicating the
duration of the defect causing the
recall. Minimum of 1 day where no
range is present.
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Data Source
Publically
available
databases of
primary SIC or
NAIC codes
for each
recalling firm

Enforcement
Report or
Press Release

Enforcement
Report or
Press Release

Variable
Type

Construct/
Variable Name
RecallBreadth
recallbreadth

Operational Definition/Sample
Data Source
Measure
Recall breadth indicates (Major=1; FDA website
Other, Not major =0) FDAdesignated “major” recalls – recalls
which due to the number of products
or other agency-determined
characteristics require special
communication efforts. Since 2008,
five major recalls have been
designated: Plainview Milk
Cooperative (powdered milk), Basic
Food Flavors (hydrolyzed vegetable
protein), Peanut Corporation of
America (peanuts/peanut products),
Setton Pistachios (whole & shelled
pistachios), and Galt, Wright County,
etc. (shell eggs).

Control
Variables

Year Dummy
yr_2008,
yr_2009, yr_2010

Year in which recall is announced

Enforcement
Report or
Press Release

Product Category
Cat0_refridge
Cat1_frozen
Cat2_shelfstable

Product categories are based on
processing & storage attributes.

Enforcement
Report &
industry
standards for
processing

Private or Public
public

A 3 category operationalization has
been used:
1.
Refrigerated
2.
Frozen
3.
Shelf Stable
The firm’s status as a private or
publicly traded company at the time
of the recall (Public=1; Private=0).
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Databases of
firm
information,
e.g., Mergent
Online

Variable
Type

Construct/
Variable Name
Firm Size
firmempl
firmrev

Operational Definition/Sample
Measure
Firm size as measured by annual
revenue or the number of firm
employees.

Firm Cluster
firmcluster

Firm Cluster is a unique dummy
variable assigned to each firm within
the sample to enable the use of
Stata’s clustering option which
allows errors within a cluster to be
correlated.
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Data Source
Databases of
firm
information,
e.g., Mergent
OnLine,
Manta, or
annual reports

Data Collection
Data were collected by accessing the FDA’s online archives of weekly enforcement
reports and press releases for food products for the years of 2008-2010. Enforcement
report information was matched to press releases to develop an initial set of 1,602 press
releases for consideration. Because the dependent variable is a measure of recall timing,
we exclude any press releases which do not contain enough information about
production, distribution or expiration dates which are necessary to calculate the
dependent variable. This reduces our sample to a total of 846 press releases.
The remaining press releases and enforcement reports were coded by three different
persons using a set of scales which were developed during a pilot analysis of 100 press
releases and refined over time to ensure internal consistency and external validity.
Approximately 20% of the total sample was coded by more than one person. Inter-rater
reliability was high (>97%) and all cases where disagreement occurred were readily
resolved through discussion among the raters.
Sample Press Releases
The following press releases correspond to the examples used in the text. Each case
in the sample has a corresponding press release.
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Example 1 – Concentrated Beverage
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Example 2 Fresh Cut Packaged Produce

Time to Recall
A further complication is introduced in determining our dependent variable because
of the lack of standardization of the use of dates within the recall press releases. Because
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the purpose of including dates and other identifying features specific to the recalled
products is to assist consumers in recognizing affected items and because product dating
is not standardized, press releases contain different types of date-related information. In
our sample we have used a combination of expiration, production and distribution dates
and product shelf life sources to calculate the dependent variable. While product shelf
lives are determined by the producer, category-specific shelf life information is available
through agricultural extension offices, academic papers which study different
preservation and product types, and consumer guidance.
Table 2A provides summary statistics for the time to recall variable. Figure 1A
illustrates the distribution of time to recall which displays the strong skew which is often
found in duration data.
Variable
timetorecall

Table 2A.2 Summary Statistics for timetorecall (Ti*)
Observations Mean
Standard Median Minimum Maximum
Deviation
350.752
322.172
258
239.5
1
1773
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Figure 2A.1 – Distribution of timetorecall
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Detection Entity & Supply Chain Recall Detection Competence
Detection entity, a proxy for supply chain recall detection competence (SCRDC) is
operationalized as the entity that detects the defect which results in a product recall. We
use a binary characterization of detection entity with the following operationalization:
1. Internal detection entity – defects detected by the recalling firm (manufacturer,
distributor or retailer) or their supplier; and
2. External detection entity – defects detected by a consumer or a regulatory
agency.
This operationalization is the most parsimonious and theoretically consistent
conceptualization of the construct, however we examined the data in more detail in order
to understand the nature of detection entity.
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Detection entity was coded directly from the recall press releases.

Based on

information provided in the press release we could distinguish between the following
mutually exclusive detection entities:
1. Agency detections –characterized by statements regarding agency inspections
and/or testing that resulted in a recall.
2. Consumer detections –characterized by a defect being discovered through
customer complaint.
3. Recalling firm (Manufacturer/Distributor/Retailer) – characterized by the firm
making the recall announcement indicating that their organization or internal
processes detected the defect.
4. Supplier to recalling firm – characterized by a statement by the recalling firm
that they were notified of a defect by a supplier.
These categories represent a comprehensive and mutually exclusive categorization of
how a defect that results in a recall may be discovered. To further parse out detection
entity among manufacturers, distributors and retailers, we coded the supply chain entity
(SCEntity) conducting the recall by searching public and private firm databases to
determine the primary NAICS code for the firm conducting the recall (Hora et al., 2011).
Due to the relatively small number of distributors conducting recall announcements, we
collapsed

this

variable

1=distributor/retailer).

to

a

binary

categorization

(0=producer/manufacturer;

We then matched the SCEntity and Detection Entity

classifications in an attempt to create a five category Detection Entity variable. Table 2B
below tabulates SCEntity versus the four category operationalization of Detection Entity.
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Table 2A.3 Full Sample (N=434) SCEntity by Detection Entity (4 category)
Detection Entity (Four Category Operationalization)
SCEntity

0 - Agency

1–
Consumer

3 – Supplier
to Recalling
Firm
196

Total

15

2–
Recalling
Firm
14

0 - producer

11

1–
distributor/
retailer
Total

23

7

2

166

198

34

22

16

362

434

236

While we would ideally like to split our categorization of Recalling Firm as a Detection
Entity into Producer (SCEntity=0) and Distributor/Retailer (SCEntity=1), we cannot do
so in this sample because only 2 cases correspond to a Distributor/Retailer detecting the
defect.
Downstream Distribution
We first look at the distribution of the variable labeled states, which is an indicator of
the number of states in which the recalled products were distributed, with a range of 1 to
50, noting that the distribution appears bimodal (Figure 2A). We therefore examine a
number of possible scale adjustments, including a 5-category (Figure 3A), 3-category
(Figure 4A), and a binary (Figure 5A) operationalization of this construct. Based on our
examination of the distribution of each operationalization, we have chosen to use a 3category scale where the number of states in which the recalled product was distributed is
categorized as Local (1-3 states), Regional (4-20 states) or National (>20 states). Note
that while the National category contains a total of 4 cases which are distributed in fewer
than 50 states, however, we argue that these cases correspond to a natural separation in
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the data between 19 states, which falls into the category of Regional, and the next value
of 28 states which falls into the category of National.
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Figure 2A.2 Histogram of states (1-50)
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Figure 2A.3 Histogram of 5-category operationalization of distribution1
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Note 1: 0=1-5 states; 1=6-10 states; 2=11-15; 3=16-20; 4=>20
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Figure 2A.4 Histogram of 3-category distribution
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1

Original Code Book
Data was recorded in a spreadsheet formatted for the task with one worksheet per
press release to minimize opportunities for transcription error between cases.

The

following table is the code book which was used to define how the original data was
coded from the press releases and enforcement reports. Not all of the data listed in this
code book is used in this study.
Item
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Item
Voluntary or Agency-Led (1 = Agency-led)
Extension of Prior Recall? (1 = Extension of Prior)
If extension, extension of what (date/firm)?
Enforcement Report (confirm date this recall is listed in Enforcement
Report)
Recall Class (1, 2 or 3) Confirm with Enforcement Report
Agency indicates “major” recall (1 = major)
This is indicated by special FAQ/reports provided by agency on the recall
– see compiled list of major recalls
Recalling Firm Name
Location of Recalling Firm
Product Name
If > 1, indicate “multiple”
Recall Announcement Date
Food or Drug (1= Drug; 0=Food)
Animal feeds = food
Animal medicine = drug
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Item
Number
12
Product Category (1-18)

13
14
15
16

17

18

19
20

Item

1 – Fresh produce
2 – Refrigerated, other
3 – Dairy
4 – Seafood, fresh
5 – Eggs (in shell)
6 – Baked goods
7 – Frozen mixtures
8 – Frozen seafood
9 – Other, shelf stable
10 – Nuts, dried fruits, dried vegetables
11 - Pet/Animal food
12 - Canned goods
13 – Injectable drug (human and vet)
14 – OTC drug
15 - OTC vet
16 – Prescription drug, non-injectable (human)
17- Vet drug, prescription
18 - Supplements

Number of Products in Recall Notice
(Continuous – count them as listed in the notice. If listed separately, same
product in different size container is counted as an additional product)
Proactive/Reactive (0,1)
REACTIVE - 1
# of Injury/Illness/Fatality (typically “no injury” indicated in press
release; otherwise, check Enforcement Report; CDC investigation, if
necessary)
Locus of Control (0,1, 2) EXTERNAL - 1; Not given = 2
Internal locus of control = 0 failure is within recalling firm
External locus of control = 1 failure is outside recalling firm
Not given = 2
Stability (0,1)
0 = no corrective action indicated
1 = corrective action indicated including preventative future measures,
ongoing investigation
Does not include shutting down production

Detection Method (1-5; NA)
CHECK ALL THAT APPLY

1 – Consumer Complaint
2 - Agency inspection or agency testing (including CDC investigation of illnesses)
3 – Supplier testing/recall/investigation
4 – Internal (firm) testing/investigation
5 – Other (specify)
NA – Cannot judge based on the information provided in the announcement.

Import (is the product, not the ingredients, an import?) (0,1). Import = 1
Imported from (if previous code = 1, indicate country product is imported
from)
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Item
Item
Number
21
Brand Attribution (0,1) Brand Attribution = 1
If the recalling firm’s name (or part of name) or a trademarked brand name is
included in the product name and/or product packaging = 1
Brand attribution may be confirmed using photos of product provided as part
of recall information.
22

Defect Type (record all that apply)

23

Downstream Distribution (# states product distributed in - count)

24
25

Manufacturer (as listed in Enforcement Report)
Location of manufacturer (record if available – typically manufacturing
firm is listed in Enforcement Report)
Volume (Enforcement Report)

26
27
28
29-30
31-32

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Pathogen
Labeling error (including undeclared ingredients, allergens)
Packaging
Sterility
Contaminant, other (includes extraneous matter & ingredient substitution)
Other, specify

Volume Units (as given in Enforcement Report)
Public or Private (0,1) 1 = Private
Earliest production date
Latest production date
Earliest expiration date
Latest expiration date
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Figure 2B.1 Output, Model 1a Estimates
. streg public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable P
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodp eriod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp
> rodperiod detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(lnormal) vce(cluster firmcluster)
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Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:

log
log
log
log
log

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

Lognormal regressi on -- accelerated failure-time form
No. of subjects
No. of failures
Time at risk

=
=
=

258
258
90494

Log pseudolikelihood =

-478.46945

Number of obs

=

258

Wald chi2(23)
Prob > chi2

=
=

229.94
0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
Robust
Std. Err.

_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
noprodXpro~d
regbynoprod
Natlbynoprod
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
breadthXpr~d
detectionX~d
detectXbre~h
_cons

-.91826
6.66e-06
-2.28e-07
1.194376
.099646
.9817505
.0022877
.0174613
1.657273
2.199458
.1843157
.6533058
-.1888054
-.0719821
.0971073
-.0000213
-.429635
.1261915
-.6495828
-.0459929
-.002004
.0025591
.0842019
1.838316

.4987438
8.84e-06
2.50e-06
.3456558
.2599794
.6016975
.0009465
.0166233
.6231316
.3897376
.5134555
.3372491
.4209648
.4609888
.4728534
.0000308
.2337168
.1739725
.6573978
.6874248
.0010313
.0201312
.414835
.6199425

-1.84
0.75
-0.09
3.46
0.38
1.63
2.42
1.05
2.66
5.64
0.36
1.94
-0.45
-0.16
0.21
-0.69
-1.84
0.73
-0.99
-0.07
-1.94
0.13
0.20
2.97

0.066
0.451
0.928
0.001
0.702
0.103
0.016
0.294
0.008
0.000
0.720
0.053
0.654
0.876
0.837
0.490
0.066
0.468
0.323
0.947
0.052
0.899
0.839
0.003

/ln_sig

.4355942

.0791859

5.50

0.000

sigma

1.545881

.122412

z

P>|z|
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[95% Conf. Interval]
-1.89578
-.0000107
-5.13e-06
.5169032
-.4099044
-.197555
.0004327
-.0151198
.4359578
1.435587
-.8220386
-.0076903
-1.013881
-.9755035
-.8296683
-.0000817
-.8877116
-.2147883
-1.938059
-1.393321
-.0040253
-.0368973
-.7288598
.6232514

.0592599
.000024
4.68e-06
1.871849
.6091963
2.161056
.0041428
.0500424
2.878589
2.96333
1.19067
1.314302
.6362705
.8315393
1.023883
.0000391
.0284415
.4671713
.6388932
1.301335
.0000173
.0420155
.8972637
3.053381

.2803927

.5907958

1.323649

1.805425

Hypothesized interactions: H2a: Detection X Number of Products; H2b: Detection X
Regional Detection X National.

Higher order terms included as mis-specification check: Number of Products X
Affected Production Period; Detection X Recall Breadth; Regional X Number of
Products, National X Number of Products; Recall Breadth X Affected Period.

Results: See Figure 2B.1. Hypothesized interaction terms are not significant (retain in
model). Additional interactions are not significant except for Recall Breadth X Affected
Period. Retain Recall Breadth X Affected Period in model.
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Figure 2B.2 Output, Model 1b Estimates
. streg public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable P
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp
> rodperiod detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(loglogistic) vce(cluster firmcluster)
failure _d:
analysis time _t:

1 (meaning all fail)
timetorecall

Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:

log
log
log
log
log

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=
=

-573.88058
-516.16367
-501.93514
-501.84949
-501. 84946

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=

-501.84946
-470.86866
-457.69648
-457.16457
-457.16341
-457.16341

Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

log
log
log
log
log
log

Loglogistic regres sion -- accelerated failure-time form
No. of subjects
No. of failures
Time at risk

=
=
=

258
258
90494

Log pseudolikelihood =

-457.16341

Number of obs

=

258

Wald chi2(23)
Prob > chi2

=
=

215.37
0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
noprodXpro~d
regbynoprod
Natlbynoprod
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
breadthXpr~d
detectionX~d
detectXbre~h
_cons

-.4184976
2.70e-06
-9.79e-07
1.564041
.0474953
1.322987
.0024306
.0127068
1.779548
2.080562
.0229607
.4100843
.0057826
.1612472
.0242285
-4.38e-06
-.1983122
.0081877
-.829853
-.4719546
-.002311
.0023807
-.1150818
1.753374

/ln_gam
gamma

Robust
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.3315999
6.38e-06
1.87e-06
.314508
.219995
.5769314
.0008935
.0109912
.5853845
.4271405
.469137
.3251966
.3294235
.4575759
.4514663
.000022
.1866565
.1223336
.5542304
.5944863
.000955
.0145847
.4268033
.7169508

-1.26
0.42
-0.52
4.97
0.22
2.29
2.72
1.16
3.04
4.87
0.05
1.26
0.02
0.35
0.05
-0.20
-1.06
0.07
-1.50
-0.79
-2.42
0.16
-0.27
2.45

0.207
0.672
0.601
0.000
0.829
0.022
0.007
0.248
0.002
0.000
0.961
0.207
0.986
0.725
0.957
0.842
0.288
0.947
0.134
0.427
0.016
0.870
0.787
0.014

-1.068421
-9.80e-06
-4.65e-06
.9476172
-.383687
.1922218
.0006794
-.0088356
.6322153
1.243382
-.896531
-.2272895
-.6398757
-.735585
-.8606292
-.0000475
-.5641521
-.2315818
-1.916125
-1.637126
-.0041828
-.0262047
-.9516008
.3481758

.2314262
.0000152
2.69e-06
2.180466
.4786776
2.453751
.0041817
.0342492
2.92688
2.917742
.9424524
1.047458
.6514409
1.058079
.9090861
.0000387
.1675278
.2479572
.2564186
.6932171
-.0004392
.0309661
.7214372
3.158571

-.2783955

.099501

-2.80

0.005

-.4734139

-.0833771

.7569974

.075322

.6228722

.9200042

.
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Hypothesized interactions: H2a: Detection X Number of Products; H2b: Detection X
Regional Detection X National.

Higher order terms included as misspecification check: Number of Products X
Affected Production Period; Detection X Recall Breadth; Regional X Number of
Products, National X Number of Products; Recall Breadth X Affected Period.

Results: See Figure 2B.2. Hypothesized interaction terms are not significant (Detection
X Regional is significant at p<.07). Retain in model. Additional interactions are not
significant except for Recall Breadth X Affected Period. Retain Recall Breadth X
Affected Period in model.
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Figure 2B.3 Output, Model 1c Estimates
. streg public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable P
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp
> rodperiod detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(weibull) vce(cluster firmcluster) time
failure _d:
analysis time _t:

1 (meaning all fail)
timetorecall

Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:

log
log
log
log

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=

-468.05622
-463.40104
-463.38672
-463.3867 1

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=

-463.38671
-428.43957
-419.2948
-418.87816
-418.87649
-418.87649

Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

log
log
log
log
log
log

Weibull regression -- accelerated failure-time form
No. of subjects
No. of failures
Time at risk

=
=
=

258
258
90494

Log pseudolikelihood =

-418.87649

Number of obs

=

258

Wald chi2(23)
Prob > chi2

=
=

260.57
0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
Robust
Std. Err.

_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
noprodXpro~d
regbynoprod
Natlbynoprod
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
breadthXpr~d
detectionX~d
detectXbre~h
_cons

-.2704438
-7.10e-07
-2.65e-07
1.747586
.0291969
1.127145
.002442
.0077731
1.61618
1.716419
-.1327504
.2510722
-.0625903
.0356033
.1281624
-4.06e-06
-.1080529
.0150573
-.7991718
-.0715644
-.0022155
.0010179
-.7183836
2.597077

.2053503
3.12e-06
1.20e-06
.3994999
.1595423
.5740853
.0008878
.0074582
.4429538
.4213375
.4516687
.2355685
.1952739
.3583767
.384042
.0000111
.1348423
.0806428
.5474021
.6143739
.000915
.0125169
.4821068
.4593267

-1.32
-0.23
-0.22
4.37
0.18
1.96
2.75
1.04
3.65
4.07
-0.29
1.07
-0.32
0.10
0.33
-0.37
-0.80
0.19
-1.46
-0.12
-2.42
0.08
-1.49
5.65

0.188
0.820
0.825
0.000
0.855
0.050
0.006
0.297
0.000
0.000
0.769
0.287
0.749
0.921
0.739
0.714
0.423
0.852
0.144
0.907
0.015
0.935
0.136
0.000

-.6729231
-6.83e-06
-2.61e-06
.9645801
-.2835002
.0019586
.000702
-.0068447
.7480069
.8906128
-1.018005
-.2106336
-.44532
-.6668022
-.6245461
-.0000258
-.372339
-.1429996
-1.87206
-1.275715
-.0040089
-.0235147
-1.663296
1.696814

.1320354
5.41e-06
2.08e-06
2.530591
.3418941
2.252332
.004182
.022391
2.484354
2.542226
.7525039
.7127779
.3201395
.7380088
.8808709
.0000177
.1562331
.1731142
.2737166
1.132586
-.0004221
.0255506
.2265284
3.497341

/ln_p

.0279753

.0804035

0.35

0.728

-.1296126

.1855632

p
1/p

1.02837
.9724124

.0826845
.0781853

.8784357
.8306363

1.203896
1.138387

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.
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Hypothesized interactions: H2a: Detection X Number of Products; H2b: Detection X
Regional, Detection X National

Higher order terms included as misspecification check: Number of Products X
Affected Production Period; Detection X Recall Breadth; Regional X Number of
Products, National X Number of Products; Recall Breadth X Affected Period.

Results: See Figure 2B.3. Hypothesized interaction terms are not significant (Detection
X Regional is significant at p<.08). Retain in model. Additional interactions are not
significant except for Recall Breadth X Affected Period. Retain Recall Breadth X
Affected Period in model. Detection X Recall Breadth is significant at p<.07.
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Table 2B.1 Comparison of Models 1a, 1b and 1c for Consistency

Predictor
Public

.

Sign
-

Firm
Revenue
Firm
Employees
Recall
Breadth
Recall
Strategy
SCRDC
QPM
Magnitude

+

Cat1_froze
n
Cat2_Shelf
Stable
Pathogen
Regional

+

National

-

Yr_2009

Model 1a
Significance
Significant

Sign
-

Model 1b
Significance
Significant

Conclusion

+

Consistent

+

Not
Significant
Significant
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant

Consistent

Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant

+

+

+

Not
Significant
Significant
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant

+

Not
Significant
Significant
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant

+

Significant

+

Significant

+

Significant

Consistent

+

Not
Significant
Significant

+

-

-

-

+

Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
significant
Significant

Consistent

Not
Significant
Significant

Yr_2010

+

Significant

+

+

Significant

Consistent

SCRDC X
Regional
Detection
X National
SCRDC X
Magnitude
Magnitude
X QPM
SCRDC X
Recall
Breadth
Regional X
Magnitude
National X
Magnitude
Recall
Breadth X
QPM
Constant

-

Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant

-

Not
Significant
Significant at
p<.10
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant at
p<.07
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant

-

Significant
at p<.08
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant
at p<.07

Consistent

Consistent

Consistent

+
+
+
+
+

+
+

+

+
+
+

+

-

+
-

-

Significant

-

+

+

-

Not
Significant
Significant

+

Significant

Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant

Model 1c
Significance
Significant
at p<.10
Not
Significant
Not
Significant
+
Significant

Sign
-

+
+
+

+
-

+
-

+

+

Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant

-

Not
Significant
Not
Significant
Significant

+

Significant

+

Significant
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-

Consistent
Consistent
Consistent

Consistent
Consistent
Consistent
Consistent

Consistent
Consistent
Consistent

Consistent
Consistent
Consistent
Consistent

Consistent
Consistent

Figure 2B.4 Output, Model 1b Estimates with Hypothesized
& Significant Interactions
. streg public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts
cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable
> Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg D etectXNatl detectionXnoprod breadthXprodperiod, dist(loglogis
> tic) vce(cluster firmcluster)
failure _d:
analysis time _t:

1 (meaning all fail)
timetorecall

Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:

log
log
log
log
log

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=
=

-573.88058
-516.16367
-501.93514
-501.84949
-501. 84946

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=

-501.84946
-468.79292
-458.0704
-457.82862
-457.82824
-457.82824

Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

log
log
log
log
log
log

Loglogistic regres sion -- accelerated failure-time form
No. of subjects
No. of failures
Time at risk

=
=
=

258
258
90494

Log pseudolikelihood =

-457.82824

Number of obs

=

258

Wald chi2(19)
Prob > chi2

=
=

179.52
0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
Robust
Std. Err.

_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
detectionX~d
breadthXpr~d
_cons

-.4386474
4.31e-06
-1.33e-06
1.537855
.0778895
1.304055
.0025367
.0057991
1.80218
2.07935
-.0016344
.1868613
.0344735
.187749
.0227185
-.8076223
-.5296953
-.0019975
-.0024157
1.796384

.3376111
6.57e-06
1.90e-06
.2933666
.2068846
.5287892
.0008902
.0055747
.5540464
.4206505
.4435496
.3007566
.2672391
.422354
.4429141
.5445903
.5743315
.0141078
.000954
.6549458

-1.30
0.66
-0.70
5.24
0.38
2.47
2.85
1.04
3.25
4.94
-0.00
0.62
0.13
0.44
0.05
-1.48
-0.92
-0.14
-2.53
2.74

z

0.194
0.512
0.484
0.000
0.707
0.014
0.004
0.298
0.001
0.000
0.997
0.534
0.897
0.657
0.959
0.138
0.356
0.887
0.011
0.006

P>|z|

-1.100353
-8.57e-06
-5.06e-06
.9628669
-.327597
.2676474
.000792
-.0051271
.7162696
1.25489
-.8709756
-.4026107
-.4893056
-.6400496
-.8453772
-1.875
-1.655364
-.0296482
-.0042855
.5127143

[95% Conf. Interval]
.2230581
.0000172
2.40e-06
2.112843
.4833759
2.340463
.0042815
.0167254
2.888091
2.903809
.8677069
.7763333
.5582525
1.015548
.8908143
.259755
.5959737
.0256532
-.000546
3.080055

/ln_gam

-.278013

.0992262

-2.80

0.005

-.4724929

-.0835332

gamma

.7572869

.0751427

.6234461

.9198606

.
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Figure 2B.5 Output, Model 1b Average Marginal Effects
. margins, dydx(*)
Average marginal effects
Model VCE
: Robust

Number of obs

=

258

Expression
: Predicted median _t, predict()
dy/dx w.r.t. : public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen
cat2_shelfstable Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg DetectXNatl detectionXnoprod
breadthXprodperiod

dy/dx
public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
detectionX~d
breadthXpr~d

-107.9488
.0010613
-.0003275
378.4577
19.16818
320.9209
.624274
1.427134
443.5068
511.7167
-.4022053
45.98555
8.483733
46.20402
5.590909
-198.7515
-130.3551
-.4915684
-.5944983

Delta-method
Std. Err.
81.77511
.0016012
.0004692
87.59462
50.89443
132.9066
.2328924
1.385898
147.5492
113.4274
109.1544
73.80135
65.67683
103.9821
108.9298
135.0592
143.0614
3.469016
.2421476

z
-1.32
0.66
-0.70
4.32
0.38
2.41
2.68
1.03
3.01
4.51
-0.00
0.62
0.13
0.44
0.05
-1.47
-0.91
-0.14
-2.46

P>|z|
0.187
0.507
0.485
0.000
0.706
0.016
0.007
0.303
0.003
0.000
0.997
0.533
0.897
0.657
0.959
0.141
0.362
0.887
0.014

[95% Conf. Interval]
-268.225
-.002077
-.0012472
206.7754
-80.58307
60.42882
.1678132
-1.289175
154.3157
289.4031
-214.3409
-98.66244
-120.2405
-157.5971
-207.9076
-463.4626
-410.7503
-7.290714
-1.069099

52.32752
.0041997
.0005922
550.14
118.9194
581.413
1.080735
4.143444
732.6979
734.0302
213.5365
190.6335
137.2079
250.0051
219.0895
65.95972
150.04
6.307577
-.1198978

. margins, eyex(firmrev firmempl)
Average marginal effects
Model VCE
: Robust

Number of obs

=

258

Expression
: Predicted median _t, predict()
ey/ex w.r.t. : firmrev firmempl

ey/ex
firmrev
firmempl

.0176703
-.0185647

Delta-method
Std. Err.
.0269269
.026532

z
0.66
-0.70

P>|z|
0.512
0.484

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0351055
-.0705665
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.0704462
.0334371

Figure 2B.6 Output, Model 2 Gamma Frailty
. streg public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable P
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp
> rodper iod detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(loglogistic) frailty(gamma)
failure _d:
analysis time _t:

1 (meaning all fail)
timetorecall

Fitting llogistic model:
Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log

likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

-613.17391
-546.42199
-509.12124
-503.58912
-502.26713
-501.94435
-501.86832
-501.85279
-501.85024
-501.84963
-501.8495
-501.84947

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

-526.82609
-467.95985
-458.61256
-457.46036
-457.23048
-457.17836
-457.16695
-457.16414
-457.16357
-457.16344
-457.16342
-457.16341

Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
1 1:

log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log

likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood

Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form
Gamma frailty
No. of subjects =
No. of failures =
Time at risk
=
Log likelihood

=

258
258
90494
-457.16341

Number of obs

=

258

LR chi2(23)
Prob > chi2

=
=

89.37
0.0000

_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
noprodXpro~d
regbynoprod
Natlbynoprod
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
breadthXpr~d
detectionX~d
detectXbre~h
_cons

-.418532
2.70e-06
-9.80e-07
1.564032
.0474988
1.323002
.0024306
.0127069
1.779511
2.080568
.0229699
.4101119
.0057838
.1612608
.0242337
-4.38e-06
-.1983194
.008197
-.8298591
-.4719758
-.002311
.0023809
-.1150699
1.753339

.3296631
9.17e-06
2.72e-06
.4071531
.2537291
.6141569
.0011805
.0131842
.4521381
.3845387
.4561784
.3523478
.2904971
.516829
.4944205
.0000222
.1905304
.1295766
.666297
.687932
.0012207
.024226
.7866172
.6223486

-1.27
0.29
-0.36
3.84
0.19
2.15
2.06
0.96
3.94
5.41
0.05
1.16
0.02
0.31
0.05
-0.20
-1.04
0.06
-1.25
-0.69
-1.89
0.10
-0.15
2.82

0.204
0.768
0.719
0.000
0.852
0.031
0.040
0.335
0.000
0.000
0.960
0.244
0.984
0.755
0.961
0.843
0.298
0.950
0.213
0.493
0.058
0.922
0.884
0.005

-1.06466
-.0000153
-6.31e-06
.7660263
-.4498011
.1192762
.0001168
-.0131337
.8933362
1.326886
-.8711235
-.280477
-.56358
-.8517056
-.9448126
-.0000479
-.5717522
-.2457684
-2.135777
-1.820298
-.0047035
-.0451012
-1.656811
.5335585

.2275958
.0000207
4.35e-06
2.362037
.5447988
2.526727
.0047443
.0385475
2.665685
2.83425
.9170632
1.100701
.5751476
1.174227
.99328
.0000391
.1751134
.2621624
.4760589
.8763462
.0000816
.0498631
1.426671
2.97312

/ln_gam
/ln_the

-.2783928
-17.70611

.0540222
803.9214

-5.15
-0.02

0.000
0.982

-.3842743
-1593.363

-.1725113
1557.951

gamma
theta

.7569994
2.04e-08

.0408947
.0000164

.6809446
0

.8415488
.

Std. Err.

z

Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) =

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.00 Prob>=chibar2 = 1.000

.
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Results: Neither Gamma nor Inverse Gaussian frailty specifications are significant.
Unobserved heterogeneity is not incorporated and Model 1 is preferred.
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Figure 2B.7 Output, Model 2 Inverse Gaussian Frailty
. streg public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable P
> at hogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp
> rodperiod detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(loglogistic) frailty(invgauss)
failure _d:
analysis time _t:

1 (meaning all fail)
timetorecall

Fitting llogistic model:
Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log

likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

-582.41961
-516.14263
-505.3142
-502.5178
- 502.00677
-501.8857
-501.85728
-501.85111
-501.84984
-501.84955
-501.84948
-501.84947

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

-506.18742
-458.94924
-457.28534
-457.18625
-457.16862
-457.16464
-457.16366
-457.16346
-457.16342
-457.16341

Fitting full model:
Iter ation
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log

likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood

Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form
Inverse-Gaussian frailty
No. of subjects =
No. of failures =
Time at risk
=
Log likelihood

=

258
258
90494
-457.16341
Std. Err.

z

Number of obs

=

258

LR chi2(23)
Prob > chi2

=
=

89.37
0.0000

_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
noprodXpro~d
regbynoprod
Natlbynoprod
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
breadthXpr~d
detectionX~d
detectXbre~h
_cons

-.41852
2.70e-06
-9.80e-07
1.564028
.0475194
1.323012
.0024306
.0127053
1.779557
2.080604
.0229819
.410104
.0057426
.1612671
.024353
-4.38e-06
-.198314
.0082191
-.8299106
-.471969
-.0023109
.0023788
-.1151623
1.753279

.3296844
9.17e-06
2.72e-06
.4071793
.2537449
.6141979
.0011806
.0131853
.4521637
.384561
.4562065
.3523689
.2905146
.5168623
.4944523
.0000222
.1905423
.1295854
.6663413
.687976
.0012208
.0242281
.786673
.6223869

-1.27
0.29
-0.36
3.84
0.19
2.15
2.06
0.96
3.94
5.41
0.05
1.16
0.02
0.31
0.05
-0.20
-1.04
0.06
-1.25
-0.69
-1.89
0.10
-0.15
2.82

0.204
0.769
0.719
0.000
0.851
0.031
0.040
0.335
0.000
0.000
0.960
0.244
0.984
0.755
0.961
0.843
0.298
0.949
0.213
0.493
0.058
0.922
0.884
0.005

-1.06469
-.0000153
-6.31e-06
.7659712
-.4498114
.1192061
.0001167
-.0131374
.8933319
1.326878
-.8711663
-.2805263
-.5636555
-.8517644
-.9447557
-.0000479
-.57177
-.2457636
-2.135916
-1.820377
-.0047036
-.0451074
-1.657013
.5334227

.2276495
.0000207
4.35e-06
2.362085
.5448503
2.526818
.0047445
.0385479
2.665781
2.83433
.9171302
1.100734
.5751408
1.174299
.9934616
.0000391
.1751419
.2622019
.4760944
.8764393
.0000817
.0498651
1.426689
2.973134

/ln_gam
/ln_the

-.2783169
-17.63485

.0540246
831.2313

-5.15
-0.02

0.000
0.983

-.3842031
-1646.818

-.1724307
1611.549

gamma
theta

.7570569
2.19e-08

.0408997
.0000182

.6809931
0

.8416167
.

Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) =

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.00 Prob>=chibar2 = 1.000

.
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Figure 2B.8 Output, Model 3 Estimates
Model 3 – Log-logistic AFT, Recall Breadth=0 Stata Output
streg public firmrev firmempl reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts
cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable Pathogen Regional
> National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg DetectXNatl detectionXnopro d if recallbreadth==0 ,dist(loglogistic) vce(cluster firm
> cluster)
failure _d:
analysis time _t:

1 (meaning all fail)
timetorecall

Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:

log
log
log
log
log

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikel ihood

=
=
=
=
=

-83.907416
-81.095309
-80.898748
-80.898227
-80.898227

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=

-80.898227
-66.76299
-60.318267
-59.714947
-59.713523
-59.713523

Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

log
log
log
log
log
log

(not concave)

Loglogistic regres sion -- accelerated failure-time form
No. of subjects
No. of failures
Time at risk

=
=
=

48
48
5304

Log pseudolikelihood =

-59.713523

Number of obs

=

48

Wald chi2(17)
Prob > chi2

=
=

214.20
0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
detectionX~d
_cons

.0055115
.0000332
-4.13e-06
.0908258
.3724697
.0030842
.0092522
2.145696
1.024279
-.3162362
-.2687472
-.7230232
.3552594
-.0196742
.0766883
.4349917
.0107415
2.892053

/ln_gam
gamma

Robust
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.8466115
.0000375
.0000153
.3387813
.4059744
.0009362
.0042262
.6783355
.4217796
.3126884
.526347
.3279586
.4067716
.4872886
.6132956
.7151503
.0127656
.3992508

0.01
0.88
-0.27
0.27
0.92
3.29
2.19
3.16
2.43
-1.01
-0.51
-2.20
0.87
-0.04
0.13
0.61
0.84
7.24

0.995
0.377
0.788
0.789
0.359
0.001
0.029
0.002
0.015
0.312
0.610
0.027
0.382
0.968
0.900
0.543
0.400
0.000

-1.653817
-.0000404
-.0000341
-.5731733
-.4232255
.0012493
.0009691
.8161829
.1976064
-.9290943
-1.300368
-1.36581
-.4419983
-.9747423
-1.125349
-.9666772
-.0142785
2.109535

-.7745146

.1540858

-5.03

0.000

-1.076517

-.472512

.4609275

.0710224

.3407803

.6234342

200

1.66484
.0001068
.0000259
.754825
1.168165
.004919
.0175354
3.475209
1.850952
.2966219
.7628738
-.0802363
1.152517
.935394
1.278726
1.836661
.0357616
3.67457

Figure 2B.9 Output, Model 3 Average Marginal Effects
. margins, dydx(*)
Average marginal effects
Model VCE
: Robust

Number of obs

=

48

Expression
: Predicted median _t, predict()
dy/dx w.r.t. : public firmrev firmempl reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable
Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg DetectXNatl detectionXnoprod

dy/dx
public
firmrev
firmempl
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
detectionX~d

.4942939
.0029772
-.0003701
8.145674
33.40477
.2766038
.8297823
192.4358
91.86201
-28.3615
-24.10247
-64.84401
31.86128
-1.764467
6.877755
39.01203
.9633509

Delta-method
Std. Err.
75.95354
.003308
.001372
30.40481
36.65226
.1121568
.4140056
77.16229
36.54242
27.91058
47.45521
34.41002
37.99746
43.6429
55.16717
66.83482
1.14792

z
0.01
0.90
-0.27
0.27
0.91
2.47
2.00
2.49
2.51
-1.02
-0.51
-1.88
0.84
-0.04
0.12
0.58
0.84

P>|z|
0.995
0.368
0.787
0.789
0.362
0.014
0.045
0.013
0.012
0.310
0.612
0.060
0.402
0.968
0.901
0.559
0.401

[95% Conf. Interval]
-148.3719
-.0035063
-.0030592
-51.44666
-38.43233
.0567805
.0183462
41.20045
20.24019
-83.06523
-117.113
-132.2864
-42.61237
-87.30298
-101.2479
-91.98181
-1.286531

149.3605
.0094607
.0023191
67.738
105.2419
.496427
1.641218
343.6711
163.4838
26.34223
68.90803
2.598391
106.3349
83.77405
115.0034
170.0059
3.213233

. margins, eyex(firmrev firmempl)
Average marginal effects
Model VCE
: Robust

Number of obs

=

48

Expression
: Predicted median _t, predict()
ey/ex w.r.t. : firmrev firmempl

ey/ex
firmrev
firmempl

.0685544
-.0348143

Delta-method
Std. Err.
.0775285
.1292173

z
0.88
-0.27

P>|z|
0.377
0.788

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0833987
-.2880756

201

.2205076
.2184471

Figure 2B.10 Output, Model 3 Estimated Without Interactions
. streg public firmrev firmempl reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable Pathogen Regional
> National yr_2009 yr_2010 if recallbreadth==0, dist(loglogistic) vce(clust er firmcluster)
failure _d:
analysis time _t:

1 (meaning all fail)
timetorecall

Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:

log
log
log
log
log

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikel ihood

=
=
=
=
=

-83.907416
-81.095309
-80.898748
-80.898227
-80.898227

pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=

-80.898227
-67.197676
-60.631914
-60.145306
-60.144075
-60.144075

Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

log
log
log
log
log
log

(not concave)

Loglogistic regres sion -- accelerated failure-time form
No. of subjects
No. of failures
Time at risk

=
=
=

48
48
5304

Log pseudolikelihood =

-60.144075

Number of obs

=

48

Wald chi2(14)
Prob > chi2

=
=

140.18
0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
_t

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
_cons

-.1014371
.0000359
-3.67e-06
.1316331
.5766707
.0029553
.0109142
2.18034
1.099083
-.2997793
-.1984133
-.5391199
.3064831
.0182859
2.739497

/ln_gam
gamma

Robust
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.7486238
.00004
.0000159
.319559
.4138236
.0008827
.0036597
.7288789
.4021486
.2933239
.439051
.4347696
.39035
.4953179
.4465605

-0.14
0.90
-0.23
0.41
1.39
3.35
2.98
2.99
2.73
-1.02
-0.45
-1.24
0.79
0.04
6.13

0.892
0.369
0.817
0.680
0.163
0.001
0.003
0.003
0.006
0.307
0.651
0.215
0.432
0.971
0.000

-1.568713
-.0000425
-.0000348
-.4946909
-.2344086
.0012253
.0037414
.751764
.3108867
-.8746836
-1.058938
-1.391253
-.4585889
-.9525192
1.864255

1.365838
.0001142
.0000274
.7579572
1.38775
.0046854
.018087
3.608917
1.88728
.275125
.6621109
.3130128
1.071555
.9890911
3.61474

-.7577247

.1393205

-5.44

0.000

-1.030788

-.4846616

.4687317

.0653039

.3567258

.6159056

Multicollinearity Check
In order to avoid potentially excessive inflation of standard errors due to
multicollinearity among the predictor variables, we test a linear model for variance
inflation. Using a variance inflation factor (VIF) of less than 10 or a tolerance (1/VIF) of
less than 0.1, we find no evidence of excessive multicollinearity in Model 1b or Model 3.
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Figure 2B.11 Output, Model 1b Multicollinearity Check
. regress timetorecall public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2
> _shelfstable Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectX
> Natl detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, cluster(firmcluster)
Linear reg ression

Number of obs
F( 22,
200)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=

258
7.88
0.0000
0.1931
302.64

(Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
timetorecall

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
recallbrea~h
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
noprodXpro~d
regbynoprod
Natlbynoprod
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
detectionX~d
detectXbre~h
_cons

-108.0758
.0002467
-.0001451
237.5881
-1.257054
92.40993
.07089
.22862
164.4753
244.6637
65.06117
52.14509
-45.65813
-14.51589
2.138258
.0009566
-18.9369
22.49533
-36.90156
93.74887
-2.64471
-2.949961
-113.1491

Robust
Std. Err.
55.04034
.001292
.0004526
59.93876
49.82181
82.96326
.0936036
2.789562
81.71949
50.36914
66.38328
100.1605
76.36621
59.42215
61.87279
.0048197
53.22967
29.44564
105.7534
114.3089
3.077076
110.5108
91.19802

t
-1.96
0.19
-0.32
3.96
-0.03
1.11
0.76
0.08
2.01
4.86
0.98
0.52
-0.60
-0.24
0.03
0.20
-0.36
0.76
-0.35
0.82
-0.86
-0.03
-1.24

P>|t|
0.051
0.849
0.749
0.000
0.980
0.267
0.450
0.935
0.045
0.000
0.328
0.603
0.551
0.807
0.972
0.843
0.722
0.446
0.728
0.413
0.391
0.979
0.216

. estat vif
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

detentbinary
yr_2009
recallbrea~h
regbynoprod
Regional
cat2_shelf~e
firmrev
noproducts
firmempl
DetectXReg
National
Natlbynoprod
cat1_frozen
Pathogen
DetectXNatl
noprodXpro~d
yr_2010
public
detectionX~d
prodperiod
detectXbre~h
reactive

6.64
4.74
4.07
3.99
3.70
3.54
3.51
3.51
3.34
3.15
3.12
3.10
2.89
2.71
2.58
2.17
1.95
1.87
1.81
1.59
1.42
1.19

0.150555
0.211104
0.245642
0.250384
0.270369
0.282157
0.285007
0.285063
0.298999
0.317617
0.320813
0.323088
0.346073
0.369500
0.386894
0.461157
0.511959
0.533827
0.552817
0.629271
0.703574
0.839405

Mean VIF

3.03

.
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[95% Conf. Interval]
-216.6096
-.0023009
-.0010376
119.3951
-99.50049
-71.185
-.1136867
-5.272106
3.332942
145.341
-65.83976
-145.3611
-196.2444
-131.6902
-119.8685
-.0085473
-123.9003
-35.56841
-245.4362
-131.6563
-8.712384
-220.8658
-292.9822

.4580902
.0027943
.0007473
355.7811
96.98638
256.0049
.2554666
5.729346
325.6176
343.9864
195.9621
249.6512
104.9281
102.6584
124.145
.0104604
86.02649
80.55908
171.6331
319.1541
3.422965
214.9659
66.6839

Figure 2B.12 Output, Model 3 Multicollinearity Check
. regress timetorecall public firmrev firmempl reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable Pat
> hogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectXNatl detectionXnopr
> od if recallbreadth==0, cluster (firmcluster)
Linear reg ression

Number of obs =
F( 20,
44) =
Prob > F
=
R-squared
=
Root MSE
=

48
7.15
0.0000
0.7081
99.59

(Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
timetorecall

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
noprodXpro~d
regbynoprod
Natlbynoprod
DetectXReg
DetectXNatl
detectionX~d
_cons

69.67727
-.0067717
.0027464
42.46192
-46.75614
.4458118
5.123869
220.4318
19.56158
22.96281
23.58726
-32.96084
-30.76605
-12.47665
.0236162
-88.86661
-65.33483
125.0521
113.1902
-.8325769
15.17917

Robust
Std. Err.
54.78716
.006179
.0020103
46.41534
40.94244
.2809858
1.573785
75.04498
31.44824
44.6152
66.60766
43.25282
47.95215
49.10257
.0600458
36.65101
37.95169
87.61368
68.77179
3.006134
39.6613

t
1.27
-1.10
1.37
0.91
-1.14
1.59
3.26
2.94
0.62
0.51
0.35
-0.76
-0.64
-0.25
0.39
-2.42
-1.72
1.43
1.65
-0.28
0.38

P>|t|
0.210
0.279
0.179
0.365
0.260
0.120
0.002
0.005
0.537
0.609
0.725
0.450
0.524
0.801
0.696
0.019
0.092
0.161
0.107
0.783
0.704

[95% Conf. Interval]
-40.739
-.0192247
-.0013051
-51.08205
-129.2702
-.1204778
1.952115
69.18857
-43.81817
-66.95321
-110.6517
-120.1312
-127.4073
-111.4364
-.0973981
-162.7319
-141.8214
-51.52171
-25.4102
-6.891041
-64.75293

. estat vif
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

firmempl
firmrev
National
DetectXReg
Regional
regbynoprod
detentbinary
noprodXpro~d
DetectXNatl
Natlbynoprod
noproducts
detectionX~d
prodperiod
public
Pathogen
yr_2009
yr_2010
cat2_shelf~e
reactive
cat1_frozen

8.72
7.82
7.37
7.03
6.87
6.64
6.21
5.76
5.47
4.27
4.01
3.78
2.98
2.40
2.27
2.07
1.95
1.93
1.76
1.68

0.114622
0.127913
0.135619
0.142300
0.145525
0.150584
0.160950
0.173473
0.182729
0.233956
0.249254
0.264355
0.335717
0.417488
0.440003
0.483446
0.512193
0.517100
0.567523
0.594900

Mean VIF

4.55

.
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180.0935
.0056814
.0067978
136.0059
35.75792
1.012101
8.295624
371.675
82.94134
112.8788
157.8262
54.20948
65.87517
86.48308
.1446305
-15.00135
11.15177
301.6258
251.7907
5.225887
95.11128

Figure 2B.13 Output, Model 3 Without Interactions Multicollinearity Check
. regress timetorecall public firmrev firmempl reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable Pat
> hogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 if recallbreadth==0, cluster (firmcluster)
Linear reg ression

Number of obs =
F( 14,
44) =
Prob > F
=
R-squared
=
Root MSE
=

48
3.55
0.0006
0.5779
108.33

(Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
timetorecall

Coef.

public
firmrev
firmempl
reactive
detentbinary
prodperiod
noproducts
cat1_frozen
cat2_shelf~e
Pathogen
Regional
National
yr_2009
yr_2010
_cons

67.24404
-.0034452
.0017262
31.40179
45.1678
.4534164
1.069738
210.9417
39.45472
-13.63888
10.81511
-23.86519
-10.87949
-12.84213
-18.66388

Robust
Std. Err.
62.99791
.0066789
.0023062
34.53904
33.59368
.2274918
.6060481
86.27126
30.35269
37.81564
43.09993
43.0145
46.3849
44.13347
49.69564

t
1.07
-0.52
0.75
0.91
1.34
1.99
1.77
2.45
1.30
-0.36
0.25
-0.55
-0.23
-0.29
-0.38

P>|t|
0.292
0.609
0.458
0.368
0.186
0.052
0.084
0.019
0.200
0.720
0.803
0.582
0.816
0.772
0.709

[95% Conf. Interval]
-59.71991
-.0169056
-.0029217
-38.20707
-22.53582
-.0050631
-.1516722
37.07341
-21.71711
-89.8513
-76.04708
-110.5552
-104.3621
-101.7873
-118.8189

. estat vif
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

firmempl
firmrev
National
public
Regional
yr_2009
Pathogen
yr_2010
detentbinary
cat2_shelf~e
cat1_frozen
prodperiod
reactive
noproducts

7.91
6.72
2.34
2.11
2.09
1.86
1.80
1.68
1.68
1.67
1.54
1.36
1.36
1.22

0.126484
0.148846
0.428246
0.474822
0.478918
0.536483
0.554571
0.596001
0.596910
0.599211
0.650848
0.734063
0.735934
0.819883

Mean VIF

2.52
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194.208
.0100151
.0063741
101.0107
112.8714
.9118959
2.291147
384.81
100.6266
62.57353
97.67731
62.82484
82.60312
76.10304
81.49109
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Construct
Purchase Risk

Locus

Stability
(Corrective
Action)

Controllability

Purchase
Dissatisfaction

Table 3A.1 Constructs and Operational Definitions
Definition
Citations
Purchase risk consists of two components:
Bettman, 1973;
1) the severity of the loss (physical,
Gurhan-Canli & Batra,
financial, etc.) associated with a potential
2004; Mitchell, 1999;
negative outcome and 2) the likelihood that
Siomokos & Kurzbad,
the outcome will be negative.
1994; Taylor, 1974
An internal locus occurs when a defect that
Folkes, 1984; Folkes
causes a product recall happens inside the
1988; Klein & Dawar,
manufacturing firm.
2004
An external locus occurs when a defect that
causes a product recall happens outside the
manufacturing firm. In other words, the
defect is because of something that happened
at a supplier or retailer, or some other entity
other than the manufacturer.
Stability relates to the permanence of the
Folkes, 1984
cause of the defect. A stable defect is one
that a consumer could reasonably expect to
occur again in the future. An unstable defect
is one that the consumer can reasonably
expect will not occur again in the future.
Stability is operationalized by providing
(unstable) or withholding (stable) a
corrective action in the recall announcement.
A controllable defect is one in which the
Folkes, 1984; Folkes
supplier or manufacturer has volitional
1988; Dawar & Klein,
control over the circumstances that allowed
2006
the defect to happen or to pass on to the
consumer. An uncontrollable defect is one
in which the manufacturer or supplier does
not have volitional control over the
circumstances which cause the defect to
happen or pass on to the consumer.
Purchase dissatisfaction occurs when a
Oliver, 1993; Oliver &
consumer's expectations about a product's
DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver
performance are not met.
& Swan, 1989;
Westbrook & Oliver,
1991
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Construct
Repurchase
Intent

Definition
Repurchase Intent is an individual's intent
regarding purchasing a product that they
have already purchased at some time in the
past. In other words, the individual has
experience with buying and using the
product, and Repurchase Intent has to do
with whether they would buy it again.

Citations
Siomokos & Kurzbad,
1994

Recall
Satisfaction

The degree to which a consumer’s
expectations regarding the handling of a
product recall are met by the firm
announcing the recall
The degree to which the consumer holds the
supplier (supplier responsibility) or the firm
conducting the recall (manufacturer
responsibility) responsible for the recall
event.
The degree to which the consumer believe
that the supplier and the firm conducting the
recall share responsibility for the recall
event.

Jolly & Mowen, 1985;
Laufer, 2002; Mowen,
Jolly & Nickell, 1981

Recall
Responsibility

Shared
Responsibility
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Laufer, 2002; Laufer et
al, 2005

Supplementary Sample Descriptives
Table 3A.2 Treatment Assignment
Scenarios
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Scenario 1 - Text 1

45

25.0

25.0

25.0

Scenario 2 - Text 1

41

22.8

22.8

47.8

Scenario 3 - Text 1

50

27.8

27.8

75.6

Scenario 4 - Text 1

44

24.4

24.4

100.0

180

100.0

100.0

Total

Table 3A.3 Demographics - Gender
What is your gender?
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Female

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

63

35.0

35.0

35.0

Male

117

65.0

65.0

100.0

Total

180

100.0

100.0
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Table 3A.4 Demographics – Age
Which category below includes your age?
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

20 or younger

12

6.7

6.7

6.7

21-29

98

54.4

54.4

61.1

30-39

39

21.7

21.7

82.8

40-49

18

10.0

10.0

92.8

50-59

9

5.0

5.0

97.8

60-69

4

2.2

2.2

100.0

180

100.0

100.0

Total

Table 3A.5 Demographics - Education
What is your highest level of education completed?
Please mark the most appropriate choice.
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

High School

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

5

2.8

2.8

2.8

Some College

79

43.9

43.9

46.7

Bachelor’s Degree

27

15.0

15.0

61.7

Some Graduate School

40

22.2

22.2

83.9

Master’s Degree

22

12.2

12.2

96.1

7

3.9

3.9

100.0

180

100.0

100.0

Doctorate
Total
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Preliminary Vignette Exercise
The following four in-class “exercises” were distributed to a MBA class at Clemson
University. Two scenarios deal with food recalls and two deal with pharmaceutical
recalls. Approximately 15 minutes were allowed for responses. Fifteen responses were
collected; the responses were evaluated qualitatively to determine if the scenarios had
face validity and were used as the basis for developing the scenarios for the sorting
exercise. Although vignettes dealing with pharmaceutical products were included in this
exercise, the pilot study reported here deals with a single food product.
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Food 1
Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong
answers.
On your way home from work, you do some grocery shopping at a local store. One of the items you
purchase is a box of individually wrapped nutrition bars. After arriving home, you check your email and a
news headline related to a product recall catches your eye. You click on the headline and are redirected to
the following press release:
Nutramill Announces Nationwide Voluntary Nutrition Bar Recall
Contact: Consumer - 555-310-1479
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Nutramill has initiated a voluntary recall of
all Nutramill Nutrition Bars manufactured using wheat flour imported from Zhou Ying Development
Co. Ltd., because they have the potential to be contaminated with Salmonella, an organism which
can cause serious and sometimes fatal infections in young children, frail or elderly people, and
others with weakened immune systems. Healthy persons infected with Salmonella often experience
fever, diarrhea (which may be bloody), nausea, vomiting and abdominal pain. In rare
circumstances, infection with Salmonella can result in the organism getting into the bloodstream
and producing more severe illnesses such as arterial infections (i.e., infected aneurysms),
endocarditis and arthritis.
Twenty-one illnesses have been reported to date in connection with this product.
The Nutramill Nutrition Bars are sold individually and in boxes of six individually wrapped bars at
retailers nationwide. The batch numbers, located on the outside wrapper of each bar, included in
the recall are 20061006, 20061027, 20061101, 20061108, 20061122, 20061126, 20061201,
20061202, 20061203, and 20061204. Each batch was manufactured using wheat flour supplied by
Zhou Ying Development Co. Ltd. The supplier’s certificate of analysis information indicated that
testing for salmonella was negative.
On February 26th, the FDA announced they had found salmonella in samples of the Nutramill
Nutrition Bars.
Nutramill is extremely concerned about the quality and safety of all of its products. The company is
particularly troubled that the certificates of analysis provided by the above-named supplier did not
report the presence of salmonella.
Nutramill wants to ensure its products are safe. Consequently, in addition to its ongoing
cooperation with the FDA, Nutramill will be conducting its own independent, analytical tests of
wheat flour from all of its suppliers.
After reading the press release you check the label of the nutrition bars you have just purchased and find
that it is Nutramills brand packaged in a box of six individually wrapped bars. The lot number in the press
release matches that listed on the box.
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Food 2
Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong
answers.
On your way home from work, you do some grocery shopping at a local store. One of the items you
purchase is a box of individually wrapped nutrition bars. After arriving home, you check your email and a
news headline related to a product recall catches your eye. You click on the headline and are redirected to
the following press release:
Nutramill Announces Nationwide Voluntary Nutrition Bar Recall
Contact: Consumer - 555-310-1479
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Nutramill has initiated a voluntary recall of
all Nutramill Nutrition Bars because they have the potential to be contaminated with Salmonella,
an organism which can cause serious and sometimes fatal infections in young children, frail or
elderly people, and others with weakened immune systems. Healthy persons infected with
Salmonella often experience fever, diarrhea (which may be bloody), nausea, vomiting and
abdominal pain. In rare circumstances, infection with Salmonella can result in the organism
getting into the bloodstream and producing more severe illnesses such as arterial infections (i.e.,
infected aneurysms), endocarditis and arthritis.
Twenty-one illnesses have been reported to date in connection with this product.
The Nutramill Nutrition Bars are sold individually and in boxes of six individually wrapped bars at
retailers nationwide. The batch numbers, located on the outside wrapper of each bar, included in
the recall are 20061006, 20061027, 20061101, 20061108, 20061122, 20061126, 20061201,
20061202, 20061203, and 20061204.
On February 26th, the FDA announced they had found salmonella in samples of Nutramill Nutrition
Bars.
Nutramill is extremely concerned about the quality and safety of all of its products. Nutramill wants
to ensure its products are safe. Consequently, in addition to its ongoing cooperation with the FDA,
Nutramill will be conducting its own independent, analytical tests of finished products prior to
distribution.
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Questions for Food 1 & 2
Please answer the following questions based on the scenario you just read. There
are no right or wrong answers.
1.

Whom do you hold responsible for the defect that has caused the recall of the nutrition bars?

2.

What, if any, additional information would you like to see in the press release?

3.

What will you do with the nutrition bars you have purchased?

4.

Whom do you hold responsible for the safety of the nutrition bars?

5.

If this were a real situation, how much would this recall influence your future purchase decisions
regarding nutrition bars? (Circle one)

6.

a.

NEGATIVE influence – less likely to purchase this brand again

b.

NO INFLUENCE on future purchases one way or the other

c.

POSITIVE influence – more likely to purchase this brand again

How do you feel about the way Nutramill has handled the recall? Why?
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Pharma 1
Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong
answers.
On your way home from work, you decide to stop by a local pharmacy to buy cough and cold medicine.
You have been feeling a cold coming on for the past few days and want to get relief from the symptoms.
After arriving home, you check your email and a news headline related to a product recall catches your eye.
You click on the headline and are redirected to the following press release:
Sierra Pharmaceuticals Initiates a Nationwide Voluntary Recall of Sierra Cough & Cold
12-Hour Relief Syrup, Lot Number 3J6274B
Contact: Consumer - 555-233-8536
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Sierra Pharmaceuticals Inc. has initiated a
voluntary recall of one lot of 4 ounce bottles of Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup, after
being notified by its supplier, Stillwater Laboratories, that a manufacturing error had affected the
product. Due to this manufacturing error, acetaminophen, an active ingredient in the cough and
cold syrup, may be present in quantities greater than what is specified on the product label. Bottles
of the cough and cold syrup are sold to consumers via pharmacies and other retail outlets. The lot
number affected in the U.S. is 3J6274B with an expiry date of September 30, 2012. The lot number
appears on the bottom of the bottle.
Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief is used to treat the symptoms of the cold virus. A decrease of
active ingredient could reduce the efficacy of the syrup. An increase in the active ingredient could
result in over dosage of acetaminophen which may result in liver toxicity, kidney damage, and blood
disorders.
Twenty-one incidents of acetaminophen over dosage have been reported in connection to this
product.
Patients who may have the affected syrup should discard the product or return it to the retailer for a
full refund.
Sierra Pharmaceuticals is committed to ensuring patient safety and is working to resolve this issue
quickly and appropriately. The company has notified the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and will issue recall communications to all distributors and retail outlets involved.
Any adverse reactions may be reported to the FDA's MedWatch Program by fax at 1-800-FDA0178, by mail at MedWatch, HF-2, FDA, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20852-9787, or on the
MedWatch website at www.fda.gov1.
After reading the press release you check the label of the cough and cold medicine you have just purchased
and find that it is Sierra Pharmaceuticals brand Cough and Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup, in a 4 ounce
container. The lot number in the press release matches that listed on the bottle.
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Pharma 2
Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong
answers.
On your way home from work, you decide to stop by a local pharmacy to buy cough and cold medicine.
You have been feeling a cold coming on for the past few days and want to get relief from the symptoms.
After arriving home, you check your email and a news headline related to a product recall catches your eye.
You click on the headline and are redirected to the following press release:
Sierra Pharmaceuticals Initiates a Nationwide Voluntary Recall of Sierra Cough & Cold
12-Hour Relief Syrup, Lot Number 3J6274B
Contact: Consumer - 555-233-8536
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Sierra Pharmaceuticals Inc. has initiated a
voluntary recall of one lot of 4 ounce bottles of Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup. Bottles
of the cough and cold syrup are sold to consumers via pharmacies and other retail outlets. The lot
number affected in the U.S. is 3J6274B with an expiry date of September 30, 2012. The lot number
appears on the bottom of the bottle. The recall is being conducted after testing indicated that
acetaminophen, an active ingredient in the cough and cold syrup, may be present in quantities
greater than what is specified on the product label.
Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief is used to treat the symptoms of the cold virus. A decrease of
active ingredient could reduce the efficacy of the syrup. An increase in the active ingredient could
result in over dosage of acetaminophen which may result in liver toxicity, kidney damage, and blood
disorders.
Twenty-one incidents of acetaminophen over dosage have been reported in connection to this
product.
Patients who may have the affected syrup should discard the product or return it to the retailer for a
full refund.
Sierra Pharmaceuticals is committed to ensuring patient safety and is working to resolve this issue
quickly and appropriately. The company has notified the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and will issue recall communications to all distributors and retail outlets involved.
Any adverse reactions may be reported to the FDA's MedWatch Program by fax at 1-800-FDA0178, by mail at MedWatch, HF-2, FDA, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20852-9787, or on the
MedWatch website at www.fda.gov1.
After reading the press release you check the label of the cough and cold medicine you have just purchased
and find that it is Sierra Pharmaceuticals brand Cough and Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup, in a 4 ounce
container. The lot number in the press release matches that listed on the bottle.
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Questions for Pharma 1 & 2
Please answer the following questions based on the scenario you just read. There
are no right or wrong answers.
1.

Whom do you hold responsible for the defect that has caused the recall of the cough and cold
syrup?

2.

What, if any, additional information would you like to see in the press release?

3.

What will you do with the cough and cold syrup you have purchased?

4.

Whom do you hold responsible for the safety of the cough and cold syrup?

5.

If this were a real situation, how much would this recall influence your future purchase decision
regarding cough and cold syrup?
(Circle one)

6.

a.

NEGATIVE influence – less likely to purchase this brand again

b.

NO INFLUENCE on future purchases one way or the other

c.

POSITIVE influence – more likely to purchase this brand again

How do you feel about the way Sierra Pharmaceuticals has handled the recall? Why?

218

Vignette Exercise Findings
General in-class feedback indicated that the vignettes, which were patterned after the
format dictated by FDA guidance for product recalls, and the situation described were
considered by the subjects to be realistic. As expected, the reactions to the scenario
indicated a negative influence or no influence on repurchase intent (of 15 responses, 10
indicated a negative influence, 5 indicated no influence), which seemed to be related to
the degree of satisfaction the subject felt with respect to the content and tone of the recall
announcement.
The use of the word “voluntary” in the recall announcement, which is typical for
FDA-regulated product recalls which are typically not legal enforcement actions,
triggered, for some respondents, a positive feeling towards the recalling firm. Noting
this, we determined that we would exclude the use of the word “voluntary” from the final
experimental scenarios to remove the potential for a spurious attribution of responsible
action on the part of the recalling firm. Since, in our investigation of FDA-regulated
recalls over the period of 2008-2010 we found no more than a handful of recall
announcements which were involuntary, and carried out by the FDA (among over a
thousand voluntary recalls) we believe this departure from realism to be justified in the
interests of maintaining internal validity of the experiment.
Interestingly, even in the manipulations where the recalling firm attributed the failure
to a supplier’s actions, the respondents indicated that they held the recalling firm
primarily responsible for the product’s safety. In some cases, respondents indicated that
they consider governmental agencies, such as the FDA to be secondarily responsible for
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product safety. We considered this to provide an intriguing clue to the way consumers
may respond when firm’s attempt to deflect blame for a defect on to their suppliers.
A number of respondents indicated that they would like to have more information
from the recalling firm, including the root cause of the defect, corrective action for the
defect, symptoms of illness, and more information about what to do if the product had
been recently consumed.
Vignette Pre-Test
The following food product recall scenario was administered to a group of
undergraduate management students at Clemson University. Students received extra
credit for completing the exercise. The exercise was administered online; 17 responses
were collected. The purpose of this pilot was to ensure face validity, readability, confirm
the amount of time the exercise required, and to test participant comprehension of the
manipulation. Results from this pilot were used, including feedback from participants, to
design the experimental vignettes for the pilot study reported in this dissertation.
In general, comprehension was excellent. One clearly inconsistent statement was
made regarding the circumstances described in the announcement; results of this item
were unambiguously negative.

Response to manipulations of locus (external),

controllability (controllable), and corrective action (unstable – corrective action provided)
were consistent with the information presented. Results of items related to perceived risk
were relatively high, consistent with the product failure scenario provided. Repurchase
intent, recall satisfaction, and responsibility were directionally consistent with our
expectations based on the cues provided. One item – dealing with whether or not the
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product was expired at the time of the recall announcement (it was not) appeared to be
confusing to participants.
Participants estimated that the exercise took between 10 and 20 minutes on average.
Free text comments regarding clarity ranged from “the entire survey was easy to
understand” to a few comments explaining that blame was perceived to be shared by the
buyer and supplier in this scenario.
The text of the pre-test vignette is provided below. Table 4b.1 below summarizes the
results of the participant responses.
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On your way home from work you do some grocery shopping at a local store. One of the items
you purchase is a frozen cheese pizza. After arriving home, you check you email and a news
headline related to a product recall catches you eye. You click on the headline and are redirected
to the following press release:
Chef Milo Announces Nationwide Recall of Frozen Cheese Pizza
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: April 9, 2012 – Chef Milo Corporation has initiated a
recall of all frozen cheese pizza manufactured using flour imported from Zhou Ying
Development Co., Ltd, because they have the potential to be contaminated with
Salmonella, an organism which can cause serious and sometimes fatal infections in young
children, frail, or elderly people, and others with weakened immune systems. Healthy
persons infected with Salmonella often experience fever, diarrhea (which may be bloody),
nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. In rare circumstances, infection with Salmonella
can result in the organism getting into the bloodstream and producing more severe
illnesses such as arterial infections (i.e., infected aneurysms), endocarditis and arthritis.
One hundred and twenty-one illnesses have been reported to date in connection with this
product.
The Chef Milo frozen cheese pizzas are sold individually nationwide. The batch numbers,
located on the outside packaging of each pizza, included in the recall are 20061006 with
an expiration date of September 30, 2012. Each batch was manufactured using flour
supplied by Zhou Ying Development Co., Ltd. The supplier’s certificate of analysis
information indicated that testing for salmonella was negative.
On April 8th, the FDA announced they had found salmonella in samples of frozen pizzas
collected during a routine inspection. Subsequent investigation revealed that the source of
contamination was the flour supplied by Zhou Ying Development Co., Ltd.
Chef Milo is extremely concerned about the quality and safety of all of its products. The
company is particularly troubled that the certificates of analysis provided by the abovenamed supplier did not report the presence of salmonella.
Consumers who have the affected pizzas should discard the product or return it to the
retailer for a full refund.
Chef Milo wants to ensure its products are safe. Consequently, in addition to its ongoing
cooperation with the FDA, Chef Milo will be conducting its own independent, analytical
tests of flour from all of its suppliers.
After reading the press release you check the label of the frozen pizza you have just purchased
and find that it is a Chef Milo brand frozen cheese pizza. The batch number in the press release
matches that listed on the box.
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Table 3B.1 Vignette Pre-Test Items, Means, Standard Deviations
and Interpretation of Results1
Item
Mean Std Dev
Interpretation
Salmonella can cause a variety
1.29
.59
Salmonella warning appears to be
of health problems, some of
taken seriously.
them very serious.
The product was recalled
4.19
.83
Comprehension good – this is not
because the manufacturer found
what was described in the
out that the distributor's
announcement.
refrigeration failed, causing
bacteria to grow and the product
to spoil.
I blame the Chef Milo
3.24
.75
Consistent with external locus.
Corporation for this recall.
I could get sick from consuming
1.35
.61
Perceived risk – high, consistent
food that has quality issues.
with product failure & hazard
warnings.
This product recall could have
1.82
.64
Consistent with supplier
been prevented by Zhou Ying
involvement & controllability.
Development Co. Ltd.
I feel like this product could be
1.53
.72
Perceived risk – high, consistent
hazardous.
with product failure & hazard
warnings.
The Chef Milo Corporation
3.12
1.65
Confusion regarding expiration
recalled this product prior to its
and date of recall.
stated expiration date.
I blame the supplier of the flour
1.76
.66
Consistent with supplier
for this recall.
involvement & controllability.
I would probably eat this pizza
4.47
.87
Perceived risk – high, consistent
anyway.
with product failure & hazard
warnings.
In general, I'm worried about the 2.13
.96
Perceived risk – high, consistent
quality of the food supply.
with product failure & hazard
warnings.
A number of people got sick
2.67
1.3
Consistent with announcement
because of this problem.
and ambiguous wording of item.
I believe that the responsibility
2.18
1.07
Consistent with supplier
for this problem is shared by
involvement & controllability
Chef Milo and their supplier.
I would definitely think twice
2.00
.71
Repurchase intent – consistent
before buying a Chef Milo
with product failure
product in the future.
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Item
Mean Std Dev
Interpretation
I believe that the Chef Milo
2.6
.74
Consistent with free text
Corporation could have done
statements – that Chef Milo
more to prevent this problem.
should have done more testing.
This product recall could have
2.38
.81
been prevented by the Chef Milo
Corporation.
Based on this recall I would be
2.18
.81
Repurchase intent – consistent
less likely to purchase Chef Milo
with product failure
brands in the future.
This particular problem is
2.89
.88
Consistent with announcement &
unlikely to happen again in the
corrective action.
future.
I feel like it is more likely than
3.53
.87
Perceived risk does not appear to
ever that the food I buy might
extend across all food products.
have something wrong with it.
Now that I know the frozen
2.24
1.48
Perceived risk – high, consistent
pizza was recalled, I feel like
with product failure & hazard
eating it might be unsafe.
warnings.
This product recall was triggered 2.41
1.46
Consistent with announcement.
by testing conducted by the
FDA.
The Chef Milo Corporation
2.06
.67
Recall satisfaction - consistent
seems to have handled this
with corrective action, supportive
problem responsibly.
statements of concern.
Please estimate how much time
4.24
.56
Between 10 and 20 minutes on
you think reading & completing
average.
this survey has taken you.
If you have any comments about
NA
NA
the wording of the scenario or
questions, or if you find any of
the questions or information
provided confusing, please note
it below.
Note 1: All scales are 1 to 5 agreement 1= Very strongly agree and 5= Very strongly
disagree except for time estimate, which is a 5 point scale anchored by “>40 minutes”
and “<10 minutes”, in 10 minute increments and the open-ended question for comments
and clarifications which was presented at the bottom of each survey page.
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Item Sorting
Q-sort exercises were conducted in undergraduate management classes at Clemson
University. Students received extra credit for completing the sorting exercise. The
exercise was administered online. To minimize the length of the sorting exercise, items
were broken up into three sorting groups. Some of the sorted constructs were not
included in the final design and ultimately several constructs were added. In order to
detect unusable or inattentive responses, the sorts included unrelated items which would
necessarily be correctly classified as “Not Applicable”. These items included unrelated
phrases such as “I would like to live off campus” and “Clemson colors are purple and
orange”. Responses which did not correctly classify these obviously unrelated items
were not used in the tentative item validation. See main text for details.
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Constructs

Internal Locus
(Manipulated
Factor)

External Locus
(Manipulated
Factor)

Purchase
Dissatisfaction
(Measurement
Scale)

Table 3B.2 Q-Sort Set 1 Items1
Items
The company recalled the product because they detected salmonella in
their finished goods.
The company recalled the product because they added the wrong
amount of an ingredient during manufacturing.
The company recalled a product after it was discovered that many
units had been sold to consumers even though the products had failed
internal quality testing.
The firm was unaware that a lightning strike had interrupted power
supply to the company's refrigeration units, causing products to be
exposed to higher temperatures.
When the company announced the product recall, it said that the defect
was due to contamination that occurred at a Chinese contract
manufacturer.
The company didn't know that their overseas supplier had substituted a
potentially harmful substance for the legitimate ingredient.
The company recalled this product because it found out that a supplier
had provided a counterfeit raw material.
The company recalled several products after it was informed by its
supplier that bacterial contamination might be present in a raw
material.
The product was recalled after the manufacturer found out that the
distributor's refrigeration failed, causing bacteria to grow and the
product to spoil.
When the company recalled this product, it announced that the defect
was due to a supplier error.
In the product recall announcement, the company said that its supplier
had falsified test results.
I feel dissatisfied with this purchase.
I am unsatisfied with how this product performs.
I am dissatisfied with my purchase of this product.

I will avoid purchasing this brand in the future.
I would be less likely to buy this company's products in the future.
Repurchase
I am less likely to purchase this brand in the future.
Intent
When a product (such as spinach or granola bars) is recalled, I tend to
(Measurement
not buy any brand of that product for a while.
Scale)
This product recall has decreased the chance that I would purchase this
product in the future.
Note 1 11 valid responses; 2 discarded due to inappropriate response to screening item.
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Table 3B.3 Q-Sort Set 2 Items
Constructs
Items
Unstable Cause – After conducting a product recall due to a counterfeit raw material
Corrective Action provided by a supplier, the company has announced that it will
Provided
conduct more frequent supplier audits and testing of raw materials.
(Manipulated
The company recalled a product because a supplier provided a
Factor)
contaminated ingredient. The company has stated that it has
instituted new testing policies as a result of this issue.
After the company recalled this product, it announced that it was
conducting a comprehensive investigation into the cause of the
defect.
Stable Cause – No The company recalled a product, stating that the defect was due to a
Corrective Action contaminated ingredient provided by a supplier.
(Manipulated
The firm indicated that the recall was due to contamination in its
Factor)
contract manufacturer's facility.
The company recalled all of its frozen pizza products due to
salmonella contamination. The cause of the contamination has not
yet been determined.
The company has recalled a product after testing revealed that it was
contaminated with salmonella.
Note 1 8 valid responses; 6 discarded to inappropriate response to screening items
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Table 3B.4 Q-Sort Set 3 Items
Sorted Items
The company recalled the product because they detected salmonella
in their finished goods.
If a company tests a product and finds out that it is unsafe, they are
responsible for making sure it is not distributed.
Controllable
The company recalled the product because they added the wrong
(Manipulated
amount of an ingredient during manufacturing.
Factor)
The company recalled a product after it was discovered that many
units had been sold to consumers even though the products had failed
internal quality testing.
In the product recall announcement, the company said that its
supplier had falsified test results.
The firm was unaware that a lightning strike had interrupted power
supply to the company's refrigeration units, causing products to be
exposed to higher temperatures.
When the company recalled this product, it announced that the defect
was due to a supplier error.
The product was recalled after the manufacturer found out that the
Uncontrollable
distributor's refrigeration failed, causing bacteria to grow and the
(Manipulated
product to spoil.
Factor)
The company didn't know that their overseas supplier had substituted
a potentially harmful substance for the legitimate ingredient.
The company recalled this product because it found out that a
supplier had provided a counterfeit raw material.
When the company announced the product recall, it said that the
defect was due to contamination that occurred at a Chinese contract
manufacturer.
The company recalled several products after it was informed by its
supplier that bacterial contamination might be present in a raw
material.
I feel like this product could be hazardous.
I will lose money if this product doesn't perform as expected.
I'm worried about the quality of the food supply.
Perceived
It's likely that I will be sick from food poisoning this year.
Purchase Risk
I could get sick from consuming food that has quality issues.
(Measurement
I feel like it is more likely than ever that the food I buy might have
Scale)
something wrong with it.
I feel less safe about consuming eggs after hearing about the latest
product recall.
Note 1 8 valid responses; 1 discarded due to inappropriate response to screening items.
Construct
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Table 3B.5 Item Placement Ratios for Controllable,
Uncontrollable and Purchase Risk
Actual Construct Classification
Theoretical Classification

Controllable

Uncontrollable

Purchase Risk

Total

% Hits

Controllable

32

16

2

40

80.00%

Uncontrollable

6

38

5

56

67.86%

Purchase Risk

0

4

49

56

87.50%

Total

38

58

56

152

78.29%

84.21%

65.52%

87.50%

Table 3B.6 Item Placement Ratios for Internal Locus, External
Locus, Repurchase Intent and Purchase Dissatisfaction
Actual Construct Classification
Theoretical Classification

Repurchase

Internal Locus

External
Locus

Purchase
Dissatisfaction

Repurchase

43

1

0

1

55

78.18%

Internal Locus

0

32

10

0

44

72.73%

External Locus

0

10

65

0

77

84.42%

Purchase Dissatisfaction

12

1

2

32

33

96.97%

209

82.30%

Total

55

44

77

33

78.18%

72.73%

84.42%

96.97%
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Total % Hits

Table 3B.7 Item Placement Ratios for Stable and Unstable
Actual Construct Classification
Theoretical Classification
Stable
Unstable

Stable
8
16

Unstable
11
21

Total
24
32

% Hits
33.33%
65.63%

Total

24
33.33%

32
34.38%

56

51.79%
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Table 3B.8 Final Measurement Items
Construct
Purchase Risk
(Pre-Test)

Summary Measure
PRAgg

Label
PR1
PR2
PR3
PR4

Purchase
Dissatisfaction

DissAgg

RSat3

I hold the supplier responsible for this
problem.

DIS3
RPurchaseAgg

RP1
RP2
RP3
RP4
RP51

Recall Satisfaction

RecallSatAgg

RSat1
RSat2

Supplier
Responsibility

Not applicable2

SuppRes

Manufacturer
Responsibility

Not applicable2

MfgRes

Shared
Responsibility

Not applicable2

1.

I'm concerned about food safety.
I'm worried about the quality of the food
I consume.
I could get sick from eating food that
has quality issues.
I feel like consuming frozen cheese
pizza could be hazardous.
I am unsatisfied with the quality of this
product.
I feel dissatisfied with my purchase of
this product.
This product did not meet my
expectations for quality.
This product recall has decreased the
chance that I would buy a Chef Milo
pizza in the future.
I would be less likely to purchase the
Chef Milo brand in the future.
I would buy a different brand of pizza
next time.
I would avoid purchasing the Chef Milo
brand in the future.
After this recall I would probably avoid
buying frozen pizza of any kind for a
while.
I feel satisfied with Chef Milo
Corporation's statements about quality.
I'm satisfied with how the Chef Milo
Corporation handled this product recall.
The Chef Milo Corporation seems to
have handled this problem responsibly.

DIS1
DIS2

Repurchase Intent

Measurement Item

I hold the Chef Milo Corporation
responsible for this problem.
I feel that responsibility for this problem
is shared by the Chef Milo Corporation
SharResp and their supplier.

RP5 was dropped based on measurement model results. 2. Responsibility measures are singleitems. All other items are the mean of items in the scale.
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Table 3B.9 Manipulation Check Items
Construct

Locus

Label

Item

Scale

CheckLocus1

The defect that caused this
recall happened at the
supplier facility.
The defect that caused this
recall happened at the Chef
Milo facility.
The salmonella contamination
in the pizza came from Chef
Milo’s processing equipment.
The salmonella contamination
in the pizza came from cheese
supplied by Robert’s Dairies,
Inc.
Chef Milo had control over
the circumstances which
caused this recall.

Disagree/Agree/
Don’t Know

CheckLocus2
CheckLocus3
CheckLocus4

CheckControl1
Controllability

CheckControl2

CheckControl3

The supplier detected
salmonella contamination in
the cheese prior to selling it to
Chef Milo.
The supplier had control over
the circumstances that caused
this recall.

Chef Milo detected
salmonella contamination in
the pizza before they
distributed it.
CheckStability1 Chef Milo described what
they are doing to prevent a
similar problem in the future.
CheckStability2 Chef Milo described what
will be done to reduce the risk
of the same defect happening
again.
CheckStability3 I feel like Chef Milo has
described what they are doing
to correct this problem so that
it doesn’t happen again.
CheckControl4

Stability
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7 point “Very
strongly disagree”
to “Very strongly
agree”
Disagree/Agree/
Don’t Know
7 point “Very
strongly disagree”
to “Very strongly
agree”
Disagree/Agree/
Don’t Know
7 point “Very
strongly disagree”
to “Very strongly
agree”

Covariate

Table 3B.10 Single-Item Covariates Measures
Item
Scale
Which category below
includes your age?
What is your gender?

7 point scale anchored by 20 or younger and
80 or older
Male or Female

Education

What is your highest
level of education?

7 point: Elementary/Middle School, High
School, Some College, Bachelor’s Degree,
Some Graduate School, Master’s Degree,
Doctorate

Recall
Awareness

I remember hearing about
at least one food recall
within the past year.
I believe that within the
past year I have become
ill from something I’ve
eaten.
Please indicate if you
have any work
experience in the
following areas:

7 point “Very strongly disagree” to “Very
strongly agree”

Age
Gender

Illness
Experience
Work
Experience

7 point “Very strongly disagree” to “Very
strongly agree”
Check all that apply: Food manufacturing,
Food service, and Healthcare
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